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Identifying the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism and 
Evaluating the McCallum Rule as a Monetary Policy  
Guideline for China 
 
by 
Shuzhang Sun 
 
Over the last thirty years there have been dramatic changes in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms in China. The People’s Bank of China (PBC) began 
functioning as the central bank in 1984 and since then monetary policy has been used 
to promote economic growth and control inflation rate. The PBC introduced the 
“credit growth quota system” in 1986, which was replaced by the window guidance 
system in January 1998. Meanwhile, financial markets (money market, bond market 
and stock market) have made significant progresses. During this transition, the 
intermediate and operating targets also switched to monetary aggregate (M2) and 
monetary supply respectively, with the adoption of a combination of monetary policy 
instruments. In this circumstance, China’s monetary policy transmission mechanisms 
have been one of the most studied topics.  
 
First, we test whether an effective interest rate channel exists currently in China using 
a standard VAR method, because it is the core channel of policy transmission in 
neoclassical economics and short-term interest rates have been used as the operating 
target by central banks in all developed economies and most of emerging markets. We 
test the effects of weighted average 7-day interbank money market interest rate and 7-
day repurchase rate on real output, general price level from 1996:Q1 to 2008:Q1 and 
find that changes in short-term interest rates could not impact on real output and 
general price level significantly as expected. However, an effective interest rate 
channel has not come into existence, though significant advancements in market-
based interest rate reform have been made during the past two decades.  
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Secondly, we identify bank lending channel in China based on quarterly data covering 
1997:Q1 to 2008:Q4. We construct a VECM model using commercial bank one-year 
lending rate, bank credit aggregate, required reserve ratio, inflation rate and real 
output.  The Johansen cointegration tests identified two cointegration relationships 
among them. To disentangle the forces between credit demand and credit supply, 
which drives the changes in credit aggregate, we impose joint restrictions on the two-
cointegration relationships simultaneously, and find that the PBC could affect the 
bank credit supply using required reserve ratio in the long-run equation. The 
corresponding loading matrix shows us that short-run disequilibria in the long-run 
relationship could be corrected through bank lending rate.  
 
Thirdly, we evaluate the possibility of taking McCallum rule as a monetary policy 
guideline for the PBC using quarterly data from 1994:Q1 to 2009:Q1. A medium-term 
or long-term policy rule could provide a stable framework, which reduce uncertainty 
and increase the credibility and transparency of current and future government 
policies, monetary policy effectiveness would be improved if the policymaker were to 
follow a rule. We use a counterfactual simulation method to evaluate the original 
McCallum rule and an improved McCallum rule. The results show that following the 
McCallum rule could reduce the root mean square error between nominal GDP target 
and simulated nominal GDP significantly. Then, we use the historical analysis method 
to confirm this result. When the actual value of monetary base deviates from the rule-
produced values dramatically, China’s economy encounters inflation or deflation 
problems. Therefore, this study argues for the McCallum rule as a policy guideline for 
China.  
 
Keywords:  Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism, Operating Target, Market-
based Interest rates, Bank Lending Channel, McCallum Rule 
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Monetary policy is not easy. Central bankers have multiple objectives and, over time, must 
confront a variety of economic circumstances. They know their actions have powerful 
effects on the economy, but the timing, magnitude, and channels of those effects are not 
fully understood.   
Monetary Policy: introduction 
Mankiw N. Greorgy, 1994 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. 1 Introduction 
 
The monetary transmission mechanism describes how policy-induced changes in the 
policy instrument (for example nominal money stock or the short-term nominal 
interest rate) affect policy goals (real output and price level). The monetary authorities 
must have an accurate assessment of their policy effect on the economy to conduct 
monetary policy successfully, and require an understanding of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Mishkin (1995), Kutter and Mosser (2002), and Ireland 
(2005) summarize the various monetary policy transmission channels through which 
monetary policy actions affect real variables. Much research (fox example, Boivin et 
al, 2010; BIS, 2008; Angeloni et al., 2003; and Taylor 1999A) has been conducted on 
the different monetary transmission mechanisms in different countries. This chapter 
provides a general description of the monetary policy transmission framework to help 
us understand this research on identifying China‟s monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. Section 2 describes some basic concepts of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. Section 3 produces monetary transmission channels and their basic 
principles as summarized by Kutter and Mosser (2002). Section 4 reports on the 
evolution of monetary policy transmission in China following its economic reform.  
Section 5 presents an overview of the current monetary policy framework in China. 
Section 6 states the role of credit in monetary policy transmission. Section 7 reviews 
the evolution of simple policy rules. The research objectives are then given in   
Section 8. 
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1.2  Definitions of Policy Instruments, Targets and Goals  
 
Goals are substantive objectives, the achievement of which increases the material 
well-being of the population (Bain and Howells, 2003). The choice made by 
governments among the goals of macroeconomic policy has historically varied over 
past decades among full employment, full-employment output (or a high output 
growth rate), a stable price level (or a low inflation rate) and a stable exchange rate 
(or a desirable balance of payment position) (Handa, 2009). Since the 1980s, primacy 
was given almost everywhere to the control of inflation on the assumption that a low 
rate of inflation was a necessary condition for the achievement of low unemployment 
and high rates of economic growth. To achieve this, the central bank needs policy 
instruments that include variables that the central bank can operate directly and 
determine their value independently of other variables in the system. Among the 
instruments available to the central bank are open market operations, the discount rate 
at which the central bank lends to commercial banks and other financial institutions, 
the reserve requirement ratios that determine the level of reserves banks must hold 
against their deposit liabilities, and the overnight loan rate. The first two determine 
the economy‟s monetary base. The third changes the monetary base multiplier, and 
the change in the overnight loan rate induces changes in various interest rates in the 
economy (Bain and Peter, 2003; Handa, 2009; Walsh, 2010).  
 
Between the goals and instruments of monetary policy lie layers of intervening 
variables: generally classified into operating targets and intermediate targets. An 
operating target variable is one which the central bank can directly or almost directly 
operate through the instruments at its disposal, typically the monetary base or a very 
short-term interest rate (usually an overnight interbank rate) (Handa, 2009). The 
policy instruments are manipulated to achieve a pre-specified value of an operating 
target. Intermediate target variables - monetary aggregates, short-term and long-term 
interest rates,  aggregate demand ( nominal national income) and inflation forecast - 
fall between operating targets and goals in the sequence of links that run from the 
policy instrument to real economic activities and inflation (Handa, 2009). Instruments, 
operating targets, intermediate targets and goals have been described in a sequence 
running from the instruments to goals. Policy design operates in the reverse fashion, 
from the goals of policy, to the values of the intermediate targets consistent with the 
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goals, to the values of the operating targets needed to achieve the intermediate targets, 
and finally to the instrument settings that yield the desired values of the operating 
targets (Tinbergen, 1956).  
 
Appropriate policy instruments, operating target, and intermediate target to fulfil 
government fixed policy goal(s) have three distinct features: (1) stable and predictable 
relationships between the ultimate goals, intermediate variables and operating targets; 
(2) achievable desired levels of the operating target through instruments at its disposal; 
and (3) predictable lags in these relationships and reasonable forecasts of the future 
course of the economy. Currently, two main operating targets – monetary aggregates 
and interest rates - are suggested for monetary policy. Two main goals of monetary 
policy are highlighted in recent literature: inflation rate (or price level) and output 
(Handa, 2009).  
 
However, when actually implementing a monetary policy analysis, it is common 
practice to ignore the reserve market behaviour and treat an operating target variable, 
such as the overnight interest rate or a reserve aggregate, as the policy instrument 
(Walsh, 2010).   
 
1.3  Monetary Transmission Mechanism  
 
We first reproduce the key assumptions of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism presented by Ireland (2005) before we turn to different monetary 
transmission mechanisms. Central bank liability includes both components of the 
monetary base: currency and bank reserves. Hence, the central bank controls the 
monetary base. Indeed, monetary policy action typically begins when the central bank 
changes the monetary base through an open market operation, purchasing other 
securities – most frequently, government bonds – to increase the monetary base and 
selling securities to decrease the monetary base.  
 
If these policy-induced movements in the monetary base are to have any impact 
beyond their immediate effects on the central bank‟s balance sheet, other agents must 
not be in a position to offset them exactly by changing the quantity or composition of 
their own liabilities. Thus, any theory or model of the monetary transmission 
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mechanism must assume that there exist no privately-issued securities that substitute 
perfectly for the components of the monetary base. This assumption holds if, for 
instance, legal restrictions prevent private agents from issuing liabilities having one or 
more characteristics of the currency and bank reserves.  
 
Both currency and bank reserves are nominally denominated, their quantities being 
measured in terms of the economy‟s unit of account. Hence, if policy-induced 
movements in the nominal monetary base are to have real effects, the nominal price 
must not be able to respond immediately to those movements in a way that leaves the 
real value of the monetary base unchanged. Thus, any theory or model of the 
monetary transmission mechanism must also assume that some friction in the 
economy works to prevent nominal prices from adjusting immediately and 
proportionally to at least some changes in the monetary base.  
 
Monetary transmission is a complex topic because there is not one but many channels 
through which the monetary policy operates as mentioned above. We reproduce 
Kutter and Mosser‟s (2002) summary of monetary policy transmission mechanisms to 
distinguish different channels. The process begins with the transmission of open 
market operations to market interest rates, either through the reserves market or 
through the supply and demand for money more broadly. From there, transmission 
may proceed through any of several channels.  
 
The interest rate channel is the primary mechanism at work in conventional 
macroeconomic models. The basic idea is that an increase in nominal interest rates 
translates into an increase in the real rate of interest and the user cost of capital, given 
some degree of price stickiness. These changes, in turn, lead to a postponement in 
consumption or a reduction in investment spending. This is the mechanism embodied 
in the conventional specification of the “IS” curve – whether of the “old Keynesian” 
(Hicks, 1937), or the forward-looking equations at the heart of the “New Keynesian” 
models (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999). 
Nevertheless, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) suggested that mechanisms (such as 
wealth channel, monetarist channel, exchange rate channel, etc.) other than the narrow 
interest rate channel may also be at work in the transmission of monetary policy.  
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One such alternative path is the wealth channel, built on the life-cycle model of 
consumption developed by Ando and Modigliani (1963), in which households‟ wealth 
is a key determinant of consumption spending. The connection to monetary policy 
comes via the link between interest rates and asset prices: a policy-induced interest 
rate increase reduces the value of long-lived assets (stocks, bonds, and real estate), 
shrinking households‟ resources and leading to a fall in consumption.  
 
The third channel is the broad credit channel developed by Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989). In this channel, asset prices are especially important since they determine the 
value of the collateral that firms and consumers may present when obtaining a loan. In 
the presence of information or agency costs, declining collateral values will increase 
the premium borrowers must pay for external finance, which in turn will reduce 
consumption and investment. The impact of policy-induced changes in interest rates 
may be magnified through this “financial accelerator” effect. 
 
The fourth channel is the bank lending channel, where banks play a more central role 
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). The essential insight is that, because the bank relies on 
reservable demand deposits as an important source of funds, contractionary monetary 
policy, by reducing the aggregate volume of bank reserves, will reduce the availability 
of bank loans. A significant subset of firms and households relies heavily or 
exclusively on bank financing, so a reduction in loan supply will depress aggregate 
spending.  
 
The exchange rate channel is an important element in conventional open-economy 
macroeconomic models (Mishkin, 1995, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). The chain of 
transmission is from interest rates to the exchange rate via the uncovered interest rate 
parity condition relating interest rate differentials to expected exchange rate 
movements. Thus, an increase in the domestic interest rate relative to foreign rates 
would lead to a stronger currency and a reduction both in net exports and in the 
overall level of aggregate demand.  
 
The final channel is described as a monetarist channel (Brunner and Meltzer, 1972, 
Meltzer, 1995) that focuses on the direct effect of changes in the relative quantities of 
assets, rather than interest rates. The argument is that because various assets are 
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imperfect substitutes in investors‟ portfolios, changes in the composition of 
outstanding assets brought about by monetary policy lead to relative price changes, 
which in turn can have real effects. Interest rates in this channel play no special role 
other than as one of many relative asset prices. These different monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms are illustrated in Figure 1.1 (Kutter and Mosser, 2002) 
                                                            
 
Figure 1.1 Channels of Monetary Policy Transmission 
 
            Source: Kutter and Mosser (2002) 
 
The most popular channel in the current monetary policy literature in industrial 
countries is the interest rate channel. Kasman (1992)，Morton and Wood (1993), 
Borio (1997, 2001), and Ho (2008) argued that central banks in the industrialized 
countries currently implement monetary policy through market-oriented instruments 
closely geared to influence short-term interest rates as operating targets.  Ho‟s (2008) 
research on emerging Asian countries confirmed a number of broad themes across 
central banks with respect to the main features of policy implementation: a focus on 
short-term money market interest rates as operating objectives, favouring averaging 
reserve requirements, using interest rate corridors with penalty rates, and searching 
for alternative instruments.   
 
In the past three decades, the credit channel also attracted considerable attention from 
economists and policymakers, built on breakthroughs in the economics of imperfect 
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information in the 1970s, which implies the failure of the Modigliani-Miller theorem
1
, 
following Bernanke and Blinder‟s (1988) presentation of their credit channel 
framework. Without necessarily denying that the interest rate channel of policy 
transmission plays an important role, the two channels can coexist and complement 
each other (Bernanke 1993; Kashyap and Stein 1994). The credit channel is often split 
into two sub-channels: the balance sheet channel (broad credit channel) and the bank 
lending channel (narrow credit channel). Central bankers have attached great 
importance to the role of bank credit in monetary transmission in developed and 
developing economies (Goodhart, 2007; Tucker, 2007; Bernanker, 2007; Bloor et al., 
2008).  
 
1.4 Evolution of China’s Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism after 
Economic Reform  
 
Following the 1978 economic reform, monetary policy in China moved away from 
administrative planned measures towards the use of indirect levers of monetary 
controls. The People‟s Bank of China (PBC) began functioning as the central bank in 
1984 and, since then, monetary policy has been used to balance the aggregates: 
economic growth and inflation rate. At the same time, direct controls on credit and 
cash were relied upon to curb inflation and to promote economic growth.  The central 
bank‟s branches were authorized to grant temporary credit up to a specified 
proportion of excess reserves. New policy instruments, such as reserve requirements, 
regulation of interest rates, rediscount facilities and open market operation played 
more and more important roles in monetary policy transmission. At same time, the 
fundraising pattern of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China changed dramatically 
from government capital injections to bank lending since the mid-1980s.  To bring the 
bank lending under control, the PBC introduced the “credit policy” framework in 
1986 called a “credit growth quota system”2. Lending by quota was a compulsory 
requirement for banks and based on central planning ideology (Ikeya, 2002). However, 
transition from direct monetary controls to indirect economic levers is not easy. 
Before 1990, even though a reserve requirement system existed, in practice a 
                                                 
1, According to Modigliani-Miller theorem, the capital structure of a firm has no influence on its investment 
decisions.  
2.  This monetary policy framework directly controls bank lending based on central planning. The PBC first 
decided a national quota of credit growth in line with the government‟s overall macroeconomic policy, allocating it 
to PBC branches in 31 provinces and major cities, which then distributed the quota to the local branches of 
commercial banks. 
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specialized bank could seek to have its lending targets adjusted retroactively so that 
the reserve ratio did not fully impose the intended restraints on lending. Similarly, the 
central bank does not appear to be able to influence the level of bank credit through a 
discount rate policy. Temporary credit borrowed from the central bank by specialized 
banks often ended up in capital investment by the ultimate enterprise borrowers. 
Interest rates did not seem to play a major role in either attracting savings deposits or 
rationing credit demand. This is because there is no real financial responsibility on the 
part of either the borrowers or local lenders. Specialized banks, as well as enterprises, 
are still not sensitive to economic levers due to their limited responsibility for profit 
and loss (Li, 1991). In addition, China lacked not only a body of effective, smoothly 
operating policy control instruments, but also a framework in which monetary policy 
could be conducted. The only tool at the time that had an effect on controlling the 
scale of credit to the specialized banks was the overall credit plan in which the central 
bank constrained the credit-expanding capability of the specialized banks. The 
“window guidance system”3 replaced the “credit growth quota system” in January 
1998.  Under this system, direct control by the PBC of bank lending is, in theory, 
against the new financial order stipulated in the Commercial Bank Law enacted in 
1995, which supports banks‟ independent decision-making based on the principle of 
self-responsibility (Ikeya, 2002).  
 
With the abolition of credit ceilings on January 1, 1998, and the expansion of open 
market operations, monetary policy operations also moved from direct credit control 
to indirect measures. During this transition, the intermediate and operational targets 
also switched to money supply and the monetary base with the adoption of a 
combination of monetary policy instruments, such as open market operations, reserve 
requirements, central bank discount, central bank lending and deposit interest rates. 
An indirect management system was set up to stabilize and promote economic growth 
and money supply as the intermediate target, through the use of multiple monetary 
policy instruments. At the same time, with the development of a money market, a 
“central bank →money market →financial institutions → enterprises (individuals)” 
transmission system was taking shape. In addition, advances had been made in 
                                                 
3. In light of window guidance, the PBC meets officers from commercial banks at set time intervals to check 
whether the operation of the banks is in line with the plan and, if necessary, to provide banks additional or adjusted 
guidance. Therefore, this system acts as a mechanism to control credit creation by banks and is a tool for PBC‟s 
monetary control. 
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developing an indirect transmission mechanism, using monetary policy instruments to 
influence operation target, and, in turn, to influence the intermediate target and 
eventually to achieve the final goal – price stability and economic growth (Yi, 2006).  
 
Currently, compared with developed countries and mature market economies, China‟s 
monetary policy has its own distinct features (Zhou, 2006). First, although the 
essential function of the central bank is to keep the value of its currency stable and 
maintain low inflation, the PBC has multiple objectives because it monitors inflation 
and keeps an eye on economic growth, the balance of payments and employment. In 
particular, it needs to promote financial reform. Secondly, the monetary aggregate 
remains an important component in the monetary policy, but the money supply 
indicator cannot be used in a rigid or dogmatic way to evaluate or measure their 
impacts on the overall economy and inflation. A combination of quantity and the price 
instrument are employed, including open market operations, required reserves, 
interest rates and the exchange rate. Thirdly, pressure for financial reform has a high 
priority. When financial institutions are in distress, stability of the currency becomes 
impossible. If the transmission mechanism is not smooth, it is difficult to implement 
monetary policies effectively that are theoretically appealing. Lastly, in promoting 
financial reform, PBC operates under the leadership of the State Council, and 
coordinates and cooperates with other government agencies. This outweighs the 
importance of a central bank‟s monetary policy independence.  
 
1.5  Monetary Targeting Regime and Its Problems in China 
 
The currently adopted monetary targeting regime in China has long been under debate. 
The theoretical foundation that supports the monetary targeting regime is the stability 
of money demand function. An effective monetary targeting framework requires a 
stable relationship between the monetary aggregate and output and price level. 
Otherwise, its value for predicting future money demand and for policy purposes is 
limited (Handa, 2009). Tobin (1958, 1969), Bruner (1968) and Friedman (1970) 
strongly held the view of stability of money demand function, but their viewpoints did 
not accord with the Keynesian view.  Much of that debate rests on the dispute over the 
speculative demand for money.   
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Friedman et al. (1970) who supported the viewpoint of stable money demand function, 
accepting the central idea of the Quantity Theory of Money. The simplified model 
based on the equation of exchange and assuming a constant transaction velocity of 
income provides important policy messages that change in an exogenous money 
supply produces proportional changes in the general level of prices and that money is 
neutral in relation to real income. The quantity of money that people wishes to hold 
(  is a stable fraction of total spending . Velocity changes only slowly and thus 
the effect of changes in  would be predictable changes in .This means the 
existence of a stable demand for money function. However, this was not true for 
Keynes who, in 1936, proposed a radically different theory of the demand for money 
based upon the motives for holding money: transaction demand, precautionary 
demand, speculative demand. The introduction of a speculative demand for money 
gives interest rates a much more important role and raises the possibility that the 
demand for money function might be unstable. According to Keynes, with an 
unchanged money supply, the demand for idle balance would increase and the income 
velocity of money would fall, causing a fall in nominal income. If individual-held 
views of normal interest rates were at all volatile, the speculative demand for money 
curve would be unstable (Bain and Howells, 2009).  
 
Hall and Papell (2005, pp. 385) presented the source of the instability of money 
demand function from another angle. They argued that the reserve ratio and the 
currency ratio were assumed fixed, so a central bank controlled the money supply as 
accurately as it wanted by controlling the monetary base. In practice, the reserve ratio 
and currency ratio are not constant, which makes the money supply difficult to control 
in the short run. 
 
According to Mishkin (2006), three related ideas, in the mid-1970s, are that 
expansionary monetary policy cannot produce higher output in the long run, that 
inflation is costly, and the advantages of a strong nominal anchor, all combined to 
help generate support for the ideas espoused by the monetarists that central banks 
needed to control the growth rate of monetary aggregates. Successful monetary 
aggregate targeting depends on one key assumption: there must be a strong and 
reliable relationship between the goal variable and the targeted aggregate. If there are 
large swings in velocity, so that the relationship between the monetary aggregate and 
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the goal variable is weak, then monetary aggregate targeting will not work. The weak 
relationship implies that hitting the target will not produce the desired outcome on the 
goal variable(s), thus the monetary aggregate will no longer provide an adequate 
signal about the central bank‟s policy stance. The breakdown of the relationship 
between monetary aggregates and goal variables, such as inflation and nominal 
income, occurs frequently.  
 
In practice, the monetary targeting regime was adopted by Britain, the USA and 
Canada for only a short period, starting in mid 1970s and fading in early 1980s when 
money demand became significantly more difficult to predict due to financial 
innovation (Goodhart, 1989; Friedman and Kuttner, 1996; Gomme, 1998). Only the 
Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank continued to formulate policy in terms of 
money growth rates, and money formed one of the pillars in the two-pillar strategy of 
the European Central Bank (Laubach and Posen, 1997; Beck and Wieland, 2007A, 
2007B; Lucas, 2007).  Currently, many central banks have shifted to using inflation 
itself as an intermediate target (Bernanke et al, 1999; Bernanke and Woodford, 2005).  
 
Many studies have examined China‟s monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
recent years, focusing on the effectiveness of intermediate targets under the monetary 
targeting regime that started in 1994. For example, Xia and Liao (2001), Yu (2001), 
Xie (2004), and Geiger (2006, 2008) argued that monetary aggregates (M1 and M2) 
are no longer suitable as intermediate targets because the estimated demand for 
money function is not stable. Thus, whether China‟s central bank could, like many 
industrial and emerging countries, switch to the short-term interest rate as its 
operating objective has attracted attention but is still being debated. In light of 
monetary theory, the precondition for adopting the short-term interest rate as an 
operating objective is the existence of an effective interest rate transmission 
mechanism in which a specific monetary framework and the operating objectives 
closely correlate to the final policy goal.  However, whether short-run interest rates 
are highly correlated with China‟s monetary policy goals – price stability and 
economic growth – remains ambiguous.  
 
Xie and Luo (2002) examined for the first time the relationship between short-term 
interest rates and inflation and real GDP in a Taylor rule framework, using the 
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interbank money market 7-days interest rate between 1992:Q1 and 2001:Q4 as the 
proxy for the policy operating objective. Their analysis showed that the rule produced 
value of the interest rate and the actual interest rate were very close and, when the 
difference between the two values got larger, the operation of the money policy 
lagged behind the economy development. However, the estimation of the response 
function showed that the short-term interest rate accommodates the inflation rate. 
Therefore, the short-term interest rate is not suitable as an operating objective for PBC.  
 
Xie and Yuan (2003) presented three characteristics of the institutional background of 
China‟s interest rate policy. The first is the interest rate control where the games 
among enterprises, state-owned commercial banks, fiscal departments and PBC 
determine the interest rate level. The fixed deposit and loan interest rates only reflect 
the PBC‟s expectation of future changes in the general price level but this expectation 
did not reflect the risk premium, depositors‟, borrowers‟ and enterprises‟ expectation 
of the future general price level, hence limited the efficacy of the interest rate policy. 
The second characteristic is that the interest rate structure is not reasonable for two 
reasons. One is the zero or even negative difference between the loan and deposit 
interest rates. Another is that the interest rate on required reserves is higher than or 
equal to the one-year official deposit interest rate and, sometimes, the interest rate on 
PBC‟s one-year loan (reloan rate) to commercial banks is higher or equal to the one-
year interest rate on commercial banks‟ loans to individuals (firms and personal loans) 
(see Table 1.1).  
 
The third is the frequent negative real interest rate (nominal interest rate minus 
inflation rate) as reported in Table 1.2. According to Xie and Yuan‟s (2003) research, 
the correlation coefficient was -0.976620 between the real one-year deposit interest 
rate and the retail price index. This indicates that adjustments in interest rates 
accommodate the inflation rate.  
 
Based on the response function, Xie and Yuan drew their conclusions: (1) the effect 
of changes in the interest rate on the inflation rate are far from the effects of changes 
in the inflation rate on the interest rate; (2) it is certain that increases in the interest 
rate could curb rises in inflation rate; and (3) the nominal interest rate has little ability 
to forecast output.  
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Table 1.1 Interest Rates on Required Reserve and Commercial Bank  
One-Year Deposit Rate and One-Year Loan Rate 
 
Interest rates on required reserves (IR) and commercial bank one-year deposits (ID) 
Period  IR ID Difference(IR-ID) 
15/05/1993-30/06/1993 7.56 7.56 0 
23/08/1996-22/10/1997 8.28 7.47 0.81 
23/10/1997-24/03/1998 7.56 5.67 1.89 
25/03/1998-30/06/1998 5.22 5.22 0 
Interest rates on PBC‟s one-year loans to commercial banks (IRL) and commercial bank 
one-year loans to individuals (IC) 
Period  IRL IC Difference 
01/05/1996-22/08/1996 10.98 10.98 0 
23/08/1996-22/10/1997 10.62 10.08 0.54 
23/10/1007-24/03/1998 9.36 8.64 0.72 
25/03/1998-30/06/1998 7.92 7.92 0 
       Source: Xie and Yuan (2003) 
 
.  
Table 1.2 Negative Real Interest Rate Periods 
Periods Band of negative interest rate 
01/1986 - 02/1986 -10% ~ 0 
05/1987 – 06/1988 -10% ~ 0 
07/1988 – 06/1989 <-10% 
07/1989 – 09/1989 -10% ~ 0 
01/1993 – 06/1994 -10% ~ 0 
07/1994 – 01/1995 <-10% 
02/1995 – 09/1995 -10% ~ 0 
                        Source: Xie and Yuan (2003) 
 
Recent research on China‟s interest rate policy showed that the interest rate has 
already played a role in monetary policy transmission in China. According to Song 
(2008), changes in the real interest rate have a strong effect on the wealth distribution; 
reducing the real interest rate will lead to an increase in consumption expenditure. Yi 
(2009) examined the relationship between the real interest rate and real GDP. The 
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author found that the one-year deposit real interest rate had a negative relationship 
with real GDP. After 1993, due to the reform in enterprises‟ and financial institutions‟ 
ownership and the relaxation in price control, the effectiveness of the interest rate 
policy has increased dramatically. The correlation coefficient between the real one-
year deposit interest rate and real GDP was -0.75 during 1993-2007, but -0.29 during 
1978-2007. In light of China‟s interest rate adjustments between 1978 and 2007, Yi 
(2009) stated that the business cycle in China, to a large extent, coincided with real 
interest rate fluctuations.  
 
1.6  Role of Credit in China’s Monetary Policy Transmission 
 
Another variable that has always played an important role in China‟s monetary policy 
is credit, even before the inception of the credit policy in 1986. Under the “credit 
growth quota system”, two types of credit rationing coexist in China: (1) potential 
borrowers are not able to obtain a loan irrespective of the interest rate they are willing 
to pay; (2) a loan of a given amount is offered at a specified interest rate with no 
possibility of obtaining a higher loan at a higher interest rate. This implies that those 
money markets are in disequilibrium with the demand for loans being greater than the 
supply from the financial institutions.  
 
Although the PBC abandoned the “credit growth quota system” in 1998, it still closely 
monitors the changes in credit aggregate in deciding on and implementing monetary 
policy and, over the past 10 years, published monthly data on the credit of financial 
institutions. When the money aggregate as an intermediate target was under question, 
Sheng and Wu (2008) proposed the adoption of the two-target money-and-credit 
framework put forward by Friedman (1981). In this framework, Friedman suggested 
using the credit aggregate as another intermediate target to complement the monetary 
aggregate as the intermediate target. Though this framework has never been publicly 
announced by any central bank, it cannot be denied that most central banks around the 
world pay attention to the role of credit in monetary policy making and 
implementation.  
 
Because of the important role played in Keynesian models by the level of credit, 
Keynesian economists have often argued that money policy may operate not only 
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through interest rate changes but also through changes in credit availability.  In theory, 
Bernanke (1993) defined the “broad credit creation process”. This process includes 
most of the value-added of the financial industry, including the information-gathering, 
screening, and monitoring activities required to make sound loans or investments. In 
addition, it includes much of the risk-sharing, maturity transformation, and liquidity 
provision services that attract savers and thus support basic lending and investment 
actions. This process also includes activities undertaken by potential borrowers to 
transmit information about themselves to lenders. The presumption of traditional 
macroeconomic analysis (typical IS-LM model) is that the credit creation process, 
through which funds are transferred from ultimate savers to borrowers, works 
reasonably well and therefore can usually be ignored.   Bernanke and Blinder‟s (1988) 
research on the correlations among credit, money and aggregate demand provided a 
theoretical analysis framework (IS-LM-CC) for the role of credit in monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. Since then, much research on the role of the credit channel 
in the monetary transmission mechanism concerning different countries has been 
conducted. However, in current dominant New Keynesian model, money and credit 
have essentially no constructive role to play in monetary policy (Woodford, 1998).  
 
Christiano et al. (2008)) described two examples that illustrate differently how money 
and credit may be useful in conducting monetary policy. The authors‟ first example 
showed that monitoring money and credit can help anchor private sector expectations 
about inflation. The second example showed that  monetary policy that focused too 
narrowly on inflation may inadvertently contribute to welfare-reducing boom-bust 
cycles in real and financial variables and, in this example, the authors showed that a 
policy of monetary tightening when credit growth is strong can attenuate this 
unintended effect of too-narrow inflation stabilization. Christiano et al. concluded that, 
as the models used for monetary policy analysis become realistic, money and credit 
will play a direct role in monetary policy.  
 
The eruption of the financial crisis in the summer of 2007 refocused attention on the 
channel of monetary policy that works through the supply of credit and overall capital 
market conditions (Adrian and Shin, 2009). In the light of the Adrian and Shin study, 
central banks liquidity facilities that attempted to counter the shrinking of 
intermediary balance sheets have become a key plank of policy, especially after short-
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term interest rates were pushed close to their zero lower bound. In the U.S., the 
Federal Reserve has put into place various lender-of-last resort programmes in order 
to cushion the strains on balance sheets and thereby target the unusually wide spreads 
in a variety of credit markets. While classic monetary policy targets a price (e.g., the 
federal funds rate), the liquidity facilities affect balance-sheet quantities. The balance-
sheet expansion of the Federal Reserve has refocused the monetary policy debate on 
the role of quantities in the monetary policy transmission mechanism.  
 
Compared with developed countries, credit/bank loans play a more important role in 
China. Handa (2009) classified the monetary transmission mechanisms into two 
categories: the direct transmission channel and the indirect transmission channel. In 
the direct transmission channel, increases in the money supply cause undesired money 
balances that are then directly spent on commodities. The mode of transmission of 
money supply increases, through interest rates and investment, to national expenditure 
and income increases are known as the indirect transmission channel. According to 
Handa (2009), in less-developed economies, a large informal financial sector and 
large, legally unaccounted funds enhance the significance of the lending and direct 
transmission channels, and reduce the significance of the indirect channel based on 
market interest rates.  
 
As we will discuss in Chapter 2, the financial sector in China has made much progress 
in past two decades but an effective yield curve has not been developed (Wu, 2008A). 
Under this circumstance, to examine the credit channel of monetary transmission 
mechanism appears to be more important than in developed countries. Research on 
the credit channel in China‟s monetary policy transmission has been conducted in 
recent years (see Wang and Wang, 2000; Jiang, Liu and Zhao, 2005). However, 
several important questions remain in the current literature. 
 
1.7  Following a Monetary Policy Rule: Commitment and Credibility 
 
The current consensus regarding monetary policy ultimate objectives is low inflation 
and stable growth of real output at full employment. However, the question about how 
a central bank fulfils its long-run monetary policy objectives, whether following a 
policy rule or with discretion has been debatable since Simons‟ seminal paper in 1936. 
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In light of Woodford‟s (2003) study, the rule about monetary policy could date back 
to Wicksell‟s (1898) work. Wicksell‟s original statement of the proposed rule was as 
follows: so long as prices remain unaltered, the banks’ rate of interest remains 
unaltered. If prices rise, the rate of interest is to be raised; and if prices fall, the rate 
of interest  is to be lowered; and the rate of interest is henceforth to be maintained at 
its new level until a further movement of prices calls for a further change in one 
direction or the other (Wicksell, 1898, p.189). Later, after studying the severe 
monetary mistakes of the Great Depression, Friedman (1959) proposed his constant 
growth rate rule with the aim of avoiding a repeat of those mistakes. Friedman‟s rule 
requires the central bank to set the rate of growth of money supply equal to the rate of 
growth of real income plus the desired rate of inflation. The typical modern-day 
simple policy rules include the Taylor Rule (1993) and McCallum Rule (1987). 
According to the Taylor Rule, central bank‟s operating target interest rate is set as a 
linear function of the current inflation rate and the current gap between real output 
and potential output. The McCallum Rule argues that a central bank would adjust the 
monetary base growth rate each month or quarter, increasing the rate if the nominal 
GDP is below its target path and vice versa.   
 
The literature in contemporary macroeconomics provides good reasons why monetary 
policy should be evaluated and conducted as a policy rule rather than as a one-time 
change in policy. First, the literature on time-inconsistency shows that without a 
commitment to a rule, policymakers will be tempted to choose a suboptimal inflation 
policy that will result in a higher average inflation rate and no lower unemployment 
than if a rule is followed in choosing a policy (see Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro 
and Gordon 1983, Woodford, 2003). Second, the credibility of the monetary policy 
appears to improve its performance; the effectiveness of the monetary policy depends 
on the public‟s expectations about a future policy as much as on the bank‟s actual 
actions, sticking to a policy rule increases the credibility about future policy action. 
The policy rules help market participants forecast future policy decisions and 
therefore reduce uncertainty. Policy rules increase accountability and potentially 
require policymakers to account for the difference between their actions and the rules 
(Taylor, 1998, Woodford, 2003). 
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The McCallum Rule is currently much less prominent than Taylor‟s Rule, primarily 
because central banks in industrial countries focus on the interest rate instead of the 
monetary base growth rate in designing their policy (McCallum, 2002A). The new 
Keynesian Taylor Rule reveals that a central bank follows an inflation target with 
short-term interest rate as its policy instrument, it ignores monetary aggregate 
(Cochrane, 2007). The McCallum Rule is a nominal income target rule with the 
monetary base as its policy instrument. A major advantage of the McCallum Rule 
over Taylor Rule is that it does not include unobservable variables such as the real 
interest rate and the output gap.  
 
Taylor does not deny that a monetary base or some other monetary aggregate can be a 
reasonable monetary instrument in emerging economies. In Taylor‟s early research 
(Taylor, 1979A) on policy rules, he used the money supply as the instrument but, 
since 1980s, he has found the interest rate to be a more practical instrument in policy 
rules for the U.S. and other G-7 countries. The reason he chose the interest rate as the 
policy instrument is that the countries he examined used the interest rate as their 
policy instrument. As Taylor (2000A) said “it is important to point out – especially in 
a discussion of emerging market economies – that the instrument in a policy rule 
could be the monetary base or some other monetary aggregate”. The choice of the 
policy instrument in a policy rule is essentially the same choice originally pointed out 
by Pool (1970). If there is too much uncertainty in measuring the real interest rate or 
if there are relatively big shocks to investment or net exports, then the monetary 
aggregate is the preferred instrument; the same is true if it is difficult to measure the 
equilibrium real interest rate. In contrast, if velocity shocks are big then the interest 
rate is the better instrument. Clearly, in emerging markets where the over-night 
nominal interest rate is not a very good guide, policy makers might want to give 
greater consideration to policy rules with monetary aggregates (Taylor, 2000A). Beck 
and Weiland (2008) also supported the importance of a monetary base variable in 
policy-making. With regard to the feasibility of adopting monetary policy rules in 
emerging economies, Meltzer (1995) and Taylor (2000A) stated that policy rules are 
applicable to countries both with and without developed financial markets.  
 
One reason why monetary policy rules are useful for designing a monetary policy is 
that the expectations of future changes in the policy instruments affect financial 
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markets and thus the rest of economy. Expectations of future short-term interest rates 
can affect long-term interest rates immediately through the term structure of the 
interest rate. The rule itself affects these expectations. For this reason, a monetary 
policy rule is more important than any single change in the monetary policy 
instrument.  As for how policy makers in emerging markets without highly liquid 
longer maturity markets take advantage of the merit of the policy rule, Taylor (2000A) 
stated that the term structure is not the only place in the economy where expectations 
of the future matter. Even in situations where financial markets are not fully 
developed and there are few long-term securities, expectations of the future can affect 
movements in the exchange rate, the price of land, even wages. It is easier for the 
private sector to form expectations if the central bank is clear in its intentions through 
some kind of policy rule. According to Meltzer (1995), monetarists typically favour 
rules for monetary policy to reduce the costs of acquiring information. Monetary 
impulse have transitional effects on output and lasting effects on price even where 
commercial paper, long-term bonds and Treasury bills do not exist. One effect of a 
sustained increase in money growth is on the prices of durable assets. Land is the 
most durable asset, so monetarist analysis implies that land prices rise in anticipation 
of inflation. The public can purchase land most readily by buying houses, so the price 
of new and existing houses anticipates future inflation and disinflation.  
 
Money supply is still a dominant policy instrument under the monetary targeting 
regime in China; the McCallum Rule appears to be an appropriate choice for China‟s 
central bank. The possibility of following the McCallum Rule for China has been 
examined, but there are some problems with that research: the research method and 
misunderstanding of the McCallum Rule itself. These shortcomings will be discussed 
in Chapter 2.   
 
1.8  Research Objectives 
 
The general objective of this research is to identify the monetary transmission 
mechanism in China starting from the mid-1990s. We chose the mid-1990s as the 
starting point, because, under the planned economy, even after the establishment of 
the PBC in 1984, there was actually no monetary policy in China. Before the Law on 
the People’s Bank of China was promulgated in 1995, monetary and fiscal policies 
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were not clearly delineated. In the move from having no monetary policy to 
formulating and implementing such a policy, China carefully studied the theory and 
practice of monetary policy of developed economies. The PBC has been a learner in 
monetary policy decision making and conduct (Zhou, 2006). Specifically, we identify 
our research objectives as follows:  
 
Objective 1:  
Most of industrial economies and emerging markets choose the short-term interest 
rate as their policy operating objective. Whether China could switch to the short-term 
interest rate as its policy operating objective is worth examining after the interest rate 
system reform has made great progress in China. The precondition of taking short-
term interest rate as a policy instrument is that changes in short-term interest rates 
have significant impacts on the goal variables – price level, real output. In this 
research, using a standard VAR and based on the results of the impulse response 
function and variance decomposition, we examine the impacts of changes in typical 
short-term interest rates on general price level, real output and a financial variable – 
exchange rate. We can then identify the possibility of an effective interest rate channel.  
 
Objective 2:  
In the past 30 years, bank credits/loans have played a more important role in China 
than in the developed countries due to a relatively undeveloped capital market and 
will continue to be an important policy indicator for the PBC. Nevertheless, existing 
research has not clearly identified whether the PBC could effectively implement its 
monetary policies via controlling commercial banks‟ loan ability. This research will 
use modern econometric techniques to distinguish the loan demand and loan supply 
forces, to provide policy makers with a clear picture of the role of the bank lending 
channel in policy transmission.  
 
Objective 3: 
 A central bank policy rule could provide a clear and transparent guide to the conduct 
of monetary policy. The last 30 years have seen extensive research on simple 
instruments rules in different economies (see, for example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 
1998; McCallum, 1999; Taylor 1999A, Taylor and Williams, 2010).  Considering that 
money supply is still a policy instrument in China, we evaluate the possibility of 
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adopting the McCallum Rule as a policy guide for the PBC, in order to improve the 
PBC policy effectiveness.  
 
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the stylized facts of 
China‟s monetary policy instruments, intermediate targets and policy objectives since 
the 1990s, and look at the impacts of advances in financial markets, the development 
of financial institutions and the reform in exchange rate regime on China‟s monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. We then review the research on the credit channel, 
especially the bank-lending channel, in monetary policy transmission mechanism and 
the remaining problems in the research on the role of credit in monetary policy 
transmission in China. Finally, we review the principles of the McCallum Rule and 
some empirical studies of it in different countries. These reviews provide us with a 
good base for studying the role of short-term interest rates, credit and monetary policy 
in China‟s monetary policy transmission. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the integration properties of our data. We separately discuss in 
detail the selection of variables for research on the different monetary policy 
transmission channels and test the order of integration of our time series variables 
using both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) test and the 
Dickey-Fuller test with GLS detrending (Elliott et al. 1996).  
 
In Chapter 4, we discuss three different research methodologies – standard VAR 
(Sims, 1980A); Johansen Cointegration Procedure (Johansen 1991, 1995); and the 
Counterfactual Simulation method. The VAR method is appropriate for testing the 
shock of short-term interest rates on real macroeconomic variables. The Johansen 
Cointegration Procedure test and the identifying restrictions of linear equations 
technique will be used to disentangle the forces between bank credit demand and bank 
credit supply. The Counterfactual Simulation method will be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of adopting McCallum Rule as a monetary policy guideline in China. 
 
Chapter 5 reports the empirical results. In section 5.2, we show that the impact of 
changes in the short-term interest rate on price levels, real GDP and exchange rate by 
reporting results of the Granger causality test, impulse response function and the 
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variance decomposition. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 report the empirical results of the bank 
lending channel and the simulation results of the McCallum Rule and nominal GDP.  
 
Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings of this study and their policy implications 
and presents the conclusions and the limitations of the study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S MONETARY  
POLICY TRANSMISSION MECAHNISM 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a critical literature review of the three aspects of China‟s 
monetary policy transmission mechanism. Section 2.2 reviews China‟s monetary 
policy instruments, intermediate target and goals. Section 2.3 reviews research on the 
credit channel; with the review of McCallum Rule in Section 2.4. 
 
 
2.2 China’s Monetary Policy Instruments, Intermediate Target, Goals and 
the Stylized Fact  
 
The People‟s Bank of China (PBC) states that the aim of its monetary policies is to 
maintain stability in the value of the currency and thereby promote economic growth.  
Therefore, the PBC is committed to two objectives: price stability and economic 
growth.  The PBC claims to pursue currency stability as the sole target of its monetary 
policy but it is impossible to ignore the goal of economic growth given its decision 
process is not independent of the state council‟s directives.  
 
Since exchange rate unification in 1994, China has maintained a managed floating 
exchange rate regime, a de facto peg of the renminbi (RMB) to the U.S. dollar (USD), 
with different floating bandwidths during different periods.  A crawling peg regime 
from 1994 to 1996 followed a de facto peg of the RMB against the USD with a 
trading band of 0.4% (about RMB/USD 8.28). The trading band tightened to 0.01% 
around the parity of RMB/USD 8.277. Following an immediate appreciation of the 
RMB against the USD of around 2% on July 21, 2005, China‟s exchange rate regime 
switched to pegging to a basket of currencies with a fluctuation bandwidth of up to 
0.3% of the previous day‟s exchange rate (Anderson, 2005). On May 21, 2006, the 
daily floating band of the RMB against the USD trading price expanded to 0.5% 
(People‟s Bank of China, 2007). However, the RMB was pegged again more or less to 
a fixed rate against the U.S. dollar in July 2008 (McNally, 2010). Based on this 
account, one can conclude that another objective of China‟s monetary policy is to 
maintain the stability of exchange rate vis-a-vis the USD.  
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Concerns about the risks of financial sector reform have led to a gradual interest rates‟ 
liberalization that took place relatively late in the economic reform. The liberalization 
of the interest rates was announced on November 1993 at the Third Plenum of the 
Fourteenth Communist Party Central Committee (CPCC). The Party recognized that 
the central bank should promptly adjust the benchmark interest rates according to 
changes in market supply and demand. This allowed commercial banks to set their 
loan and deposit rates within a specific range. In 2002, the Sixteenth National 
Congress reiterated the need to advance interest rate reforms and optimize financial 
resource allocation. Furthermore, the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central 
Committee in 2003 argued the need to establish a robust mechanism for market-based 
interest rates and monetary policy actions consistent with the country‟s economic 
objectives (Bernard and Maino, 2007).  
 
During 1986-1993, China‟s monetary policy targeted currency in circulation and 
banks‟ loan portfolios.  In September 1994, the PBC defined and announced three 
levels of money supply indicators: M0, M1, and M2. In 1996, the PBC formally 
treated money supply as an intermediate target.  The elimination of credit ceilings in 
1998 left M2 (money supply) as the single major intermediate target.  The theoretical 
assumptions underlying China‟s monetary policy are that the objectives such as the 
GDP growth rate and the inflation rate correlate with the intermediate targets (money 
supply) that are firmly connected to the monetary base. Furthermore, the money 
multiplier is assumed to be stable, and the central bank can influence intermediate 
targets by adjusting policy instruments.  
 
Several researchers have devised classification schemes to describe the mechanism 
central banks have at their disposal for controlling financial activity. For example, 
Bernard (2004) noted that monetary policy instruments fall into two broad categories: 
rules-based instruments and monetary market operations. The first category refers to 
the regulatory power of the central bank, which includes liquidity asset ratio, reserve 
requirements, and standing facility.  The second category, market operations, is used 
at the discretion of the central bank. These include an interest rate linked to money 
market conditions and aims to influence the underlying demand and supply conditions 
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of the central bank. This includes open market–type operations, auction techniques, 
and fine–tuning operations (Bernard, 2004).  
 
Xie (2004) classified the PBC‟s 13 monetary policy instruments used between 1983-
2002 into four categories: (1) ratio instruments such as required reserve ratios; (2) 
interest rates, such as rediscount rates, central bank interest rates on reserve 
requirements, central bank lending rates, deposits and lending interest rates of 
financial institutions; (3) quantity instruments, such as central bank lending, open 
market operations (on treasury bonds and foreign exchange) and rediscounting; and (4) 
other instruments, such as central bank bills, central bank bonds, special deposits to 
the central bank, standing facilities and moral suasion.  
 
Geiger‟s (2006, 2008) classification of the PBC‟s monetary policy instruments is 
different from Xie‟s classification. Ginger identified two main categories of the 
PBC‟s instruments; price-based and quantity-based. Price-based instruments are 
indirect and incorporate the PBC lending and deposit rates, discount and rediscount 
rates, reserve requirements and open market operations (OMOs). Quantity based 
instruments are direct and include window guidance, direct PBC lending and capital 
control.  
 
Bernard and Maino (2007) summarized China‟s main monetary policy instruments as 
standing facilities, OMOs, reserve requirements, interest rate control, window 
guidance, and other administrative measures. “The PBC has developed a set of 
monetary instruments which conform to best practices and place the PBC in a 
relatively strong position to rely primarily on market-based instruments in the conduct 
of money policy. Open market operations in the form of issuance of the PBC‟s bills 
play an important role in the sterilization of excess liquidity and reserve requirements 
provide important support to OMOs” (Bernard and Maino, 2007, pp. 14). 
 
Based on Bernard‟s (2004) theoretical framework, we can conclude that the current 
choice of China‟s monetary policy is a mix of rules-based instruments and money 
market operations. In 1993, the PBC introduced the OMO into its monetary policy 
toolbox. Following the abolition of the credit rationing policy in 1998, OMOs became 
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the PBC‟s main monetary policy instrument.  The PBC benchmark lending rates, - 
rediscount rates, the interest rate on required reserves and excess reserves constitute 
an upper and a lower limit in money market interest rates. The central bank bill rates 
serve as a target rate in setting the money market interest rate, such as the federal fund 
rate in the U.S. (Xie, 2004; Wu, 2008A).  Automatic collateralized lending and the 
excess reserves facility constitute China‟s standing tools for monetary control. 
 
Xie (2004) investigated the relationship between the monetary aggregate (M1, M2) 
and the monetary base, from the first quarter of 1994 through to the fourth quarter of 
2002.  The results indicated that the impact of the monetary base on M1 is not strong, 
and the impact of the monetary base on M2 is even weaker.  Among the four different 
liquidity injecting channels, namely, the PBC‟s lending to financial institutions, 
foreign exchange purchase by the monetary authority, OMOs on treasury bonds, and 
the rediscount window, only the central bank lending Granger caused M1, and none 
Granger caused M2. Therefore, monetary aggregates are endogenously determined 
and have strong correlations with monetary policy.  
 
Xie (2004) also explored the dynamic relationships between monetary aggregates, 
economic growth and inflation rates using data from the first quarter of 1992 to the 
third quarter of 2002.  He argued that the money supply affects output and, in the 
short run, money is not neutral. Nevertheless, the impacts of money supply on output 
last no more than 11 quarters. Money is neutral in the long run and the impacts of 
money supply on output are not permanent. In both the short and long run, money 
supply and inflation correlate, where changes in the money supply have permanent 
effects on the inflation rate and the price level.  Geiger (2006, 2008) documented 
severe deviations of the targeted and the actual values from 1994 to 2006. 
 
Table 2.1 compares the targeted with the actual values of China‟s monetary 
aggregates, M1 and M2, from 1994 to 2006. The targeted and the actual values 
decreased only three times for M1, and four times for M2. Strong deviations of about 
4% occurred several times for both M1 and M2 raising doubts about the 
controllability of the monetary aggregates.  
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Table 2.1:  Targeted and Actual Values of PBC Monetary Aggregates 
 
Year  M1 growth (per cent) M2 growth (per cent) 
 Target  Actual  Target  Actual  
1994 21 26.2 24 34.5 
1995 21-23 16.8 23-25 29.5 
1996 18 18.9 25 25.3 
1997 18 16.5 23 17.3 
1998 17 11.9 16-18 15.3 
1999 14 17.7 14-15 14.7 
2000 15-17 16 14-15 14.7 
2001 13-14 12.7 15-16 14.4 
2002 13 16.8 13 16.8 
2003 16 18.7 16 19.6 
2004 17 13.6 17 14.6 
2005 15 11.8 15 17.6 
2006 14 17.5 14 16.9 
This table compares the targeted and the actual values of the China‟s monetary aggregates of the M1 
and M2 from 1994 to 2006 (Geiger, 2008). 
 
The systematic liberalization of interest rates involved the lifting of the restrictions on 
wholesale transactions followed by liberalization of the retail transactions. Interest 
rates on foreign currency deposits and lending were eliminated for local currency 
(Bernard and Maino, 2007).  The reform of market interest rates progressed steadily 
from 1996.  By the end of 1999, the interbank borrowing rates, discount rates for 
commercial paper, and repos and spot trading rates in the interbank bond market were 
fully liberalized.  The purchasers‟ bids determined the interest rates on policy 
financial bonds and treasury bonds (Xie, 2004). The PBC also adjusted the 
refinancing rate to a reference rate for the money market. 
  
Reform of retail banking operations involved first allowing banks to price counterpart 
risks of customers within a floating margin before fully liberalizing the lending and 
deposit rates (Mehan, Quintyn, Nordman, and Laurens, 1996).  The authorities 
reduced the number of administered interest rates, adjusted bank lending rates on 
industrial and commercial enterprises more frequently to reflect changes in the PBC 
benchmark rate, and allowed financial institutions to price their lending operations 
within a floating margin.  The discretionary bands on lending rates expanded in 1998 
(Xie, 2004).  In October 2004, the PBC removed the ceilings on lending rates and the 
floors on deposit rates. A floor for lending rates and a ceiling for deposit rates 
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protected the banks‟ intermediation margins. From 1996 to 2007, the PBC removed 
about 120 administered interest rates (Wu, 2008A).  
 
Both the depth and breadth of the money markets in China have improved 
significantly over the past decade.  Currently, China‟s money market comprises three 
sub-markets.  The first sub-market is the interbank money market. Originating in the 
1980s and modified in 1993, a reformed and unified national interbank market began 
operation in January 1996. Banks lent and borrowed funds among themselves for 
terms from overnight to four months. The amount of lending and borrowing is fixed 
in proportion to the balance of their deposits. In contrast, non-bank financial 
institutions lent and borrowed funds among themselves for a maximum of seven days 
and the trading volumes depend on the capital level. The seven-day loan rate is 
China‟s interbank offered rate (CHIBOR) (Xie, 2002).   
 
By the end of 2007, the number of market participants reached 717, fourteen times 
greater than when the markets began operation. As of November 28, the trading 
volume reached RMB13700 billion. The interbank market rules and regulations were 
enforced in August 2007. Green (2007a, 2007b) argued that the introduction of more 
market driven reference rates such as the Shanghai interbank offered rate (SHIBOR) 
for the onshore money market was a critical step in terms of improving China‟s 
money market.   
 
The second sub-market is the interbank bond market, which functions as a liquidity 
market. The China interbank bond market began operating in June 1997.  By the end 
of 2007, there were 7095 participants (The People‟s Bank of China Annual Report, 
2007).  Both the turnover and the liquidity of the interbank bond market have 
expanded significantly, with total turnover exceeding RMB100000 billion in 2008. 
The tradable stocks increased from RMB72.3 billion in 1997 to RMB9024 billion by 
June 2008 (China Monetary Policy Report, 2008).  It is currently the biggest bond 
market in China.   
 
China‟s interbank bond market currently has had three characteristics added since its 
initial development. First, the trading participants in the interbank bond market have 
been diversified by allowing non-banking financial institutions (such as funds 
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companies, securities companies and insurance companies) and other enterprises to 
trade in this market. Second, with Treasury bonds and PBC bills as the main trading 
products, the debts issued by policy banks and commercial banks, and commercial 
paper issued by the finance companies and other big corporations have increased 
significantly. Issuers of bonds in this market include the Ministry of Finance, the 
central bank, policy banks, commercial banks, non-banking financial institutions, and 
corporations. The central bank uses the term structure of bond yields and long-term 
interbank rates as reference rates to predict inflation trends. This also serves as an 
important basis for pricing other financial products in the market in China. 
 
Finally, the bond repo market, the third sub-market of the money market, is used for 
short-term borrowing. The turnover reached RMB51580 billion by the end of 
November 2008. Since 1997, the repo rate has been set by the market, with the most 
active contracts between one and seven days. The seven-day repo rate, in effect, 
became the bond market benchmark rate and it became the official reference indicator 
for the money market from October 12, 2004. Because commercial banks, securities 
companies and other financial institutions trade in this market, frequent changes in the 
repo rate reflect changes in the stock and money loan markets (ChinaNet). This 
market is less volatile and liquid than the CHIBOR and its successor SHIBOR. 
Compared with the interbank markets, repo markets are more active and the interest 
rates are more stable (Xie, 2002; Loretan and Wooldridge, 2008).   
 
The segmentation of the money markets is the result of regulations because the initial 
operations of the money markets led to disorder in the financial industry in the early 
1990s. Instead of using it as a means to manage reserves by commercial banks, it was 
abused by both financial and other nonfinancial institutions to obtain short-term funds 
to invest in securities and real estate (Xie, 2002; Bernard and Maino, 2007). In order 
to prevent bank funds being used to participate in the stock market, the PBC barred 
commercial banks from repo trading on the stock exchange. Beginning in 1997, 
commercial banks were allowed to carry out repo trading only on the interbank 
market, with the goal of building a firewall between the money and capital markets 
(Xie, 2002; Bernard and Maino, 2007). Short-term borrowing by securities companies 
in the interbank market led to contagion because changing conditions in the capital 
market had a direct impact on interbank markets. From 2000, securities companies, 
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funds management companies and other non-banking financial institutions were 
permitted to trade into the interbank markets under certain conditions.  However, the 
coexistence of the interbank bond market and the stock exchange bond market, and 
the limits on RMB interbank market activity for commercial banks funded in foreign 
currencies remained the source of market segmentation (Wu, 2005; Bernard and 
Maino, 2007).  
 
In 1994, China adopted a managed floating exchange rate regime against the USD, 
coupled with a move to partial convertibility on the current account (Zhang, 2001).  
Further, in December 1996, China adopted current account convertibility but 
maintained administrative controls on the capital account (Xie, 2004). Following the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, China implemented a fixed foreign exchange regime. This 
was in place until July 2005, when Chinese authorities announced a switch to a new 
exchange rate regime. The exchange rate was pegged to a basket of currencies with 
numerical weights unannounced (on 10 August, the PBC published the composition 
of the currency basket, which includes the U.S dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, Korean 
Won as well as the currencies of other countries such as Singapore, UK, Malaysia, 
Russia, Australia, Thailand and Canada). This allowed movement within any given 
day to increase flexibility (Frankle, 2009). However, some researchers argued that 
China‟s current foreign exchange policy was still “fixed” instead of “floating” (see 
McKinnon and Schnabl, 2006; Frankle and Wei, 2007; Prasad, 2007).  
 
Previous studies argued that, for one country, unfettered movement of international 
capital, independent monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate policy cannot coexist. 
In theory, capital controls can prevent large inflows (outflows) when domestic interest 
rates are higher (lower) than foreign rates. This allows the PBC to operate an 
independent monetary policy. In practice, it is difficult to maintain effective capital 
controls over time, particularly in an economy like China‟s that is not only open to 
international trade but trades across world extensively (Goldstein and Lardy, 2007; 
Wu, 2006). With a large current account surplus, the PBC faces the challenge of 
sterilizing the increase in the domestic money supply resulting from the large 
purchase of foreign exchange (i.e. the sale of domestic currency).  
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China‟s balance of payments has remained strong since 1996 and its global current 
account surplus has expanded substantially over the years. The current account 
surplus was $7.24 billion in 1996, rising to $68.7 billion (3.6% of GDP) in 2004, 
$160.8 billion (7.2% of GDP) in 2005 and $371.8 billion in 2007 (11.3% of GDP) 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2008; IMF Statistic Database, 2007; State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange). Since then, China‟s account surplus (in 
absolute terms) has been the largest of any country.  
 
The build-up of official holdings of foreign exchange reserves has accelerated since 
2005.  In the 12-months to June 2005 and June 2006, foreign exchange reserves rose 
by $240 billion and $230 billion, respectively (Goldstein and Lardy, 2008). In the 12 
months to June 2007, foreign exchange reserves rose by $391 million, about three-
fifths more than in the previous two 12-month periods. In the 12 months to June 2008, 
foreign exchange reserves rose by an astonishing $467 billion. At the end of 
September 2008, total foreign exchange reserves reached $1905.5 billion (People‟s 
Bank of China, 2008) (see Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2 Build-Up of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves in China 
Time  Volume  (million in US$) Ratio of GDP to FER (%) 
1996 7.24 1.06 
2004 68.7 3.6 
2005 160.8 7.2 
2008 371.8 11.3 
Period  Increased Volume (million in US$) 
06/2004-06/2005 240 
07/2005-06/2006 230 
07/2006-06/2007 391 
07/2007-06/2008 467 
           Source: IMF Statistic Database, National Bureau of Statistics, 2008,  State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange website 
 
Since the unification of China‟s exchange rate in 1994, except during the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, the RMB has been under pressure to appreciate. To maintain stability 
in the RMB, the PBC adopted several comprehensive measures. These included 
improving the foreign exchange purchase-and-sale system via foreign exchange 
designed banks, changing interest rate policy and shifting to OMOs (Xie, 2004).  
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Following 2000, the appreciation pressure was fuelled by expanding capital inflows 
and foreign trade surpluses. Thus, the PBC had more pressure to intervene in the 
market.  
 
Anderson (2004, 2005) and Green (2007a, 2007b) suggested that China can run an 
independent monetary policy under any foreign exchange regime and have little 
difficulty in retaining control of the growth of its domestic money supply. They 
argued that this can be absorbed with an effective capital control system and 
successful stabilization via the sale of central bank bills and an increase in the 
required reserve ratio for banks. In contrast, Goldstein and Lardy (2006), Lardy 
(2006), and Prasad, Rumbaugh & Wang (2005) argued that China‟s (quasi) fixed 
exchange rate has weakened the effectiveness of its monetary policy. They believed 
that the resulting policy mix has left China with an interest rate structure that is far 
from optimum. Since a low real interest rate contributes to an underlying excess 
demand for credit and rapid growth of lending from banks, low deposit interest rates 
have been a major contributing factor to the boom in the property market.  
 
2.3 Reviews on Credit Channel 
2.3.1 Interest Rate Channel and Credit Channel Theory 
 
There are two assets in the interest channel: money and bonds (which include 
government bills and bonds, commercial paper, corporate bonds, stocks, bank loans, 
consumer credit, etc.). Monetary non-neutrality arises if the movements in reserves 
affect real interest rates. In a monetary contraction, the central bank reduces reserves, 
limiting the banking system‟s ability to sell deposits. Depositors must then hold more 
bonds and less money in their portfolios. If prices do not instantaneously adjust to 
changes in the money supply, the fall in household money holdings represents a 
decline in real money balances. To restore equilibrium, the real interest rate on bonds 
increases, increasing the user cost of capital for a range of planned investment 
activities and interest-sensitive spending falls. The effect of a change in the money 
supply on the short-term interest rate decreases over time as prices adjust to this 
change. However, real effects are possible in the short run. In an interest rate channel, 
supply and demand for money determine the short-term interest rate, which in turn 
affects investment and output. The financial condition of commercial banks and firms 
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plays no role in affecting investment or other types of spending (Bernanke 1993; 
Kashyap and Stein, 1994; Hubbard, 1995) 
 
The balance sheet channel involves changes in the net worth of bank-dependent 
borrowers, which leads to an increase in their cost of raising external finances. The 
key mechanism involves the link between “external finance premium” (the difference 
between the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of funds internal 
to the firm) and the net worth of potential borrowers (defined as the borrowers‟ liquid 
assets plus collateral value of illiquid assets less outstanding obligations). With the 
presence of credit market frictions and the total amount of financing required held 
constant, standard models of lending with asymmetric information imply that the 
external finance premium depends inversely on borrowers‟ net worth. This inverse 
relationship arises because when borrowers have limited wealth to contribute to 
project financing, the potential divergence of interests between the borrower and the 
supplier of external funds is greater, implying an increase in agency cost; lenders must 
be compensated for higher agency costs by a larger premium to be in equilibrium. To 
the extent that borrowers‟ net worth is pro-cyclical (for example, pro-cyclicality of 
profits and asset prices), the external finance premium will be countercyclical, 
enhancing the swings in borrowing and thus in investment, spending, and production 
(Bernanke et al., 1989, 1996, 1999). 
 
The bank lending channel attached a specific role to the bank, unlike the balance sheet 
channel that is concerned about a borrower‟s ability to meet payments. According to 
Anders (2003), the bank lending channel can be explained from two perspectives. One 
is the “deposit explanation”, which refers to the conventional bank lending channel, 
and the other is “capital-adequacy explanation”, which is called bank capital channel. 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Stein (1998) presented the logic of the bank lending 
channel in light of the “deposit explanation”.  Markovic (2006) and van den Heuvel 
(2007) presented the bank lending channel logic from the “capital-adequacy 
explanation” perspective.  
 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) modified the traditional IS-LM framework to 
accommodate the role of credit in a macro-economy. Their model yields a simple 
construction of a bank lending channel in the transmission of monetary policy. They 
34 
 
assume that banks hold three assets – reserves, loans, and short-term bonds – and 
issue one liability – bank deposits. Loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes, both as 
sources of finance to borrowers and as assets held in a bank portfolio. Therefore, the 
stock of bank credit depends on the spread between the bank and bond market rates of 
interest. In the Bernanke-Blinder model, a contraction of monetary policy results in 
simultaneous leftward shift in the LM and IS curves, because the bank loan rates 
increase in response to the monetary policy contraction thus reducing the supply of 
investible funds to the market. In this way, the impact of bank balance sheets 
amplifies the transmission of monetary policy. According to Bernanke and Blinder, 
the IS curve will be affected by disturbances to the supply or demand for bank credit 
(both of which will affect bank loan rates independently of market rates of interest) 
and a more symmetric treatment of money and credit is feasible and appears 
warranted.  
 
Unlike Bernanke and Blinder who focused on the asset side of the bank‟s balance 
sheet, Stein (1998) focused on the liability side of the bank‟s balance sheet in an 
adverse-selection model of bank asset and liability management. In Stein‟s model, the 
banks hold three assets – reserves, new loans and old assets (loans made previously 
and still in the banks‟ books) – and three liabilities – insured deposits, previously 
raised non-deposit finance and incremental non-deposit finance. Because asymmetric 
information on the old loan value exists, adverse selection matters when the bank 
wants to raise non-deposit external finance. In Stein‟s analysis, smaller banks with 
lower asset values face difficulties in raising non-deposit external finance during 
monetary contraction compared with the large banks with higher asset values. Large 
banks depend exclusively on insured deposits to finance their lending. The author 
concluded that banks are subject to adverse-selection problems that constrain their 
lending and insured deposits can help banks to circumvent such problems and allow 
them to lend more freely. With regard to monetary policy, Stein‟s model showed that 
central banks can still influence both bonds rates and loan-bond spreads and thereby 
have a direct impact on both firms that finance themselves in the open market and 
those that borrow from the banks.  
 
Monetary policy affects bank loans through two distinct channels (Stein, 1998). First, 
a cutback in reserves by the central bank forces banks to move away from insured 
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deposit financing toward adverse-selection-prone forms of non-deposit finance. This 
in turn leads to a decrease in aggregate bank lending and hence to an increase in the 
relative cost of bank loans. The second channel focuses solely on frictions at the bank 
level, completely ignoring the frictions at the household level. Even if money plays no 
special role for households, the central bank can still influence both bond rates and 
loan-bond spreads and thereby has a direct impact on both firms that finance 
themselves in the open market and those that rely on banks. Stein‟s model can be 
viewed as providing micro foundations for the lending channel. The key distinction in 
Stein‟s model is the difference between reservable and non-reservable bank liabilities. 
Lending is affected by reserve shocks only if all non-reservable bank liabilities are 
subject to the adverse selection problem  
 
Three necessary conditions must hold for the existence of the traditional lending 
channel of monetary policy transmission (Kashyap and Stein, 1994): (1) intermediate 
loans and open market bonds must not be a perfect substitute for some firms on the 
liability side of their balance sheet so these firms are unable to offset a decline in the 
supply of loans by borrowing directly from the household sector in the public markets; 
(2) by changing the quantity of reserves available to the banking system, the central 
bank must be able to affect the supply of intermediate loans. That is, the intermediate 
sectors must not be able to completely insulate their lending activities from shocks to 
reserves, either by switching from deposits to less reserve-intensive forms of finance 
or by reducing their net holding of bonds; and (3) there must be some form of 
imperfect price adjustment that prevents any monetary policy shock from being 
neutral. If either of the first two conditions does not hold, bonds and loans effectively 
become perfect substitutes, and then the bank lending view reduces to the pure money 
view.  
 
Van den Heuvel (2007) developed a dynamic model of bank asset and liability 
management that incorporates risk-based capital requirement and an imperfect market. 
In van den Heuvel‟s model, bank lending depends on the bank‟s financial structure as 
well as the lending opportunities and market interest rates. Van den Heuvel focused 
on bank capital equity not on any particular role of bank reserves. This mechanism 
seems to fall outside the conventional bank lending channel. However, the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomy is still effective even though the supply 
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of bank loans is constrained. According to the van den Heuvel (2007) analysis, 
monetary policy effects on bank lending depend on the capital adequacy of the 
banking sector; lending by banks with low capital has a delayed amplified reaction to 
monetary policy shocks, relative to well-capitalized banks. In addition, van den 
Heuvel stated that bank capital affects lending even when the regulatory constraint is 
not binding and that shocks to bank profits, such as loans defaults, can have a 
persistent impact on lending.  
 
In the van den Heuvel model (2007), the risk-based capital requirements of the Basel 
Accord and imperfect market for bank equity imply a failure of the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem for the bank. When equity is sufficiently low, due to loan losses or some 
other adverse shock, the bank will reduce lending because of the capital requirement 
and the cost of issuing new equity. Even when the capital requirement is not currently 
binding, van den Heuvel‟s model showed that a bank with low capital may optimally 
forgo profitable lending opportunities to lower the risk of future capital inadequacy. 
Another crucial feature of the van den Heuvel model is the maturity transformation 
performed by banks, exposing them to interest rate risk. A monetary tightening by 
raising short-term interest rate lowers bank profits.  
                                              
2.3.2 Empirical Evidence of the Bank Lending Channel in Other Countries 
 
Empirical studies on the bank lending channel in the U.S. focused on the correlations 
among aggregate output, bank debt and indicators of monetary policy. Bernanke and 
Blinder‟s (1992) study concluded that monetary policy works in part through the bank 
lending channel. However, their result is plagued by the problem of identifying shifts 
in loan demand from shifts in loan supply. Ramey (1993) concluded that the money 
channel is much more important than the credit channel in the direct transmission of 
policy shocks. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) bypassed this identification problem 
by examining relative movements in bank loans and commercial paper following 
monetary policy shocks. The authors found supportive evidence for the bank lending 
channel. Using the dates identified by Romer and Romer (1989) that signal 
contractionary shifts in monetary policy, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox found that the 
financing mix shifts away from bank loans following a monetary contraction. In other 
words, the contractionary policy reduced the supply of bank credit and resulted in an 
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increase in the demand for non-bank credit. However, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), 
Eichenbaum (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) conducted a series of studies 
using disaggregated data and found no evidence to support a bank lending channel in 
monetary policy transmission.  
  
Considering the borrowers‟ heterogeneity in their sensitivity in the business cycle and 
the types of credit they use, evidence based on Ramey (1993), Kashyap et al. (1993) 
showed the aggregate credit measure can be problematic. To avoid this problem, 
Kashyap and Stein (1995) used quarterly data on individual banks‟ operating in the 
U.S. from 1976:Q1-1992:Q2. They classified banks by their asset size and used the 
Federal Reserve Fund rates as the monetary policy instrument. Their results showed: 
(1) a tightening in monetary policy reduced deposits across all different sizes of banks 
in a similar fashion; and (2) loan volume is much more sensitive to monetary policy 
for small banks than big banks. That is, an increase in the Federal Reserve Fund rate 
has a negative and statistically significant effect on the growth rate of total loans for 
small banks. They obtained similar results using commercial and industrial loans. 
They also found that small bank holdings of securities are more sensitive to changes 
in monetary policy. Kashyap and Stein (2000) conducted another study on the bank 
lending channel using bank level data that included quarterly observations of every 
insured U.S. commercial bank from 1976 to 1993. They reported that, within the class 
of small banks, changes in monetary policy mattered more for banks‟ lending with the 
least liquid balance sheets. Kashyap and Stein concluded that it is difficult to answer 
how important the bank lending channel is for aggregate activity quantitatively but 
could not deny the existence of a lending channel in monetary transmission. Kishan 
and Opiela (2000), Peek et al. (2003), and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) supported 
the existence of a bank lending channel in U.S based on bank level data.  
 
According to Kashyap and Stein (2000), even if the identification problem could be 
solved by using bank level data, aggregation problems made it difficult to quantify the 
impact of monetary policy on aggregate credit. To avoid this aggregation problem, 
vector error correction models (VECM) have been widely used. Within the VECM 
framework, the relationships of supply and demand for loans can be identified by 
testing for the presence of multiple cointegrating relationships and by testing 
exclusions, and exogeneity and homogeneity restrictions on the cointegrating 
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relationships. Loan supply and demand can therefore be modelled jointly, rather than 
in a one-equation reduced-form format (Mello and Pisu, 2009).  
 
Research on the bank lending channel in other countries includes Kashyap and Stein 
(1997) for European banks, Farinha and Marques (2001) for Portuguese banks, and 
Alfaro, Franken, Garcia and Jara (2004) for Chilean banks. Their findings supported 
the existence of a bank lending channel. Mello and Pisu (2009) conducted a study to 
test for the existence of a bank lending channel in the transmission of monetary policy 
in Brazil using monthly aggregate data for the period 1995:12 to 2008:6. Mello and 
Pisu argued that using bank-level data to estimate the reduced form supply equations 
may not be informative about the strength of the bank lending channel for monetary 
transmission. Instead, they tested for exclusion/homogeneity restrictions on multiple 
cointegration vectors in the VECM to disentangle the loan supply and demand effects 
of monetary policy shocks. They documented the existence of a bank lending channel 
in Brazil and found that a comparatively low credit-to-GDP ratio does not preclude 
the transmission of monetary policy through a bank lending channel.  
 
2.3.3 Overview of China’s Financial Institutions’ Development 
 
The salient characteristic of the Chinese banking sector in the pre-reform era was a 
mono bank system. Between 1949 and the late 1970s, the PBC functioned both as the 
central bank and the only deposit-taking and lending institution. Hence, it was not 
similar to a commercial bank seeking profit to maximize shareholders‟ wealth (Yu 
and Xie, 1999). In 1984, the PBC was transformed to the central bank of China. Its 
specialized banking functions were transferred to the Big Four state-owned 
specialized banks created in the 1970s, including the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC, originally specialized in lending to the industrial sector), the Bank of 
China (BOC, traditionally responsible for foreign exchange activity and the financing 
of imports and exports), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC, traditionally focused 
on agricultural lending and rural development) and the Construction Bank of China 
(CCB, traditionally focused on financing infrastructure development). The Big Four 
state-owned commercial banks dominate China‟s banking system, accounting for 
more than half of the total bank assets. The objectives of the Big Four state owned 
banks differed according to the sector in which they were directed to specialize. Some 
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bank loans were used by SOEs (state owned enterprise) to meet their financial 
requirements. The SOEs regard bank debts as working capital; business losses and 
defaults were dealt with by additional borrowing (Dobson and Kashyap, 2006). The 
dominant state-ownership of commercial banks allowed the government to be 
involved in the decision making of these banks. 
 
Since 1995, the government has introduced institutional and regulatory reforms to 
transform the Big Four into commercial banks. To relieve the Big Four of their state-
directed lending roles, three policy banks were created in 1994. The Agriculture 
Development Bank of China took over the policy lending role from the ABC; the 
China Development Bank took over the policy lending role from the CCB and, to a 
certain extent, from the ICBC; and the Export-Import Bank of China took over the 
policy lending role from the BOC, particularly the trade financing function (Maswana, 
2008).  
 
In addition to the state banks‟ domination, a few smaller commercial banks were 
established in the 1980s and 1990s, whose equity ownerships were distributed among 
state and private investors. These commercial banks are divided into two subgroups: 
(1) shareholding or joint-stock commercial banks, which are incorporated as joint-
stock limited companies under the People‟s Bank of China‟s Company Law; and (2) 
urban commercial banks, based on the traditional urban credit cooperative, which 
became commercial banks with stock-holding features. Foreign-funded banks and 
branches of foreign banks also expanded rapidly in China. Currently, China‟s 
financial system consists of China‟s central bank, state-owned banks, policy banks, 
joint-stock commercial banks, foreign-funded banks and branches of foreign banks, 
trust and investment corporations, and rural and urban credit cooperatives (see Table 
2.3).  
 
The declining asset quality of state-owned banks forced the government to inject 
public funds to clean up the banks‟ balance sheets. In addition, in late 2006, China 
began opening its banking sector to foreign competition, as mandated by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Furthermore, with regard to international competition, 
strategic investors (particularly, institutional investors) were ushered in to invest in 
state-owned banks that were transformed from a policy entity into a business entity 
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operating on a commercial basis. The ongoing commercialization process of China‟s 
banking sector affects the behaviour of bank executives. For example, Chinese banks 
recently introduced incentive and discipline mechanisms to improve their credit 
analysis and risk evaluation. Moreover, local governments no longer have direct 
authority over local bank branches (Firth et al., 2009) 
 
Table 2.3 Assets, Deposit, and Loans of Chinese Banking Institutions 
 
 Assets Deposits Loans 
Type of institution No. of 
Institution 
Percent of 
Total 
Percent of 
Total 
Percent of 
Total 
Big Four commercial banks 4 48.4 53.5 45.58 
Policy Banks 3 8.99 0.90 13.27 
Joint Stock Commercial banks 12 18.4 18.0 20.04 
Urban Commercial Banks 91 6.49 7.27 6.81 
Foreign-investment Banks 267 2.14 1.188 2.146 
Others  12.86 11.06 12.33 
Source: The People‟s Bank of China Quarterly Statistical Bulletin from 1997:Q1-2009:Q1 
Note: data as of December 31, 2008 
 
2.3.4.   The Credit Channel in China’s Monetary Policy Transmission 
 
The studies of Wang and Wang (2000), Li (2001) and Zhou and Jiang (2002) pointed 
to the existence of the credit channel in China based on the cointegration method and 
Granger causality test. Sun (2004) examined the relationships among monetary 
aggregates ( 1M  and 2M ), credit aggregate, and GDP to identify China‟s monetary 
transmission mechanism covering the period 1994:Q1 to 2003:Q1. Based on the 
cointegration relationships among the monetary aggregate, credit aggregate and GDP, 
Sun conducted the Granger-causality test and found that the credit aggregate did not 
„Granger cause‟ the GDP and monetary aggregate, but the monetary aggregate 
„Granger cause‟ credit aggregate and GDP. Therefore, Sun concluded that it is the 
money channel rather than the credit channel that is important in China‟s monetary 
policy transmission.   
 
Jiang, Liu and Zhao (2005) adopted a VAR model based on quarterly data for GDP, 
inflation rate, monetary aggregate and credit aggregate from 1992:Q1 to 2004:Q2 to 
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examine the effectiveness of the money and credit channels in monetary transmission 
in China. According to the impulse response function, Jiang, Liu and Zhao found that 
the credit aggregate had a more immediate and a stronger impact on inflation rate and 
GDP than the monetary aggregate
2M  in eight quarters. The magnitude of the impact 
reached its peak at four quarters lag and was significant even at 10 quarters lag but 
began to decline thereafter. The impact of credit on GDP was much stronger than the 
monetary aggregate in 10 quarters. The authors concluded that the credit channel 
plays an important role in China‟s monetary policy transmission.    
 
Sheng and Wu (2008) utilized a VAR model (a level VAR and a difference VAR) and 
monthly data for monetary aggregate 2M , CPI, industrial value-added, and credit 
aggregate to test whether the credit channel exists in China from 1998:1 to 2006:6. 
Based on the group Granger causality test, Sheng and Wu found that: (1) credit 
Granger causes 2M ; and (2) 2M and credit aggregate Granger causes industrial value-
added. Sheng and Wu concluded that changes in the credit aggregate gave rise to 
changes in the monetary aggregate, not vice versa; and that the bank credit aggregate 
instead of the monetary aggregate was the actual intermediate target. Therefore, the 
money channel did not exist in China and the credit channel played an important role 
in monetary policy transmission. This result supported Wang‟s (2003) findings.  
 
Some questions still remain concerning the credit channel in China‟s monetary policy 
transmission. First, previous researchers have tested the relationships among the bank 
loan aggregate, GDP (or industrial value), price level and monetary aggregate since 
the data on the bank loan aggregate not the data on bank loan demand or bank loan 
supply that are available. However, they did not identify which force, the bank loan 
supply or bank loan demand, drove the changes in the bank loan aggregate. Secondly, 
no researchers have examined whether the bank loan aggregate responds to changes in 
the stance of monetary policy of the PBC. According to Kashyap and Stein (1994), if 
the bank lending channel exists in China, changes in the required reserve ratio by the 
PBC should affect the supply of bank loans because it changes the quantity of 
reserves available to the banking system. Thirdly, the results based on the Granger 
causality tests have been ambiguous because it is difficult to draw clear conclusions 
unless the data can be described by a simple two-dimensional system (Bent, 2005). As 
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Sims (1977) described it, the conclusion of the Granger-causality test depends on the 
right choice of the conditioning set
4
. In reality, one can never be sure that the chosen 
conditioning was large enough. Another problem regarding this research method is 
that the approach to test the credit channel focuses on evaluating the forecast power of 
credit aggregates for real activity relative to the forecasting power of monetary 
aggregates. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argued that such an approach to test the 
credit channel is invalid and suffered from an incorrect premise, which treats credit 
aggregates as an independent causal factor affecting the economy. In addition, credit 
is rarely a primitive driving force and the credit condition (measured by the external 
finance premium) is an endogenous factor that helps shape the dynamic response of 
the economy to shifts in monetary policy. Thus, the theory has no particular 
implications about the relative forecasting power of credit aggregates.  
 
2.4 Reviews on McCallum Rule 
2.4.1. Principles of the McCallum Rule 
 
McCallum (1987, 1993, and 2006) advocated a policy rule for central banks to follow 
in setting monetary policy. The rule, developed outside the confines of a single model, 
would work well with different economic models since it is free from the model-
specific problem. Since macroeconomists disagree about the forces that drive the 
economy, they are unlikely to come up with an optimal rule for the operation of the 
monetary policy (Stark, 1996). The McCallum Rule requires central banks to target 
the growth rate of nominal GDP using the monetary base as its instrument.  
 
According to McCallum (1984, 1985, 1987), four principles should be followed in 
designing a monetary rule. First, the rule should dictate the behaviour of a variable 
that the monetary authority can control directly and/or accurately. Second, the rule 
should not rely on the presumed absence of regulatory changes and technical progress 
in the financial industries. Third, neither money stock nor (nominal) interest rate 
paths
5
  are important for their own sake; these variables are relevant only to the extent 
that they are useful in facilitating good performance in the magnitudes of inflation and 
                                                 
4 The central notion of Granger Causality is one of incremental predictability. If a series Y is better predicted by the 
complete universe of past information than by that universe less the series X, then X Granger-causes Y. According 
to the definition, the information set on which conditioning is defined includes all possibly relevant variables and 
is infinitely extended back into time. However, practical implementation must use data sets that are more limited: a 
finite number of lags and often only a pair of variables (Hoover, 2001).   
5In Macroeconomics, the word “path” describes the locus of a variable changes over time. 
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output or employment. Fourth, a well-designed rule should recognize the limits of 
macroeconomics knowledge. In particular, it should recognize that neither theory nor 
evidence points convincingly to any of the numerous competing models of the 
interaction of nominal and real variables. 
 
Based on the four principles, McCallum (1987) specified a target path for nominal 
GDP using the monetary base as the operational mechanism, a variable that can be 
accurately set on a daily basis by the central bank with a floating exchange rate. 
Specifically, the rule “would adjust the base growth rate each month or quarter, 
increasing the rate if nominal GDP is below its target path and vice versa” (McCallum, 
1984, p. 390). In 1993, McCallum revised the rule using the nominal GDP growth rate 
instead of the nominal GDP as the target, supported by Stark and Croushore (1996). 
In algebraic form, the McCallum Rule is given as follows: 
 
)( 1
*
1
*
  ttttt XXVBXB      (2.1) 
 
Where all the variables are in logarithms, B  is the monetary base, VB  is the 
average base velocity growth rate over the previous four years,  is the monetary 
response factor, and X is the log of nominal GDP. The asterisk (*) denotes the target 
growth rate, which is the sum of the inflation rate and the long-run average real GDP 
growth rate.  
 
The growth of the monetary base is determined by the three terms on the right-hand 
side of equation (2.1). The first term sets the monetary base growth rate equal to the 
desired rate of inflation plus the potential or desired real GDP growth rate. McCallum 
emphasized real, since outputs and employment levels over the long run will be 
independent of the average growth rate of the nominal variables (McCallum 1988, 
p.175). The second term on the right-hand side of equation (2.1) is the growth rate of 
monetary base velocity, which reflects the impact of technological and regulatory 
changes on the velocity of the monetary base. In this regard, the McCallum Rule 
forecasts the average growth rate of velocity over the future. This term helps to 
prevent the price level from drifting in response to a permanent shock to money 
demand. With the velocity growing at a steady-state rate and the nominal GDP growth 
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rate equal to its target, the rule forces the inflation rate to remain at a desired level, 
assuming that the monetary policy is neutral in the long run.  The last term on the 
right-hand side of equation (2.1) is most important for stabilization of output and price 
level, which suggests the monetary policy authority to adjust monetary base growth 
whenever the nominal GDP growth rate differs from its target. When the nominal 
GDP growth rate is below its target, the monetary authority should temporarily 
increase monetary base growth and vice versa.  
 
The first feature of the McCallum Rule is that the nominal GDP is preferred to 
monetary aggregates such as M1 or M2 as the monetary authority‟s principal target 
variable. Monetary aggregates have become unreliable guides and the nominal GDP 
correlates with the real GDP and inflation. In addition, the nominal GDP, in principle, 
has two other features that make it a good guide for policy. First, under nominal GDP 
targeting, the monetary policy would adjust to offset disturbances to aggregate 
demand. A second attractive feature of nominal GDP targeting is that it would help 
the policy maker to balance the goals of stable output growth and inflation in response 
to aggregate supply disturbance (Clark, 1994). Furthermore, the nominal GDP is 
preferred to real GDP as the policy target because a central bank cannot control or 
predict with accuracy how the nominal GDP growth divides on a quarter-by-quarter 
basis between real growth and inflation (McCallum, 1988).   
 
The second feature of the McCallum Rule is the specification of a constant growth 
target for nominal income, rather than a target rate that varies over the cycle. In this 
way, it would at least eliminate policy surprises as a source of undesirable fluctuations 
arising from the central bank‟s pursuit of an optimal policy decision. The third feature 
of the McCallum Rule is to utilize the monetary base instead of interest rate as the 
monetary policy instrument. McCallum in his 1993 paper discussed in detail the 
reasons why he preferred monetary base to interest rate as a policy instrument. 
McCallum argued that if the nominal interest rate is use as an indicator of monetary 
policy stance, then tightening or easing the policy stance results in ambiguity. In this 
regard, the rule is desirably operational, since the central bank is capable of 
controlling the monetary base variable with accuracy. 
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A technical issue regarding the McCallum Rule is whether the behaviour of the base 
growth target specified by the rule is permissible for the base growth to be of use in 
practice. McCallum (2006) suggested using the average nominal GDP growth over 
the past 4 quarters instead of the most recent quarter for the rule‟s final term (this is 
analogous to the Taylor Rule‟s use of an average four-quarter inflation rate value). 
The McCallum Rule that uses the average nominal GDP growth over the past four 
quarters for the final term is refer as the improved (McCallum) rule in this study.  We 
evaluate the original and improved McCallum Rule separately.  
 
2.4.2  Previous Empirical Studies on McCallum Rule  
 
Several studies have used the counterfactual or stochastic simulation method to test 
the robustness of McCallum‟s rule. Based on seasonally adjusted U.S. quarterly data 
for 1954:Q1 – 1985:Q4, McCallum (1988) verified the rule using two single equation 
models, regressing nominal income growth rate on the current or one-period lagged 
monetary base growth rate, and one-period lagged nominal income growth rate. 
However, these two single equation models used to depict the nominal income 
determination are simple and likely to be policy invariant. McCallum further verified 
the robustness of his simple rule to an atheoretic VAR model and structural classical 
and Keynesian slant model. The simulation results showed that adherence to monetary 
base-growth rates specified in equation (2.1) would have yielded essentially the 
desired inflation, despite the financial and regulatory changes during the testing 
period, while reducing the extent of cyclical fluctuation in nominal income. In 
McCallum‟s latter papers (1993, 1999, 2000), similar models were used to further 
verify the robustness of the rule based on data from different countries. In these 
papers, McCallum adopted a nominal target of the growth-rate type, rather than the 
growing-level type used in his prior research. The main disadvantage with a level-
type target path is that the target variable reverts back to the preset path after any 
disturbance that has driven it away, even if the effect of the disturbance is of a 
permanent nature. Since such an action entails general macroeconomic stimulus or 
restraints, this type of targeting procedure would probably induce extra cyclical 
variability in demand conditions, which implies extra variability in real output if price 
level stickiness prevails (McCallum, 1999, p. 1498).  
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Hall (1990), Judd and Motley (1991, 1993), Dueker (1993), Stark and Croushore 
(1996), Philip (2000), and Razzak (2003) presented supportive evidence of the 
McCallum Rule based on data from different developed countries using simulation 
methods. In their study, Stark and Croushore (1996, p. 3) encouraged researchers to 
use models in which monetary policy has real effects. For this reason, they excluded 
the real business cycle and rational expectations models from their study because the 
real effects of monetary policy in these models tend to be nonexistent or very small. 
Stark and Croushore (1996) examined the effectiveness of the McCallum Rule using a 
Keynesian model, a reduced form model and a structural VAR model. They 
concluded that McCallum Rule is a potentially useful rule for setting monetary policy.  
 
The historical analytical method developed by Stuart (1996) and Taylor (1999B) 
consists of contrasting actual settings of instrument variables during some historical 
time span with the values specified by particular rules in response to prevailing 
conditions. Discrepancies or agreements between rule-specified and the actual values 
can then be evaluated in light of ex-post judgments concerning the merit of the 
various rules. Stuart (1996) compared the McCallum Rule with the monetary policy 
decisions based on a thorough assessment of the prospect for inflation using UK data 
for the period 1985:Q1-1962:Q2. The author found that the simple rule provided 
information about inflation and economic activity that can be used with other relevant 
information in the formulation of monetary policy. 
 
Taylor (1999B) examined the U.S. monetary history for two different periods: 1880-
1914 versus 1955-1997, using the framework specified by the Taylor Rule. He 
concluded that the historical approach to monetary policy evaluation complements the 
model-based approach and that case studies were useful for judging how much 
discretion is appropriate when a policy rule is use as a guideline for central bank 
policy decisions. McCallum (2000) followed the Stuart-Taylor method on the U.S. 
and UK from the early 1960s to 1998 and for Japan from the 1970s to 1998. 
McCallum concluded that the Stuart–Taylor method can also be a useful approach to 
McCallum Rule evaluation in addition to simulations with structural models. 
 
The McCallum Rule is currently less popular than the Taylor Rule in developed 
countries, but it has attracted the attention of some researchers who have a great 
47 
 
interest in China‟s monetary policy. Some researchers have tried to test the McCallum 
Rule to identify a guideline for the PBC. For example, Burdekin and Siklos (2005) 
applied McCallum Rule to model Chinese monetary policy using the coefficient 
specified by McCallum and then allowed the data to determine the coefficient 
estimates. Based on the simulated values for the nominal GDP growth rate, the 
authors concluded that the PBC had appeared to respond to the gap between the target 
and the actual nominal GDP and China‟s inflation and monetary policy outcomes 
could be satisfactorily modelled using standard empirical techniques instead of a 
figment of China-specific “structural” factors. However, Liu and Zhang (2007) 
compared the fit of the modified McCallum Rule using the monetary base or M2 as 
the dependent variable with the actual realized values for money supply. The authors 
concluded that a quantity of money rule in the spirit of McCallum could not 
adequately depict the PBC‟s policy stance.   
 
Following the estimation of the standard McCallum Rule and a modified McCallum 
Rule, Kong (2008) concluded that the two estimated McCallum rules reflected the 
trend of the actual base money growth rate. In this regard, it is practical to utilize the 
McCallum Rule as a guideline for China‟s monetary policy. Koivu et al. (2008) 
analyzed China‟s monetary policy after 1994 using a quantity-based McCallum Rule. 
By testing the excess money supply (deviation of the actual money supply growth 
from the value given by the McCallum Rule), the authors suggested that the 
McCallum Rule can be a useful tool for analyzing the monetary policy stance and for 
providing information about inflationary pressures in the Chinese economy. 
 
Mehrotra and Sanchez-Fung (2010) modeled China‟s monetary policy using a 
McCallum-Taylor type rule covering the period 1994Q1-2008Q1. Instead of using 
nominal GDP as policy target as in the original McCallum rule, the authors used a 
reaction function that allows feedback from the output and inflation gaps, together 
with an effective trade-weighted exchange rate. Mehrotra and Sanchez-Fung found 
that the Chinese monetary policy has been procyclical, reflecting an accommodative 
reaction to the inflation gap. However, the reaction to the output gap was 
countercyclical, whereas the money supply did not react significantly to the exchange 
rate development.  
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However, some unaddressed issues remain in previous studies. First, the Liu and 
Zhang (2007) and Koivu et al., (2009) studies adopted the McCallum‟s specified 
coefficient value of 0.5 for the monetary response factor based on Japanese data for 
the period 1972-1992. In addition, a 4% long-term average annual growth rate of real 
output was used as the target growth rate in the rule when conducting the simulation 
to decide on the coefficient value (McCallum 1993). On the other hand, the 
McCallum Rule coefficient value of 0.25 is based on U.S. data for the period 
1954:Q1-1985:Q4. A 3% long-term average annual growth rate of real output was 
used as the target growth rate in the rule when identifying the coefficient value 
(McCallum 1987, 1988). Therefore, to test the validity of the McCallum Rule using 
Chinese data, a researcher should take into account variations in the value for  . 
Second, Kong (2008) evaluated a modified McCallum Rule, with the inflation gap 
(the difference between inflation target and realized value) added into the rule as an 
independent variable. However, he neglected the fact that the feedback term defined 
in the McCallum Rule is the nominal GDP growth, which gives equal weight to 
changes in the real output gap and deviations of inflation from the target. Furthermore, 
Koivu et al. (2009) used 2M  as the dependent variable to test the effectiveness of the 
McCallum Rule in China. This ignores the fundamental principle of the McCallum 
Rule that the instrument variable should be under the central bank‟s direct control.  
 
The McCallum-Taylor type rule in Mehrotra and Sanchez-Fung‟s study (2010) 
models China‟s monetary policy constructively for its explicit consideration of real 
GDP, inflation and exchange rate variables. However, this type of rule does not 
consider the changes in money velocity that has significant influence on the monetary 
policy transmission, especially in developing countries such as China that has 
experienced markedly monetization process. This may influence the empirical results 
of their research. In addition, the specification of such rule essentially deviates from 
McCallum‟s original thought about his policy rule. 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we first reviewed previous researches of China‟s monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. The effectiveness of the currently adopted monetary 
targeting regime is under question and the reform and development of China‟s 
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financial system provide conditions for the possibility of adopting a new monetary 
policy regime, taking short-term interest rate as the PBC‟s operating target. This is the 
motivation for our study to see if an effective interest rate channel currently exists in 
China. Section 2.3 first reviews the basic principles of the interest rate channel and 
credit channel then the previous empirical studies on credit channel in different 
countries including China. We found some problems remain to be solved after 
previous research on the credit channel in China, especially the force that drives the 
increases in bank credit aggregate was not identified clearly. These remaining 
problems led to this study on the credit channel in China. Finally, we summarize the 
principles of the McCallum Rule and the improvement of it. Some research in other 
countries showed the McCallum Rule can be used as a policy guideline. However, 
some mistakes exist in previous studies on the McCallum rule as a policy guideline in 
China. Because of this, we decided to re-evaluate the possibility of using McCallum 
Rule as China‟s monetary policy guideline.  
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CHAPTER 3 
VARIABLES SELECTION AND THE EXAMINATION 
 OF DATA PROPERTIES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the variables and examines the properties of the data used in 
this study
6
. Section 3.2 presents the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to examine 
the properties of the data and the Dickey-Fuller test with GLS detrending (DFGLS) 
method used to verify the results of the ADF test. Section 3.3 explains the selected 
variables used to test the impact of short-term interest rates on output and inflation 
and the results of the ADF and DFGLS tests on these variables. Section 3.4 describes 
the related variables for the identification of bank lending channel in China and the 
test results of their integration properties. The variables selected for the study of the 
McCallum Rule and tests of their integration properties are discussed in Section 3.5.  
 
3.2  Integration Properties of Time Series Data 
 
A time series variable is stationary when it has a finite mean, variance and auto-
covariance function that are all independent of time. Analogously, a non-stationary 
series variable has a time dependent mean or autocovariance function. A stochastic 
time series is said to be integrated of order d  if the series requires difference of d  
times in order to achieve stationarity (Engle and Granger, 1987). Thus, the time series 
tX  is said to be integrated of order one, denoted )1(~ IX t , if its level series tX  is 
non-stationary but its first difference series tX  is stationary, denoted as )0(~ IX t .  
 
Determining the order of integration of a time series variable involves testing for the 
number of autoregressive unit roots that the time series contains. For example, the 
first order autoregressive process is given as follows: 
ttt uXX  1        (3.1) 
Where 0X  is a fixed initial value,    is the autocorrelation coefficient and  tu  is 
„white noise‟. When  <1, the series tX  is covariance stationary since it has a 
                                                 
6 The accuracy and transparency of Chinese statistics has been debated for a few years. Rawski (2001) and Holz 
(2008) reported that China‟s GDP growth rate was over-estimated. However, Klein (2002) and Chow (2002) 
argued that China‟s GDP growth performance was, to a large extend, reliable.  
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constant mean and variance that are independent of time. Algebraically, a covariance 
stationary tX  has these properties: 
Mean: ( )tE X     （3.2） 
Variance 2 2var( ) ( )t tX E X       (3.3) 
Covariance:  ( )( )t t kk E X X       (3.4) 
Where k  is the covariance between the values of tX  and t kX  , that is, between the 
two X  values k  period apart.  
In contrast, when 1 , tX  is nonstationary both its mean and variance are time 
dependent. Algebraically, a nonstationary tX  has these properties: 
Mean: 
0 0( ) ( )t tE X E X u X      (3.5) 
Variance: 2var( )tX t     (3.6) 
 
Let L   be the lag operator where itt
i XXL  , then equation (3.1) can be written as a 
lag polynomial of degree one in the form of equation (3.7) 
 
tt uXL  )1(        (3.7) 
 
The root of the associated polynomial equation 01  z  is /1 . If the root of the 
equation exceeds one in absolute value, then 1  and hence tX  is stationary. On 
the other hand, if the root of the equation equals one then 1 , in which case tX  has 
a unit root and is nonstationary (Hayashi, 2000).  
 
Suppose tX  is a nonstationary random walk process with zero drift that 
is
ttt uXX  1 . Then, the first difference series tt uX   is clearly stationary 
since it is a white noise process by definition. Thus, if a non-stationary series contains 
only a single unit root then it needs to be differenced only once in order to achieve 
stationarity. Recalling the definition of the order of integration of a time series, such a 
nonstationary series will be integrated of order one or )1(I . This result extends to the 
more general case where a non-stationary time series tX  containing d  unit roots is 
said to be )(dI  since tX  needs to be differenced d  times to become stationary.  
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Conventional least squares regression analysis necessitates that all variables are 
covariance stationary, namely, the underlying data generating the process possesses a 
finite mean and variance. Under this circumstance, ordinary least squares estimates 
are distributed asymptotically normal, and t  statistics are valid for inference. 
However, empirical evidence suggests that the levels of most macroeconomic 
variables are often characterized as integrated of order one, i.e., non-stationary. 
According to Enders (2004, pp 108), important variables  in macroeconomic analysis, 
for example GDP, financial aggregates, interest rates and exchange rates, have a time-
dependent mean and variance that typically increase over time. Traditional regression 
with nonstationary variables will result in what Granger and Newbold (1974) called 
spurious regression. A spurious regression has a high 2R  and t  statistics that appear 
to be significant, but the results are without any economic meaning. The regression 
outputs “looks good” because the least-squares estimate are not consistent and t  
statistics do not possess asymptotic t  distribution, if the residuals of the regression 
equation are nonstationary. Thus, inferences based on conventional tests may not be 
correct. These findings suggest that the integration properties of data should be tested 
before performing regression analysis. We apply two kinds of unit roots test 
procedures to test the integration properties of our data: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test and Dickey-Fuller test with GLS detrending.  
 
3.2.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (1981) for an autogressive unit root are based on 
the following ordinary least square regression equations: 
tititt yyy     11      (3.8) 
tititt yyy     110     (3.9) 
tititt ytyy     1210           (3.10) 
 
The difference between the three regressions is the presence of the deterministic 
elements 0  and ta2 . The first is a pure random walk model, the second adds an 
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intercept or drift term, and the third includes both a drift and a linear time trend. The 
process of ADF tests is summarized in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Summary of ADF Tests 
Model Hypothesis Test Statistic 
tititt ytyy     1210  
0  
00   given 0  
02   given 0  
02   
020    
0  
  
  
3  
2  
tititt yyy     110  
0  
00   given 0  
00    
0  
  
1  
tititt yyy     11  
0  0  
Sources: Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) 
 
 ,   and   statistics are used to test the hypothesis 0 . Dickey and Fuller (1981) 
provided three additional F-statistics (called 1 , 2  and 3 ) to test joint hypothesis 
of the coefficients. Note that these test statistics are the conventional least squares 
regression t  and statisticsF   computed for testing the appropriate null hypothesis. 
 
In all cases, the null hypothesis is to test the time series variable whether it contains a 
unit root. However, a question concerns whether it is most appropriate to estimate 
equations (3.8), (3.9) or (3.10), unless the researcher knows the actual data-generating 
process. It might seem reasonable to test the hypothesis using the most general form 
of the models, equation (3.10). Enders (2004, p 210) argued that one problem with 
this line of reasoning is that the presence of the additional estimated parameters 
reduces the degrees of freedom and the power of the test. Reduced power means that 
researchers will not be able to reject the null of a unit root when, in fact, no unit root 
is present. Moreover, the appropriate test statistics (i.e., ,  ,  ) for 0  depends 
on which of the regressors are included in the model. Campbell and Perron (1991) 
reported that only when the drift or trend is absent do the nonstandard Dickey-Fuller 
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distributions dominate. If the data-generating process is known to contain a trend or 
drift, we test the null hypothesis using the standardized normal distribution.  
 
From the above summary, we can see that too few or too many regressors may cause 
a failure of the test to reject the null of a unit root. Doldado and Sosvilla-Rivero (1990) 
suggested a strategy to test for a unit root when the data-generating process is 
completely unknown. Doldado and Sosvilla-Rivero‟s modification to resolve this 
problem was documented by Enders (2004) as follows: 
 
Step 1: Start with the least restrictive of the plausible models (which will generally 
include a trend and drift) and use the   statistic to test the null hypothesis 0 . Unit 
root tests have a low power to reject the null hypothesis; hence, if the null hypothesis 
of a unit root is rejected, we can conclude that the }{ ty  sequence does not contain a 
unit root (see Table 3.2).  
 
Step 2: If the null hypothesis is not rejected, it is necessary to determine whether too 
many deterministic regressors were included in step 1. The presence of these 
regressors may have reduced the power of the test. As such, one can test for the 
significant of the trend term by testing the hypothesis 02   using the 3  
statistic. If the trend is not significant, proceed to step 3. Otherwise, if the trend is 
significant, retest for the presence of a unit root using the standardized normal 
distribution. If the null of a unit root is rejected, we can conclude that the }{ ty  
sequence does not contain a unit root. Otherwise, the }{ ty  sequence contains a unit 
root.  
 
Step 3: Estimate the model without the trend. Test for the presence of a unit root using 
the   statistic. If the null is rejected, we can conclude that the model does not 
contain a unit root. If the null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected, we should test 
for the significance of the constant by testing the hypothesis 00    using the 1  
statistic. If the drift is not significant, we should estimate an equation in the form of 
(3.9) and proceed to step 4. If the drift is significant, we should test for the presence of 
a unit root using the standardized normal. If the null hypothesis of a unit root is 
55 
 
rejected, we can conclude that the }{ ty  sequence does not contain a unit root. 
Otherwise, the }{ ty  sequence contains a unit root.  
 
 Step 4: Estimate a model in the form of equation (3.8). Use   to test for the presence 
of a unit root. If the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected, we can conclude that the 
}{ ty  sequence does not contain a unit root. Otherwise, the }{ ty  sequence contains a 
unit root.  
 
Table 3.2 Summary of the ADF Tests Procedure 
Model 1: 0 1 2 12
p
t t i t i ti
y a y a t y            
0H  Test Stat If do not reject, then If  reject, then 
Step 1.1 0   
  Next step Stop: no unit root 
Step 1.2a 2 0, 0a    3  Next model Next step 
Step 1.3  0   (0,1)N  Stop: unit root  Stop: no unit root 
Model 2: 0 1 12
p
t t i t i ti
y a y y           
0H  Test Stat If do not reject, then If  reject, then 
Step 2.1  0   
  Next step Stop: no unit root 
Step 2.2a 0 0, 0a    1  Next model Next step 
Step 2.3  0   (0,1)N  Stop: unit root  Stop: no unit root 
Model 3: 1 12
p
t t i t i ti
y y y          
0H  Test Stat If do not reject, then If  reject, then 
Step 3.1 0     Stop: unit root  Stop: no unit root 
Gu: (2004) 
 
Another important issue regarding the implementation of the ADF tests is the 
selection of k  - that is, the number of lagged first-difference terms kty   needed to 
induce an appropriate white noise error structure in the estimated ADF test regression 
equations. As documented by Enders (2004), Dickey-Fuller tests are sensitive to the 
choice of k , the number of lags in the estimated equation. Too few lags may adversely 
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affect the size of the test. In other words, selecting too few lags may cause one to 
over-reject a true null of a unit root at any chosen significance level. Second, too 
many lags may reduce the power of test because more parameters are estimated and 
the number of effective observations is reduced, given the need for additional initial 
conditions. That is, there is a high probability of falsely rejecting a true null of a unit 
root against a false stationary alternative when more lags are used. One approach to 
selecting the appropriate lag length is to start with a relatively long lag length and 
pare down by the usual t -test or F -tests. In addition, it is also possible to determine 
the lag length using an information criterion such as the AIC or SBC. For information 
criterion selection methods, we must specify an upper bound to the lag length. In this 
study, we use the Bartlett criteria 
1/ 4int(12( /100) )T  where int denotes the largest 
integer less than or equal to 
1/ 412( /100)T  and T is sample size, and this criterion is 
adopted by default in Eviews 6 that was used to run our data analysis.  
 
Since the ADF test takes the absence (presence) of a unit root as the alternative (null) 
hypothesis, we begin testing for the presence of a unit root in our first difference 
series ty . In other words, we begin by testing whether our level series ty  contains 
two unit roots. If the null of a single unit root is rejected for the first difference 
series ty , implying that ty  is stationary, and ty  does not contain two unit roots, 
then we proceed to test for the presence of a single unit root in the level series ty .  
 
3.2.2 Dickey-Fuller Test with GLS Detrending (DFGLS) 
 
As discussed earlier, we may include a constant, or a constant and a linear time trend 
in our ADF test regression. We are concerned about the appropriate form to use since 
we do not know the actual data-generating process. To overcome this problem, we 
used the alternative procedure proposed by Elliott et al. (1996), the DFGLS test. It is a 
modification of the ADF test. The basic idea of the DFGLS test is to detrend data 
before applying the ADF unit root tests. Since the data are already detrended, the 
constant or time trend variables will be taken out before running the ADF tests. 
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Eilliott et al. (1996) defined a quasi-difference of ty  as )|( tyd  that depends on the 
value   representing the specific point alternative against which we wish to test the 
null: 
1
             if 1
( | )
  if 1
t
t
t t
y t
d y
y y t

 

 
 
    (3.11) 
Next, consider an OLS regression of the quasi-differenced data )|( tyd  on the 
quasi-differenced )|( txd : 
( | ) ( | ) ( )t t td y d x           (3.12) 
where tx  contains either a constant, or a constant and trend, and let ˆ( )   be the OLS 
estimates from this regression.  
 
All that we need now is a value for  . Eilliott et al. (1996) provided a 
recommendation regarding the specific value of  , where: 
 
 
1 7 /               if 1
1 13.5/           if = 1,  
t
t
T x
T x t

  
 

   (3.13) 
 
We now define the GLS detrended data, dty  using the estimates associated with the : 
ˆ( )
t
d
t ty y x         (3.14) 
Finally, the DFGLS test estimates the standard ADF test equation. The only 
difference is that the DFGLS test substitutes the GLS detrended d
ty  for the original ty : 
 
1 1 1
d d d d
t t t p t p ty ay y y              (3.15) 
 
No constant or trend term is included in equation (3.15) since the dty  are detrended. 
Like the ADF test, we consider the ratiot   for ˆ  from tested equation (3.15).  
 
3.3  Variables Selected for Testing Interest Rate Channel in China 
 
This section describes the related variables and quarterly data from 1996:Q1 to 
2008:Q1 used to examine the macroeconomic dynamics of the unified interbank 
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market operation in China and reports the results of ADF and DFGLS tests on these 
variables. 
  
First, we consider the effects of short-term interest rates on GDP, general price level, 
monetary aggregate, and exchange rate. We assume the 7-day interbank money 
market rate (INTm), normally referred to as CHIBOR, and 7-day repo rate (INTr) 
which is benchmark rate in the interbank bond market  as the PBC‟s policy stance. 
Another policy-related variable in our study is the domestic monetary aggregate M2 
(M), which is the intermediate target of the PBC. We use the nominal effective 
exchange rate (NEER) to examine effects of managed floating exchange regime on 
output and prices. The output measure is real GDP with the consumer price index 
(CPI) as the general price level. All data are expressed in natural logs and are 
seasonally adjusted using ARIMAX12, with the exception of short-term interest rates.  
 
Figure 3.1 graphically displays China‟s real GDP, CPI, aggregate M2, nominal 
effective exchange rate, INTm and INTr in level.  This figure shows the two short-
term interest rate variables do not move together with other macro-variables, namely 
interest rate variables and do not display a similar stochastic trend over time.  
 
Figure 3.1. Level of Real GDP, CPI, M, NEER, TNTm, INTr 
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Table 3.3 Results of ADF Unit Root Tests for Time Series 
Series K 
  3    1    
Levels 
GDP 1 -1.96 2.54 0.59 7.14 3.78 
CPI 0 0.90 3.44 2.58 10.81*** 3.74 
M2 0 -2.82 4.21 -0.71 428.7*** 28.28 
INTm 0 -1.61 1.42 -0.80 0.32 0.54 
INTr 0 -1.06 1.55 -0.20 0.06 0.20 
NEER 10 1.39 4.14 0.61 0.77 -1.08 
Difference 
GDP 0 -11.37*** 64.71*** -11.30*** 63.95*** -9.47*** 
CPI 0 -6.78*** 23.25*** -5.77*** 16.67*** -5.01*** 
M2 3 -4.25*** 9.47*** -4.31*** 9.35*** -0.73 
INTm 1 -3.29* 5.50 -2.78* 3.88 -2.48** 
INTr 1 -4.26*** 13.22*** -4.98*** 12.58*** -5.00*** 
NEER 1 3.37* 5.68* -2.48 3.09 -2.20** 
Notes: ***; **;* signify 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively 
 
Table 3.3 reports the results of the ADF unit root tests for the time series. We first 
tested the first difference for all the time series for the possible presence of two unit 
roots. The    statistics are all significant at the 10% level. Thus, the null hypothesis 
of a unit root is rejected. This suggests that the first differences of all time series are 
stationary. Following this, we tested all time series in level. The   statistics are 
insignificant at the 5% level. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root and hence they are non-stationary.  
 
Table 3.4 Results of DFGLS Unit Root Tests for Time Series 
Series K Constant  Constant 
and trend  
k Constant  Constant 
and trend 
 Level Difference 
GDP 1 1.78 -1.59 0 -11.30*** -11.44*** 
CPI 0 3.62 -1.48 0 -3.57*** -4.80*** 
M2 6 0.77 -2.04 0 -3.70*** -5.60*** 
INTm 8 -0.21 -1.39 2 -2.13** -4.00*** 
INTr 0 -0.92 -1.52 0 -1.92* -3.17* 
NEER 1 -1.12 -1.90 1 -2.43** -3.34** 
Notes: ***; **;* signify 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively 
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The DFGLS test results for the time series are listed in Table 3.4. Starting from the 
first differences of the time series, the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected. This 
suggests that the first differences of the time series are stationary. Following this, we 
tested the time series in level and failed to reject the null hypothesis of unit root, 
which implies that the level series are non-stationary.  
 
3.4  Variables Selected for Identifying the Bank Lending Channel in China 
 
Aguiar and Drumond (2006), Van den Heuvel (2007), and Gomez-Gonzalez and 
Grosz (2007) noted that bank capital influences the loan supply through changes in 
capital requirements. Furthermore, the interbank interest rate is used as the monetary 
policy instrument to influence bank loans (Gomez-Gonzalez and Grosz, 2007; Mello 
and Pisu, 2009) because it reflects the cost of a bank‟s borrowing that further affects a 
bank‟s lending. However, this study does not utilize these two variables for the 
following reasons. First, commercial banks in China have no strictly imposed capital 
adequacy regulations. Secondly, the interbank interest rate does not influence the 
commercial bank lending rates that are under the PBC‟s regulation. Geiger‟s (2006, 
2008) research showed that changes in interbank interest rates do not have any effect 
on bank loans in China.  
 
This research uses the total loans of financial institutions, official benchmark 
annualized one-year loan interest rate (RC) and required reserve ratio (RR) as the 
proxy for bank loan (BL) and the two policy instrument variables that influence loan 
demand and supply, respectively. The required reserves ratio is changed frequently by 
the PBC. Therefore, it is important to consider the effects of changes in the required 
reserve ratio on the variations of bank credit in China. Since the required reserves are 
levied solely on banks, the identification problem is much less acute for this policy 
variable. GDP is used as real activity variable that influences loan demand. The credit 
aggregate and GDP are deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) and defined in log 
terms. We also included seasonal dummy variables in the VECM, which consider the 
possibility of seasonal factors in the GDP and loan aggregate. Quarterly data from 
1997:Q1 to 2008:Q4 were obtained from the PBC quarterly statistical bulletin. We 
conducted the ADF unit root test on all relevant time series and report the results in 
Table 3.5.   
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Table 3.5 Results of ADF Unit Roots Test for Time Series 
Series K 
  3    1    
Levels 
GDP 1 -2.12 3.23 0.86 8.35*** 4.05 
BL 2 -0.81 4.39 2.66 17.74*** 5.82 
PI 6 -0.47 4.21 1.08 1.84 1.59 
RR 1 -1.90 5.10 -1.15 0.67 -0.20 
RC 1 -0.57 0.42 -0.69 1.00 -1.35 
Difference 
GDP 0 -11.60*** 67.42*** -11.43*** 65.36*** -9.26*** 
BL 1 -6.90*** 23.83*** -5.80*** 16.87*** -2.40** 
PI 5 -4.13** 8.93** -2.78* 3.92 -2.26** 
RR 0 -5.98*** 18.01*** -5.16*** 13.36*** -5.22*** 
RC 0 -3.10 5.39 -3.21** 5.40** -3.02*** 
Notes: ***; **;* signify 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively 
 
In difference, the   statistics are all significant at the 5% level. Thus, the null 
hypothesis of unit root is rejected. This suggests that the first differences of the time 
series are stationary. In level, the   statistics are insignificant at the 10% level for all 
time series. We failed to reject the unit root hypothesis and hence they are non-
stationary. The DFGLS unit root test results are shown in Table 3.6. The results are 
consistent with the ADF test. In difference, the hypothesis of unit root is rejected for 
all variables that are stationary. 
 
Table 3.6 Results of DFGLS Unit Root Tests for Time Series 
Series K Constant  Constant 
and trend  
k Constant  Constant 
and trend 
 Level Difference 
GDP 1 2.02 -1.76 0 -10.13*** -11.30*** 
BL 0 0.70 -0.92 2 -2.70*** -3.89*** 
PI 4 -0.98 -2.06 4 -2.08** -2.92* 
RR 1 -0.98 -1.29 0 -5.18*** -5.67 
RC 1 0..68 -2.01 0 -3.30*** -3.08* 
Notes: ***; **;* signify 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. K stands for the lag length 
that is determined by SIC. The results are obtained using Eviews 6. The sample period is 1997:Q1-
2008:Q4 
 
 
62 
 
3.5  Variables Selected for Evaluating the McCallum Rule 
 
Our study uses the GDP target and real effective exchange rate from 1994:Q1 to 
2009:Q1, and monetary base and nominal GDP from 1990:Q1 to 2009:Q1 to study the 
McCallum Rule. We chose 1994 as the starting point since the third phase of China‟s 
economic reforms started then. During the third phase, the official and market 
exchange rates were unified and current account transactions were liberalized. In 
addition, the banking reformd included the establishment of three policy (non-
commercial) banks and separating policy finance from more commercially oriented 
activities.  In the same year, the PBC started the monetary targeting regime using M2 
as the intermediate target.  
 
To construct the time series for  VB  (average value of previous four years) starting 
from 1994:Q2 ( MBNGDPVB / 7), we used the monetary base and nominal GDP 
data from 1990:Q1. However, officially released quarterly data for the monetary base 
are available only from 1993:Q1 (The People‟s Bank of China Quarterly Statistical 
Bulletin). Therefore, we utilized annual data for the monetary base and M1 from 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) to calculate the money multiplier for the period 
1990-1992. Based on the calculated money multiplier and officially released quarterly 
data for M1 from 1990:Q1 to 1992:Q4, we obtained the quarterly data for the 
monetary base from 1990:Q1 to 1992:Q4.  
 
Another important time series in the McCallum Rule is the nominal GDP target but it 
is unavailable for China since the Chinese government released only the annual real 
GDP target instead of the annual nominal GDP target. McCallum uses the sum of the 
average long-run real GDP growth rate and the target inflation rate as a proxy for the 
nominal GDP target. In China, the government announces a real GDP target and a 
RPI or CPI inflation target every year in the Report on the implementation of the plan 
for National Economic and Social Development and on the Protocol for National 
Economic and Social development. Although the RPI (retail price index) or CPI 
(consumer price index) inflation rate are not exactly equal to the GDP deflator 
inflation rate, we preferred the former to the latter, since the GDP deflator is a 
realized value not a target value.  Furthermore, we do not know how the current 
                                                 
7 NGDP and MB stand for nominal GDP and Monetary base in level. 
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changes in GDP are divided into the GDP deflator and real output growth. Before 
1997, the Chinese government announced a RPI inflation rate target instead of the 
CPI inflation rate target, and announced a RPI and CPI inflation target rate 
simultaneously between 1998 and 2000.  The annual CPI inflation target rate, which 
became available only from 2001, exceeded the annual RPI inflation target rate for the 
same period by 2%.  
 
To construct a complete time series for the CPI inflation target, we added 2% to the 
RPI inflation target rate for 1994-1997 to approximate the CPI inflation target values 
for the same period. Following this, we added the CPI inflation target rate to the 
officially announced real GDP target growth rate to obtain a time series for the annual 
nominal GDP growth rate target.  The annual values for the nominal GDP growth 
target rate are interpolated into quarterly values using the following formula: 
 
1)1( 4/1  arQr       (3.16)  
 
Where ar denotes annual growth rate and Qr  is the interpolated quarterly growth rate.  
 
Data on the exchange rate (quarterly average real effective exchange rate) were 
obtained from the Bank for International settlement (BIS) monthly average real 
effective exchange rate using the simple average method with the year 2005 equal to 
100.  
 
The results of ADF and DFGLS tests on monetary base growth rate ( B ), monetary 
base velocity change rate ( VB ), nominal GDP growth rate ( X ), real effective 
exchange rate change rate ( S ) are reported in Table 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. The 
results of both ADF and DFGLS tests show all time series are stationary. The   
statistics from the ADF test are significant at 5% level for all time series. Therefore, 
we can reject the null hypothesis of unit root. When including the constant alone, 
DFGLS also reported all time series reject the null hypothesis of unit root at 5% level.  
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Table3.7 Results of ADF Unit Root Tests for Time Series 
Series K 
  3    1    
Level 
B  1 -3.91** 7.71** -3.89*** 7.65** -2.28** 
VB  1 -2.63 4.56 -2.95** 4.35* -2.95*** 
X  0 -2.21 2.57 -2.23 6.74** -2.10** 
S  0 -5.22*** 13.70*** -5.22*** 13.65*** -4.96*** 
Notes: ***; **;* signify 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively 
 
Table 3.8 Results of DFGLS Unit Root Tests for Time Series 
Series K Constant  Constant and Trend 
Level    
B  2 -2.04** -2.83* 
VB  1 -2.09** -2.81* 
X  0 -12.39*** -12.29*** 
S  0 -4.46*** -5.16*** 
                 Notes: ***; **;* signify 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively 
 
3.6  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we selected the variables that will be used to test different monetary 
policy transmission channels based on theory. In the light of Enders (2004), 
macroeconomic variables, for example GDP, financial aggregates, interest rates and 
exchange rates, have time-dependent means and variances increasing over time. 
Therefore, after describing the concept of the data integration property, we used the 
ADF test and the Dickey-Fuller test with the detrending method to test the order of 
integration of our time series data. We found that all the time series data, except for 
short-term interest rates, were integrated of )1(I . For this reason, when testing whether 
an effective interest rate exists in China, we used the first different data to construct a 
difference VAR. A cointegration relationship existed among the related variables 
credit aggregate, price level, bank lending interest rate, GDP and required reserve 
ratio. Therefore, in next chapter, we can use a cointegration approach together with 
restrictions on the cointegrated relationship to test the bank lending channel. 
Moreover, the (0)I  properties of the monetary base growth rate ( B ), monetary base 
velocity change rate ( VB ), nominal GDP growth rate ( X ), real effective exchange 
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rate change rate ( S ) ensure that OLS method can be used in estimating the 
coefficients in the macroeconomic condition model before we conduct the simulation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the three different research methodologies used in the study.  
Section 4.2 presents the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) method used to test the effects 
of short-term interest rates on output and price level. Section 4.3 describes the 
cointegration method used to identify the bank lending channel in China. Section 4.4 
discusses a counterfactual simulation method used to study the McCallum Rule.  
 
4.2  Vector Autoregressive Method  
 
Since Sims‟s seminal paper in 1980, the VAR framework has been widely used in 
macroeconomics research because it allows the direct estimation of the joint 
stochastic processes describing the variables under consideration. If a researcher is 
unclear about which variable is endogenous and which is exogenous, the VAR 
method allows the researcher to treat all variables as jointly endogenous. Researchers 
using VAR to identify transmission of monetary policy in advanced economies 
include Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2000) for the United States, Kim and 
Nouriel, (2000) for the G-7 economies, and Peersman and Smets (2003) for the Euro 
area. Era and Holger (2007) and Cheng (2006) used the VAR framework to study the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism in developing countries Armenia and Kenya 
separately. The basic concepts underlying the VAR modelling process can be 
summarized as follows:  
 
Let tY  be a 1n  vector of variables, t a 1n  vector of mean zero structural 
innovations and 
p
pLBLBLBBLB  
2
210)(  a  nn  matrix polynomial in the 
lag operator. The pth  order structural VAR model is written as:  
( ) t tB L Y  ; 
'
ttE  ; 0
' sttE  ， 0     (4.1) 
where   is a diagonal matrix. 0B  is a non-singular normalized matrix with ones on 
the diagonal.  This matrix summarizes the contemporaneous relationships between the 
variables of the model. The coefficients are unknown and the variables have 
contemporaneous effects, so this VAR cannot be estimated directly because standard 
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estimation techniques require that the regressors be uncorrelated with the error term.  
We therefore transform equation (4.1) into a reduced form VAR:     
 
             ttt YLAY  )(  ;  
'
ttE  ;  0
' sttE  , 0    (4.2) 
 
where 
p
pLALAALILBBLA 
 22
1
0 )()(  and tt B 
1
0
 . 
 
The error terms t  are composites of the underlying shocks t . Equation (4.2) 
contains only predetermined variables and the errors terms are assumed to be serially 
uncorrelated with constant variance. Hence, each equation in the VAR system can be 
estimated using OLS. Furthermore, the OLS estimates are consistent and 
asymptotically efficient. The model must be exactly or over-identified in order to 
estimate the structural model.  We adopt the identification method proposed by Sims 
(1980) based on the Choleski decomposition of the structural innovations to solve the 
identification problem.  In order to recover the structural parameters from the reduced 
form model, so that the innovations in Choleski decomposition have a direct 
economic interpretation, there must be the same number of parameters in 0B   and   
as there are in , the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form.  
 
Combining equations (4.1) and (4.2), the variance-covariance matrix,   can be 
expressed as follows: 
'1
0
1
0 )()(
  BB       (4.3) 
 
Consistent estimates of 0B  and  can be obtained through the sample estimation of 
  that can be estimated by OLS.  The right hand side of equation (4.3) contains 
)1(  nn  parameters to be estimated whereas the left-hand side contains only 
2/)1(  nn  parameters; we need 2/)1(  nn  restrictions to achieve identification. 
If the n  diagonal elements of   are set to one, all that is required is a 
further ( 1) / 2n n   restriction on B . In the Choleski decomposition scheme, the 
identification of structural shocks depends on the ordering of the variables. It 
corresponds to a recursive economic structure with the most endogenous variable 
ordered last. 
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Following identification of the structural shocks of the interest rate, the standard 
practice in VAR analysis is to report results from Granger-causality tests, impulse 
responses, and forecast error variance decompositions (Stock and Watson, 2001).  
Because of the complicated dynamics in the VAR, these statistics are more 
informative than the estimated VAR regression coefficients or 2R  statistics, which 
typically go unreported (Stock and Watson, 2001).  
 
One of the main uses of VAR model is forecasting and the structure of the VAR 
model provides information about a variable‟s or a group of variables‟ forecasting 
ability for other variables. According to Granger (1969), if a variable, or a group of 
variables 1y  is helpful for predicting another variable, or a group of variables 2y , then 
1y  is said to Granger-cause 2y , otherwise it fails to Granger-cause 2y . Formally, 1y  
fails to Granger-cause 2y  if for all 0s  the MSE (mean square error) of a forecast of 
2,t sy   based on ),,( 1,2,2 tt yy  is the same as the MSE of a forecast of  2,t sy   based on 
),,( 1,2,2 tt yy  and ),,( 1,1,1 tt yy . Clearly, the notion of Granger causality does not 
imply true causality. It implies only forecasting ability. 
 
The impulse response function can be computed based on equations (4.2) and (4.1) as 
follows. First, we decompose the residual covariance matrix   as 'CDC  ; 
where C  is an invertible lower triangular matrix with ones along the diagonal and D  
is a diagonal matrix with positive diagonal elements. Next, we define the structural 
errors as -1Ct t  . These structural errors are orthogonal by construction since  
-1 -1' -1 ' -1'var( ) C C C CD Ct C D          (4.4) 
 
Any covariance stationary VAR( )p  process similar to equation (4.2) has a Wold 
representation of the form, where s  is ( )n n moving average matrices  
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
    (4.5) 
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where
j j A  , the matrices s  are determined by recursive 
substitution
1
1
p
s s j j
j
A



   , with 0 In   and 0jA   for j p . The structural B  
matrix in equation (4.1) is equal to -1C  . 
 
The impulse responses to the orthogonal shocks jt  are  
, ,
, ,
i t s i t s
ij
j t j t s
y y

 


 
 
 
, 0 ;, ,1 ,  snji      (4.6) 
Where 
s
ij  is the ( , )i j  element s . A plot of 
s
ij  against s  is called the orthogonal 
impulse response function of iy  with respect to j . With n variables, there are 
2n  
possible impulse response functions.  
 
The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) answers the question: what 
portion of the variance of the forecast error in predicting ,i t hy   is due to the structural 
shock j ? Using the orthogonal shocks t  the steph ahead forecast error vector, 
with a known VAR coefficient, may be expressed as: 
1
|
0
h
t h t h t s t h s
s
Y Y 

   

       (4.7) 
For a particular variable ,i t hy  , this forecast error has the form  
shtn
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Since the structural errors are orthogonal, the variance of the steph  forecast error is  
2
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yy    (4.9) 
where 
2 var( )j jt  . The portion of , , |var( )i t h i t h ty y   due to shock j  is:  
nji
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In a VAR with n  variables there will be 2n  ( )ijFEVD h  values. We must keep in 
mind that the FEVD in equation (4.10) depends on the recursive causal ordering used 
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to identify the structural shocks t  and is not unique. Different causal ordering will 
produce different FEVD values (Zivot and Wang, 2003).  
 
The variables in the model should be stationary for the model to be meaningful in 
modelling the relationships among the outputs, prices, and policy-related variables in 
a VAR.  However, the unit root tests have shown nonstationarity for some time series 
used in our study.  Sims (1980A) and Sims and Stock and Watson (1990) 
recommended against differencing when the related variables are cointegrated (the 
cointegration procedure will be discussed in next the section) even if the variables 
contain a unit root.  They argued that the goal of a VAR analysis is to determine the 
interrelationships among the variables, not to determine the parameter estimates. 
Conducting the analysis in levels allows for implicit cointegration relationship in the 
data. However, if the related )1(I  variables are not cointegrated, it is preferable to use 
the first difference. There are three consequences if the )1(I  variables are not 
cointegrated and one estimates the VAR in level. The first consequence is the test 
loses its power because we estimate 2n  with more than one parameter. The second is 
the test for Granger causality on the )1(I  variables, which do not have a standard F  
distribution for a VAR in levels.  The last is when the VAR has )1(I  variables, the 
impulse responses at long forecast horizons are inconsistent estimates of the true 
response.  
 
Enders (2004) noted that the lag length test can be performed regardless of the 
variables in question are stationary or integrated. Eviews 6 selects the lag length of 
our VAR model using the VAR lag order selection criteria. All the information 
criteria select a lag order of one. The residual test suggests that we can reject 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity at the conventional 5% level of significance.  
Based on the selected lag length, we performed two cointegration tests; one for the 
same five variables in the level VAR, and exclude the short-term interest rates in the 
second test. The results show that when short-term interest rates are included in the 
VAR, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration (see Table 4.1). In this 
study, we use the first order difference of the related variables to construct a VAR 
model. 
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Table 4.1 Result of Johansen Cointegration Test  
Variables: GDP, CPI, M, INTm, NERR (p=1) 
0H     Trace  5% Critical Value  Max-Eigen  5% Critical 
Value 
0r      76.72   88.03         27.07        38.33 
Variable: GDP, CPI, M, NEER (p=1) 
0H     Trace  5% Critical Value  Max-Eigen  5% Critical 
Value 
or      67.50   54.07         35.99                       28.58 
This table reports two Johansen cointegration test results, one for the five variables in the level VAR, 
and one excluding the short-term interest rate variable. 
 
The vector of endogenous variables in our benchmark model, equation (4.11), consists 
of real GDP (GDP), the consumer price index (CPI), monetary aggregate (M), 
interbank market borrowing rate (INTm) and nominal effective foreign exchange rate 
(NEER).  We replaced the interbank market bond repurchase rate (INTr) with INTm 
in equation (4.12) to test the robustness of our results:  
 
 NEERINTmMCPIGDPYt ,,,,     (4.11) 
 NEERINTrMCPIGDPYt ,,,,     (4.12) 
 
Equation (4.11) and (4.12) show the ordering of the variables.  When using Choleski 
decomposition method to identify structural shocks, the ordering of variables is of 
crucial importance. According to Favero (2001), monetary variables should be 
ordered last, since they are expected to react faster to real economy than otherwise. 
Belke and Polleit (2010) strongly support Favero‟s principle of ordering variables. 
The Chinese government sets its real GDP growth rate and inflation rate every year, 
and they are real variables. Currently, money supply is still PBC‟s policy operating 
target, and short-term interests are assumed to be endogenous. Under the managed 
floating foreign exchange rate regime, exchange rate is determined by domestic and 
international together, so it is assumed to be most endogenous variable. For these 
reason, we assumed that prices (CPI) have no immediate effects on output (GDP), 
money stock (M) has no immediate effect on prices, monetary policy shock (INTm) 
has no immediate effect on the money stock and the nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEER) has no immediate effect on the money policy. Technically, this means we 
first estimate the reduced form of the benchmark model equation (4.11) then compute 
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the Cholesky factorization of the reduced form VAR covariance matrix. In other 
words, the relations between the reduced form errors and the structural disturbances 
are given as follows: 
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4.3  Johansen Cointegration Tests and Vector Error Correction Model 
 
In this section, we present the econometric framework and the procedures used to 
identify the bank lending channel. We model China‟s bank lending activity using a 
vector error correction model (VECM). We then test for cointegration using the 
Johansen procedure.  
 
Suppose tX   represents a column vector of integrated order-d  variables. If some 
linear combination of these ( )I d  variables, denoted 
' ( 0)tX    is integrated of 
order *d d , then the variables tY  are said to be cointegrated of order 
*d d  with 
cointegration vector   (Engle and Granger, 1987). The most important case is 
where * 0d  , since this condition implies that the cointegration relation ' tX  is 
integrated of order zero, and hence is stationary. The stationarity condition allow us to 
interpret the stationary cointegrating relationship, ' ~ (0)tX I , among the series tX  as 
a stable long-run “equilibrium” relationship since this specific set of variables obeys 
certain long-run equilibrium constraints. The intuition behind the concept of 
cointegration is that, even though the level variables are non-stationary, which is, 
dominated by their long-run components, certain linear combinations of these 
variables can be stationary. In these circumstances, the long-run components of the 
series cancel each other out to produce a stationary time series. Such variables are 
then said to be cointegrated, and the vectors of coefficients of the linear combinations 
are called the cointegrating vectors. The estimation methods for cointegration analysis 
fall into two categories: single equation method and system method. Phillips (1991) 
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demonstrated that the best approach to the estimation of a cointegarted system is the 
Johansen maximum likelihood procedure (Johansen, 1991). The Johansen maximum 
likelihood procedure ensures that the coefficient estimates obtained through this 
procedure are systematically distributed, median unbiased, and asymptotically 
efficient, and that hypothesis tests may be conducted using standard asymptotic Chi-
square tests.   
 
A principal feature of cointegrated variables is that their short-run dynamics must be 
influenced by the deviation from long-run equilibrium. The dynamic model implied 
by this feature is one of the error corrections.  In an error-correction model, the short-
run dynamics of the variables in the system are influenced by the deviation from 
equilibrium.  
  
The Johansen (1991) multivariate cointegration procedure is based on the k th  order 
vector autogression (VAR) model. 
 
tTktkttt DYAYAYAY    2211  (4.14) 
  
Where ),,,( 21  pt YYYY   is a 1p  vector of jointly endogenous (1)I  variables. 
),2,1( kiAi   is a p p matrix of parameters,   is a 1p  vector of constant to 
represent deterministic trend, tD  are centred seasonal dummy variables orthogonal 
to , and 01 ,, YY kt  are fixed initial values. The 1p  random disturbance vector t  
is assumed to be distributed independent and identically normal with zero mean and 
covariance matrix .  
 
To highlight explicitly the distinction between the short-run dynamics and long-run 
static disequilibrium response the vector autoregressive model given in question is 
rewritten as a vector error-correction form as: 
  
ttktkttt DYBYBYBY    12211   (4.15) 
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Where 
1 1
k
ii
B I A

    and 
k
j ii j
B A

   for kj ,,2  . In this reformulated 
model the matrices kBB ,,2   capture the short-run dynamic effects of the system 
since they are the coefficient matrices of the stationary lagged difference 
terms 11 ,,   ktt YY  . On the other hand, 1B  describes the long-run statistic 
equilibrium relationship that exists within the system since it contains the stationary 
linear combination of the integrated level variables 1tY  . As such, the coefficient 
matrix 1B  is called the long-run impact matrix.  
 
Johansen (1991) showed that the number of distinct stationary cointegration 
relationships r  among the variables tY  is given the rank of 1B ,
 where 
10 ( ) 1rank B r p    . This reduced rank condition permits the null hypothesis of at 
most r  distinct stationary cointegrating vectors 1( )H r , to be formulated as: 
  
'
1 1( ) :H r B       (4.16) 
 
Where  and    are both p r  matrices of full rank r . The columns of   are 
interpreted as the r  stationary cointegarting vectors of the systems tY . That is,   has 
the property that the linear combinations ' tY  are stationary even though tY  is itself 
non-stationary (Engle and Granger 1987). The thi  row of   measures the 
contribution of the vector error-correction model. More specifically, the individual 
values ir  indicate the force with which thi  equation responds to disequilibrium in 
the thr  cointegrating relations. The larger the absolute value of ir , the faster is the 
force of adjustment. As such, the matrix a  is often interpreted as a matrix of error-
correction or adjustment parameters.  
 
Since the Johansen procedure focuses on   and  , it first eliminates kBB ,,2  . This 
estimation procedure proceeds by first adjusting the differenced and level series tY  
and 1tY   for all short-run dynamic effects in the model. This is achieved by regressing 
tY  and 1tY   individually on 11 ,,   ktt YY   and a constant and obtaining the two 
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1p  least squares residual vectors 0 1 and t tR R , respectively. 0 1 and t tR R  are 
interpreted as the differenced and level series adjusted for short-run dynamics. These 
residual vectors are then used to reformulate the model as: 
  
1'ot tR a R error       (4.17) 
 
which is a standard reduced rank regression model only in the unknown 
parameters  and   .  
 
The Johansen procedure maximizes the likelihood function with respect to   and   
and shows that the maximum of the likelihood function is obtained by solving the 
eigenvalue problem 
 
1
11 10 00 01 0S S S S
       (4.18) 
 
The matrices 1
1
 ( , 0,1)
T
ij it jtt
S T R R i j

   are the corresponding p p  residual 
product moment matrices of 0 1 and t tR R . Let )
ˆˆˆ( 21 pr     be the 
corresponding estimated eigenvalues of equation (4.15) and let )ˆ,ˆ,,ˆ( 1 pr    
be the corresponding estimated eigenvectors normalized such that '
11S I   . 
 
The roots of equation (4.18), )ˆˆˆ( 21 pr    , represent the r  
squared canonical correlations between 0 1 and t tR R . The corresponding eigenvectors 
i  define the directions in which the linear combinations 
'
iˆ tY  are correlated with the 
stationary process, 0tR . Thus, 
ˆ
i  measures how strongly the linear combination 1tY   
is correlated with the stationary part of the system tY  after correcting for short –run 
dynamics.  
 
The number of cointegrating vectors is generally unknown and all estimated eigen- 
values ˆi  are nonzero. To determine the number of stationary cointegrating 
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relationships one must therefore statistically discriminate between nonzero and zero 
eigen-values. Johansen (1988, 1991) proposed two likelihood ratio test statistics for 
testing the hypothesis of r  cointegrating vectors.  They are called the trace statistic 
and the max  , or maximal eigen-value, statistic. The trace statistic tests the null 
hypothesis 0r r  against the alternative 0r r  for ),,1,0(0 pr   and is defined as  
0
1 0 1
1
ˆ( ( ) | ( )) ln(1 )
p
Trace i
i r
Q H r r H p T 
 
       (4.19) 
 
Where prr 
ˆˆˆ
21 00
    are the 0p r  smallest estimated eigen-values of 
equation (4.19). In contrast, the maximal eigen-value statistic tests the null hypothesis 
0r r  against the alternative 0 1r r   and is defined as  
 
01 0 1 0 1
ˆ( ( ) | ( 1)) ln(1 )Max rQ H r r H r r T          (4.20) 
 
The main difference between these two statistics is that the maximal eigen-value 
statistic tests the null against a specific alternative, whereas the trace statistic tests 
against a general alternative. The intuition behind these test statistics is 
straightforward. Since the cointegrating relationships are associated with non-zero 
eigen-values testing the null of r  cointegrating vectors is equivalent to testing how 
many of the largest order eigen-values are significantly different from zero or 
equivalently, how many of the smallest ordered eigen-values are not significantly 
different from zero.  
 
In the case of the trace statistic, if the null hypothesis of at most 0r  cointegrating 
vectors is true, then there must be 0p r  estimated eigen-values that are not 
statistically different from zero, or equivalently, if the calculated trace statistic TraceQ  
is large. Analogously, for the maximal eigen-value statistic, if the null hypothesis of 
exactly 0r  cointegrating vectors is true, then we would expect the estimated 0 1r   
ordered eigen-value 
0 1
ˆ
r   to be not statistically different from zero. Thus, we would 
reject this null if 
0 1
ˆ
r   is small, or equivalently, if the calculated value of the 
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maximaleigen-value statistic MacQ  is large. In both cases, the testing procedure is 
sequential commencing with the null hypothesis 1 : 0H R   and ending when one first 
fails to reject the null hypothesis under test. In either case, the null hypothesis is 
rejected if the calculated test statistic exceeds its corresponding critical value.  
 
In general, the trace statistic tends to have greater power than the maximal eigen-
value statistic when 
'ˆ
i s  are evenly distributed. The reason is that the trace statistic 
takes into consideration all 0p r  smallest eigen-values. In contrast, the maximal 
eigen-value statistic has greater power when the ˆi s are either too large or small. 
Under the null hypothesis of 0r r  cointegrating vectors, the asymptotic distribution 
of both the trace and the maximal eigen-value statistics are non-standard. However, 
the critical values for these test statistics are tabulated by simulation in Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) and Osterwald-Lenum (1992).  
 
The Johansen technique determines how many independent cointegrating 
relationships exist among the set of variables considered. However, the estimated 
parameter values in the r  coinntegrating relations are not unique. In addition, when 
r >1, we need other conditions to identify the parameters of the structural equations 
of the system in question. Therefore, we need to test the restrictions on the elements 
of the   and  parameters matrices. The test of  allows us to identify which of the 
equations in the system the cointegrating vectors enter and at what magnitude. The 
test of   is concerned with restrictions on the parameters within the long run 
relationships themselves. The test of   is particularly important since the objective is 
to extract estimates of the structural equations that underline the reduced form. The 
parameter estimates obtained after having specified how many cointegrating 
relationships exist are the unrestricted reduced form parameter estimates.  
 
When r =1, the parameter estimates of the single cointegration relationship can be 
read directly from the estimated   vector. There is no difference between the reduced 
form and structural model in this case. The estimated parameter values can be 
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obtained by following a conventional normalization, in which the variable is regarded 
as the dependent variable in the relationship and is given a coefficient of -1.  
 
When r >1, it is not rational to take the unrestricted estimates of the vectors in   
directly as economically meaningful long run parameter estimates. In addition to the 
normalization problem, it is necessary to impose and test restrictions on the elements 
of   to identify the long-run structural relationships between the variables. An 
important part of this exercise is to conduct the long-run exclusion tests (i.e. the 
parameters associated with particular variables have zero coefficients). Johansen 
(1995) and Juselius (2006) discussed the formal description of this procedure as 
follows: 
 
Let iR  denote a 1 ip m  restriction matrix and i iH R   a 1 ip s  design matrix 
( 1)i im s p   so that
' 0i iR H  . Thus, there are im  restrictions and consequently is  
parameters to be estimated in the thi  relation. The cointegrating relations are 
assumed to satisfy the restriction ' 0i iR   , or equivalently i i iH   for some 
vectoris   i , that is  
),,( 11 rrHH        (4.21) 
where the matrices 1, rH H  express the linear hypothesis on   to be tested. Note 
that the linear restrictions iH  do not specify any normalization of the vectors i . 
 
Here, we discuss some principles for choosing iH so that (4.21) identifies the 
cointegrating relations. The rank condition for identification requires that the first 
cointegration relations, for example, is identified if  
 
1) , ,(), ,( '111
'
1
'
11
'
1  rHRHRrankRRrank rrr          (4.22)  
 
This implies that no linear combination of r  , ,2  can produce a vector that looks 
like the first relation, i.e. satisfies the restrictions defining the first relation. However, 
in order to check the rank condition (4.22) we need to know the coefficients i  
) , ,1( ri   but, in order to estimate the coefficients we need to know whether the 
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restrictions are identifying. One can check the rank condition before estimation by 
first giving the coefficient   some arbitrary numbers. If the rank condition is satisfied, 
estimation can proceed. To avoid the arbitrary coefficients and explicitly check the 
rank condition based on the known matrices iR and iH , Johansen (1995) gave the 
following condition for a set of restrictions to be identifying.  
 
The set of restrictions is formally identified if for all i  and 1,,1  rg   and any set 
of indices rii g  11  not containing i , it holds that: 
 
gHRHRrank
g
iiii ),(
''
1
     (4.23) 
where, gii  , ,1  indicates the number of columns in the matrix ) , ,(
''
1 giiii
HRHR  . 
The matrix ) , ,( ''
1 giiii
HRHR  contains at least g linearly independent columns.  
 
To identify the restrictions, the rank condition (4.23) holds for all iR  ( ri ,,1 ). The 
structure is over-identified if it is identified and the inequality (>) holds for at least 
one i . The structure is just-identified if equality holds for all i  and there are zero 
restrictions. If other than zero restrictions are imposed, such as (-1, 1), the inequality 
(>) in equation (4.23) can in some cases be found in a just-identified model. The 
structure is under-identified if the rank condition (equation 4.23) is violated for at 
least one i .  
 
In an identified model, the parameters can be estimated subject to the restrictions by 
the iterative procedure reported below.  
 
We consider the equilibrium error correction term in equation (4.15) and write it as 
follows: 
 
1
''
1
'
1
'
11
'
1
'
111
'
  trrrtrrtt YHYHYY        (4.24) 
 
The hypothesis on   is expressed as ),,(),,( 111 rrr HH    . 
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where ),1( riHi   are known design matrices of dimension 1 ip s , and i  are 1is   
matrices of unrestricted coefficients. We again partition   so that it corresponds to 
the partitioning of  : ),,( 1 r  . 
The concentrated model can be written as follows: 
 
ttrrrtt RHRHR   1
'
1
'
1
'
110         (4.25) 
 
The estimation procedure can be summarized as follows: for fixed values of r ,,2  , 
or r ,,2  , we can find the ML estimate of 1  by performing a reduced rank 
regression of tY  on 
'
1 1tH Y   correct for all the stationary and deterministic terms, that 
is, 1
'
1
'
2 ,,  trt YY   , 1tY   and tD . This determines the estimate of 1  and 
hence 1 1 1H  . In the next step, we keep the values r ,,, 31   fixed and perform a 
reduced rank regression of tY  on 
'
2 1tH Y   corrected for all stationary and 
deterministic terms. This determines 2 . By applying the algorithm until the 
likelihood function has converged to its maximum, we can find the maximum 
likelihood estimates of   subject to the identifying restrictions.  
 
The speed of convergence of the switching algorithm depends very much on how we 
choose the initial values of  . For example, the unrestricted estimates of   are not in 
general the best choice because the unrestricted eigenvectors need not correspond to 
the ordering given by rHH ,,1  , and thus can be very undesirable initial values. 
Instead, the linear combination of the unrestricted estimates which is as close as 
possible to ( )isp H  ( ri ,,1  ) is clearly preferable as a starting value for i . These 
can be found by solving the eigen-value problem: 
 
 ˆ)(ˆˆˆ '1''' iiii HHHH
     (4.26) 
 
For the r  eigenvalue r 1  and r ,1 , and choose the eigenvector defined by 
iiH 
ˆ~  as initial value for i  . This choice of initial values has the extra advantage 
that for exactly identified equations no iterations are needed.  
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The test restrictions on the elements of the matrix , also known as the loading matrix, 
address the weak exogeneity issue. Let the parameters of interest be ija , and the 
parameters of the r  the cointegrating vectors. If 1 2 0i i ira a a    , the 
i th endogenous variable, ix , is weakly exogenous for the system as a whole, it 
would be valid to model a reduced system of 1n equations condition on ix  
(Johansen, 1992). If the individual elements of  are zero, this implies the absence of 
a particular cointegrating relationship in the equations in the ECM system. This may 
also have implications for weak exogeneity of the variables with respect to the 
parameters of interest. For example, ija =0 implies that the 
thj cointegrating vector 
does not enter the thi equation in the VAR (Viegi, 2005). 
 
4.4  Counterfactual Simulation Method 
 
Following the McCallum framework (1987, 2002A), we used the counterfactual 
simulation method to evaluate the possibility of the McCallum Rule to achieve a 
nominal GDP growth rate target for China. If the application of the rule in place of 
actual historical policy yields smoother nominal GDP paths than those actually 
experienced, we can conclude the rule performs well. In order to calculate the 
performance of the McCallum Rule in minimizing deviations around a given target 
path for nominal GDP, we need to specify the macroeconomic conditions in which the 
policy rule will work. Before presenting the simulation technique, we first discuss the 
macroeconomic condition used in this study. McCallum (1988, 1993) and Stark and 
Croushore (1996) documented the robustness of the rule by testing it across different 
models. The simple reduced-form type models used by McCallum (1988, 1993, 
2002A) provided results that are comparable to those produced with small but 
somewhat more complex structure models used in his studies. Additionally, Hall 
(1990), Hafer et al. (1991, 1996) and Philip (2000) used single equation models to 
evaluate the McCallum Rule.  
 
Recently, DSGE models have been widely used in monetary policy research for 
developed economies and some developing economies. However, this study does not 
use the DSGE model to construct a macroeconomic environment to simulate the 
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money supply growth path and nominal GDP growth path for a few reasons.  First, 
most DSGE models available in the literature have a basic structure that incorporates 
elements of the New Keynesian paradigm and the real business cycle approach. The 
benchmark of the DSGE model is a fully micro-founded model with real and nominal 
rigidity (see, Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2003). 
 
In a benchmark DSGE model, households decide how much to invest and are 
monopolistic suppliers of different types of labour, which allows them to set the 
wages. However, it is widely known that China‟s economic development depends 
more on government-led investments and export instead of consumption. In addition, 
China confronts a high unemployment problem. Households are nearly complete 
wage-takers and have no ability to affect aggregate investment and labour supplies. 
Therefore, the use of the DSGE model in China lacks a micro-foundation. Secondly, 
modelling and capturing the dynamics of emerging market economies is not easy. 
This is partly related to the idiosyncratic structural features exhibited by emerging 
economies as well as the historical vulnerabilities to external factors and resulting 
periods of high macroeconomic instabilities (Tovar, 2009). Thirdly, DSGE models are 
not likely to outperform other traditional models available at central banks, at least for 
now (Tovar, 2009).  
 
Previous research showed that single equations could provide sufficient economic 
conditions to evaluate the McCallum Rule and that the DSGE model is not 
appropriate to evaluate China‟s monetary policy. In this study, we first replicated a 
single equation macroeconomic model used by McCallum (2002A) that specified the 
relationship between the nominal GDP growth and monetary base growth. This model 
provided a basic macroeconomic condition to evaluate the possible effectiveness of 
the McCallum Rule using China‟s data. The model is as follows: 
 
ttttt BXXX 11322110       (4.27) 
 
where tX  and tB  denote logarithms of the nominal GDP and the monetary base, 
respectively. tX  and tB  are quarterly growth rates. t1 is disturbance term.  
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To avoid the reverse-causation problem, equation (4.27) excluded the tB  term (Sims, 
1980B; King and Plosser, 1982). This method avoids the real sector that drives the 
monetary sector, in contrast to the traditional view of monetary movements as a 
business cycle impulse. Furthermore, it is common that monetary policy operates with 
variable lags on the economy (Blinder, 1998, p.13).  Equation (4.27) introduces a full 
two-quarter lag between the target departures 1
*
1   tt XX and corrective effects, 
which reflects the causal direction. Before conducting the simulation, we estimated 
the parameters and residuals of equation (4.27) over the study period, with the 
residuals capturing shocks to the economy. Then, using the McCallum Rule given by 
equation (2.1) and the initial actual values of GDP growth and monetary base growth, 
we determined a simulated value for monetary base growth. With a simulated 
monetary base growth, we can then use equation (4.27) to obtain a simulated value for 
nominal GDP, which feed into the equation. The root–mean–squared-error (RMSE) is 
used to measure the deviations of the simulated and actual values of the nominal GDP 
from the targets. The RMSE is given as follows: 
 
      nXXRMSE tt /)( 2*     (4.28) 
In McCallum‟s view, a floating exchange rate regime is necessary for the monetary 
policy rule to work effectively (1987, p. 13). Given China‟s managed floating 
exchange rate regime, we extend equation (4.27) by adding an exchange rate variable 
to test the rule‟s robustness, namely:  
 
tttttt SBXXX 2141322110      (4.29) 
 
where tS  denotes the log of the real effective exchange rate, with an increase in 
tS implying a devaluation of the Chinese currency. 
 
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the technical characteristics of the 
counterfactual simulation technique. Currently, three main methods are used by 
economists to explore their interesting economic problems. The first is the regression 
method, asking how in fact results varied with initial or exogenous conditions. The 
second is the counterfactual simulation method, which asks how the results would 
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vary. Counterfactual simulation is what alternatives to actual history there are. It 
imagines what would have happened to an economy if, contrary to fact, some present 
condition were changed. When performing a counterfactual simulation, the usual 
method is to construct an explicit model M , with parameters, P , and initial conditions 
(or exogenous variables), I , and the simulation results obtained by way of 
endogenous variables, R . The counterfactual simulation process is to vary some 
element of the setup, the simplest being a variation in I  , and then compare the 
different results (McCloskey, 1987). The third one is the computational experiment 
method (Kydland and Prescott 1996). It was not used in this research.  
 
A model could be simulated deterministically or stochastically. In a deterministic 
simulation, all equations in the model are solved so that they hold without error 
during the simulation period (namely, all the error terms in the behaviour equations 
have been set at zero), all coefficients are held fixed at their point estimates and all 
exogenous variables are held constant. In a stochastic simulation, the equations of the 
model are solved so that they have residuals, which match to randomly drawn error 
and, optionally, the coefficients of exogenous variables of the model also varied 
randomly. Formally, we report Kolsrud‟s (2004) review on stochastic simulation as 
below.  
 
A macroeconomic model is a nonlinear dynamic simultaneous equation system. 
Without forward-looking behaviour its structural equations can be written as follows: 
 
1( , , , ) ~ (0, )t t t tf y y x iid       (4.30) 
 
Where f  denotes a vector function. The ty , 1ty  , tx , and   are vectors of current and 
lagged endogenous variables, exogenous variables and parameter respectively. t  is a 
vector of errors or shocks, assumed to be intertemporally independent and identically 
distributed ( )iid , with zero means and a contemporaneous covariance matrix . The 
dynamic structure of the model is made explicit by the inclusion of a single lag 1ty  . 
Lags in the exogenous variables are irrelevant for the discussion and are dropped to 
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simplify notation. Definitional equations are embodied in f . They do not contribute 
to the simulation properties of the model, and are therefore ignored.  
 
The parameters are estimated by suitable methods. The estimated model is given as 
follows: 
 
1( , , , ) ~ (0, )t t t tf y y x b e id S     (4.31) 
 
b  denotes estimates of parameters. The vectors of the empirical residuals te  are 
dependent, but approximately identically distributed ( )id .  
 
Generally, the nonlinear system equation (4.30) has no closed form solution for ty . 
However, the system implicitly defines a presumably unique solution 
1( , , , ).t t t ty g y x    A numerical approximation to this solution is a deterministic 
dynamic simulation of equation (4.31): 
 
),,~,,~(~ 1 bxygy tttt     00
~ yy  ,   Tt ,,1   (4.32) 
 
where the tildes denote simulated values. It is common to set 0)(~  tt E  . 
If the model is linear, equation (4.31) can be written as 1t t t tGy Dy Px e   . G, D and 
P denote matrices of parameter estimates. With an invertible G , the linear version of 
equation (4.32) is given as: 
 
ttt PxGyDGy
1
1
1 ~~ 

      (4.33) 
which maps ( ) 0tE    onto ( | , , )tE y G D P . This is called certainty-equivalence. In a 
nonlinear model, it does not hold. The procedure implicitly follows the statistical 
practice of plugging in the best estimates of unknown parameters, and treating only 
the   as stochastic.  If we alter this practice by treating the parameter estimates as 
stochastic, then certainty-equivalence becomes untenable.  
 
86 
 
From the specification and estimation of the model, it follows that the shocks t  in 
equation (4.30) and the estimates ˆb   in equation (4.31) are stochastic. The 
unknown parameters   are constants. Therefore, the exogenous variables x  are the 
only deterministic input.  
 
The mapping of variables implies a mapping of probability distributions of input 
variables onto a probability distribution of output variables. Classical econometrics 
lets us assume that the input vectors are independent. The two mappings can be 
schematized as: 
  
1
ˆ, 1 1 ,
                          , , , model
                                           
( ), , ( ), ( ) model ( )
t t t t
y t t t t y t t
y x b y
F y x F F F y 

 

 
 

 
   (4.34) 
 
where F  denotes a joint distribution. A time subscript on ,y tF  accommodates non-
stationarity. Since the mapping of the input variables is known implicitly through the 
structural model equation (4.31), the resulting mapping of the variables‟ distributions 
is unknown. But , ( )y t tF y  ( Tt ,,1 ) can be estimated by dynamic stochastic 
simulation.  
 
Stochastic simulation is synonymous with sampling the distributions of the stochastic 
variables in the estimated model. This involves first sampling the stochastic input 
variables and then it approximates the implicit reduced form solution numerically. 
The two tasks can be seen as first sampling on the input side of the model directly and 
then on the output side of the model indirectly. The sampling is carried out by 
replicating a single (deterministic) simulation N  times. Each  n  replication is 
simulated with new values of the stochastic input variables randomly drawn from 
their respective postulated and estimated distributions. A simple way to do this is to 
assume a certain parametric distribution, typically normal, for the shocks and the 
simulation parameters, and to centre the distributions on the expected zero shock 
vector and on the estimated parameter vector.  
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The algorithm for stochastic dynamic simulation of a backward-looking model is:  
 
For Nn ,,2,1   replications of a single dynamic simulation  
   Generate ~ ( , ),n ni iN b B  and let ,0 0ny y  
   For Tt ,2,1  periods within a single dynamic simulation  
         Generate
, ,~ (0, )n t n ti iN S , and simulate , , 1 ,( , , , )n t n t t n t ny g y x    
End for t  loop (returns a solution path , , 1( )
N
n t n t tY y   for replication n ) 
End for n  loop (returns a bundle of N  solution paths , , 1 1{( ) }
N N
n t n t t nY y    
n  is independent over replications ( )ni , and identically distributed normal ( )iN , 
centred on the estimates b  with empirical covariance matrix B . Its value changes 
only with each n  replication and remains constant through the T  simulation periods. 
,n t  is independent over both replications and time ,( )n ti  and is identically normally 
distributed. A new value is drawn for every simulation period t  in every n  replication.  
 
In this study, we undertook stochastic simulation rather than deterministic simulation 
to find whether adopting the McCallum Rule would help stabilize China‟s output and 
price level (see Copper and Fisher, 1972). First, the incorporation of random 
disturbances into a stable economic system can produce cyclical behaviour. In 
addition, nonstochastic simulations of nonlinear models can lead to results 
inconsistent with the true properties of the stochastic model. It is particularly 
important in the study of rules to decide on the use of the deterministic or stochastic 
forms of models because use of the deterministic forms of models would be likely to 
lead to recommending some sort of constant growth rate rules when exogenous 
variables follow steady time paths. Following these rules, policy variables will keep 
target variables constant or grow at a constant rate, since econometric models are 
usually systems of difference equations. In practice, economic relations do not hold 
exactly and it is not possible to keep variables exactly at their target levels. There will 
be discrepancies between the target and actual values of variables whatever policies 
are used; the question at issue is whether attempting to adjust these discrepancies by 
means of rules that depend on observations of the economy will be destabilizing. The 
technique of stochastic simulation ensures the existence of differences between actual 
and target values of variables under all policy regimes.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
Three different research methodologies were described in this chapter. The advantage 
of the standard VAR method is that it allows researchers to treat all variables as 
jointly endogenous. In testing whether an effective interest rate channel exists, we are 
not sure which of the relationships, changes in macro-variables driving the changes in 
short-term interest rate or changes in short-term interest rates driving the changes in 
macro-variables, holds. Therefore, it is an appropriate method for us.  
 
We then reproduced the Johansen cointegration procedure (1991). This procedure 
allows us to find out how many cointegration relationships exist. If more than one 
cointegration relationship exists, we can identify the loan supply and loan demand 
relationships simultaneously by imposing some restrictions on these cointegration 
relationships based on China‟s economic condition. The method of imposing 
restrictions on cointegration relationships (Johansen, 1995) helps us to disentangle the 
bank loan demand and supply forces so that we can make sure whether the PBC could 
effectively control the credit supply using its policy instruments. The VECM model 
allows us to test the short-run dynamic relationships among the related variables 
without losing the long-run relationship. 
 
Finally, we describe the simulation method. This method is widely used when 
evaluating different policy rules. To simulate the McCallum Rule, we need a model to 
characterize the properties of a given economy. For this purpose, we use equations 
(4.27) and (4.29) to characterize China‟s macroeconomic circumstances.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter reports the empirical results about the three aspects of China‟s monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. Section 5.1 documents the results of the block 
causality test, the impulse response functions and forecasting error variance 
decompositions regarding the impacts of changes in short-term interest rate on output 
and price level. The next section reports the cointegration test results and the 
imposition of joint exclusion and exogeneity restrictions in identifying the bank 
lending channel in China. The simulation results of the McCallum Rule in a simple 
macroeconomic model are presented in Section 5.3.  
 
5.2  Impacts of Changes in the Short-term Interest Rate on Real Variables 
 
This section reports the block Granger Causality test, the response to system shocks 
by analysing impulse and forecasting error variance decomposition. Table 5.1 
summarizes the Granger Causality test results for the five-variable VAR and the P -
values associated with the F -statistics to test whether the relevant sets of coefficients 
are zero.  
 
  Table 5.1 VAR Granger-Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
 Dependent Variables in Regression 
Regressor  ∆GDP ∆CPI ∆M2 ∆INTm  ∆NEER 
∆GDP   0.56 0.74 0.20 0.86 
∆CPI 0.45  0.51 0.29 0.37 
∆M  0.21 0.95   0.07* 0.55 
∆INTm 0.61  0.06* 0.90  0.49 
∆NEER 0.84   0.01** 0.86 0.71  
This table summarizes the Granger Causality results for the five-variable VAR.  
* and ** indicates significance level of 10 and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The results show increases in the INTm
8
 and NEER significantly predict the CPI 
growth at 10% and 1% significance levels respectively, but did not Granger cause 
                                                 
8 Note: now that the first difference of all variables, namely INTm, NEER, GDP, CPI, M and Repo, was used in 
this section, and NEER, GDP, CPI and M are in logarithmic form, so the changes in a variable refer to the changes 
in its growth rate. 
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GDP. An increase in the monetary aggregate Granger causes the growth of INTm at 
the 10% significance level, but not vice versa. 
 
Impulse responses trace the response of current and future values for each of the 
variables to a one-unit increase in the current value of one of the VAR errors. This 
assumes that errors return to zero in subsequent periods and that all other errors are 
equal to zero (Stock and Watson, 2001). In other words, the interpretation of the 
impulse response requires that the innovations be contemporaneously uncorrelated 
across equations. However, the innovations in a VAR are correlated and may be 
viewed as having a common component that cannot be associated with a specific 
variable (Eviews 6). Thus, we use the inverse of the Choleski factor of the residual 
covariance matrix to orthogonalize the impulses.  
 
Figure 5.1 presents the impulse response functions that document the impact of a one-
off rise in the INTm on output, prices, monetary aggregate and exchange rate. The 
dotted lines show the impact of a unit rise in the monetary aggregate on other 
variables at 95% confidence levels. Output changed by about 0.4%, peaking in the 
second quarter and vanishing completely by the seventh quarter following monetary 
contraction. The CPI changed by about 0.2% peaking in the second quarter and 
decreased to below 0.1% by the fifth quarter after monetary contraction. The response 
of the monetary aggregate to the interest rate shock appeared to be insignificant. 
However, an inspection of these impulse response functions shows that the response 
functions of GDP and CPI are inconsistent with what we expected to be the effects of 
monetary policy contraction. Only the impulse response function of the nominal 
effective exchange rate appeared to be consistent with the theoretical prediction that 
an increase in the interest rate leads to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, 
but is statistically insignificant.   
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Figure 5.1 Impulse Responses in the Recursive VAR (INTm) 
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This study also examined the impacts of the shocks of monetary aggregate on the 
other variables. A rise in a one-unit monetary aggregate resulted in a 1% decline in 
the GDP, reaching a trough in the second quarter and reverting to 0.5% at the peak of 
the third quarter. An increase in monetary aggregate led to a decline in real GDP 
within two quarters and then promoted economic growth with four to six quarters‟ lag. 
There is an insignificant impact on both the CPI and NEER. However, the impact on 
the short-term interest rate is significant at the 10% level after one quarter (see Figure 
5.1).  
 
The forecast error decomposition is the percentage of the variance of the error made 
in forecasting a variable due to a specific shock at a given horizon (Stock and Watson, 
2001).  The relative importance of monetary policy fluctuations in the other variables 
can be measured through the variance decomposition. Table 5.2 reports the variance 
decomposition of the five VAR variables covering 1 to 12 quarters. The second 
column in each sub-table shows the forecast errors of the variable for each forecast 
horizon. The remaining columns present the percentage of the variance due to the 
shock of the variable appearing as heading, with each row adding up to 100. The 
results show that innovations in INTm account for about 0.34% of the forecast error 
variance in the output and about 9% in the price level in a year.  Innovations in the 
monetary aggregate explain about 3.24% of the output forecast error, and only about 
0.1% in the price level.  The innovations of money supply and interest explain each 
other, at about 4.7% and 0.1% respectively. Our results confirm the insignificant 
influence of changes in the short-run interbank bank borrowing interest rate on GDP 
growth rate and the statistically significantly influence on the price level, but in the 
“wrong” direction.  Another interesting result is that shocks to the monetary aggregate 
significantly influence the INTm rather than the reverse.  
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Table 5.2: Variance Decomposition (INTm) 
 
       
        Variance Decomposition of ΔGDP: 
 Period S.E. ΔGDP ΔCPI ΔM2 ΔINTM ΔNEER 
       
       
 1  0.067191  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.077274  95.61735  0.747174  3.247708  0.337880  0.049888 
 8  0.077403  95.55325  0.755237  3.277852  0.359609  0.054049 
 12  0.077405  95.55067  0.755621  3.277949  0.361010  0.054747 
       
       
 Variance Decomposition of ΔCPI: 
 Period S.E. ΔGDP ΔCPI ΔM2 ΔINTM ΔNEER 
       
       
 1  0.008903  1.015293  98.98471  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.009952  1.899751  81.56250  0.100684  8.907859  7.529210 
 8  0.010235  1.914807  78.09226  0.128086  10.33863  9.526215 
 12  0.010288  1.917015  77.46623  0.130873  10.55684  9.929040 
       
       
 Variance Decomposition of ΔM2: 
 Period S.E. ΔGDP ΔCPI ΔM2 ΔINTM ΔNEER 
       
       
 1  0.009551  0.308828  1.161612  98.52956  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.009617  0.678184  1.982264  97.19940  0.107697  0.032459 
 8  0.009620  0.685572  1.988073  97.15250  0.133768  0.040086 
 12  0.009620  0.685725  1.988910  97.14739  0.136041  0.041934 
       
       
 Variance Decomposition of ΔINTM: 
 Period S.E. ΔGDP ΔCPI ΔM2 ΔINTM ΔNEER 
       
       
 1  0.389118  0.700276  0.140861  0.108984  99.04988  0.000000 
 4  0.505393  3.529952  3.985635  4.734654  87.66348  0.086276 
 8  0.512978  3.528730  4.259895  4.819651  87.29407  0.097652 
 12  0.513331  3.529012  4.276629  4.819884  87.26525  0.109224 
       
       
 Variance Decomposition of ΔNEER: 
 Period S.E. ΔGDP ΔCPI ΔM2 ΔINTM ΔNEER 
       
       
 1  0.004518  0.283709  5.497382  0.090923  1.655793  92.47219 
 4  0.007174  0.545544  10.47459  0.265867  5.794468  82.91954 
 8  0.007993  0.731029  11.54858  0.218461  8.591484  78.91045 
 12  0.008165  0.777887  11.77393  0.215670  9.328558  77.90395 
       
        
Figure 5.2 displays the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks defined as 
temporary, unexpected and exogenous rises in the Repo with the variance 
decomposition of the forecast errors shown in Table 5.3. The results are similar to 
those derived from Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2. For a one-unit rise in the Repo, the GDP 
rose by about 0.4% at the peak of the second quarter and decreased to 0.08% in the 
fourth quarter; the CPI rose to a peak by 0.2% in the second quarter. The directions of 
the changes were similar to those in the benchmark VAR.  Within one year, the 
innovations in the Repo explained about 0.35% of the GDP forecast error and about 
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7.7 %for the price level forecast error. However, the impact of the Repo and monetary 
aggregate on GDP is statistically insignificant  
 
Table 5.3:  Variance Decomposition of VAR (Repo) 
 
 
      
      
 Variance Decomposition of ΔGDP: 
 Period S.E.  ΔGDP ΔCPI ΔM2 ΔINTR ΔNEER 
       
       
 1  0.071468  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.082012  94.62480  1.382626  3.424394  0.355899  0.212286 
 8  0.082096  94.59207  1.390798  3.435846  0.359099  0.222188 
 12  0.082097  94.58933  1.391206  3.435795  0.359456  0.224209 
       
       
 Variance Decomposition of ΔCPI: 
 Period S.E.  ΔGDP ΔCPI ΔM2 ΔINTR ΔNEER 
       
       
 1  0.009595  1.302966  98.69703  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.010676  1.775495  81.55952  1.970865  7.730516  6.963607 
 8  0.010884  1.730996  79.14847  1.915285  8.505136  8.700115 
 12  0.010921  1.723015  78.72026  1.905542  8.610425  9.040754 
       
       
 Variance Decomposition of ΔM2: 
 Period S.E.  ΔGDP ΔCPI ΔM2 ΔINTR ΔNEER 
       
       
 1  0.008841  0.701716  0.345849  98.95243  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.008876  0.762420  0.413269  98.41496  0.037637  0.371711 
 8  0.008882  0.762074  0.425920  98.30062  0.048837  0.462552 
 12  0.008883  0.761997  0.429913  98.27425  0.054278  0.479562 
       
       
 Variance Decomposition of ΔINTR: 
 Period S.E.  ΔGDP ΔCPI ΔM2 ΔINTR ΔNEER 
       
       
 1  0.352308  0.308717  0.466141  1.921718  97.30342  0.000000 
 4  0.413797  2.023479  5.832656  1.886932  89.95875  0.298180 
 8  0.415126  2.024507  5.909361  1.876778  89.88886  0.300489 
 12  0.415136  2.024533  5.909992  1.876696  89.88830  0.300480 
       
       
 Variance Decomposition of ΔNEER: 
 Period S.E.  ΔGDP ΔCPI ΔM2 ΔINTR ΔNEER 
       
       
 1  0.004997  0.453490  6.613098  0.393814  17.40211  75.13749 
 4  0.007863  0.405743  11.70457  0.392003  17.68611  69.81157 
 8  0.008662  0.421778  12.40114  0.407970  18.38188  68.38723 
 12  0.008814  0.425498  12.52219  0.410484  18.52898  68.11285 
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Figure 5.2 Impulse Responses in the Recursive VAR (Repo) 
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5.3  Empirical Testing for the Bank Lending Channel in China  
 
We first discuss the model we used to identify the bank-lending channel in the 
monetary transmission mechanism and then report the empirical testing results. We 
consider a simple aggregate model of loan supply ( sL ) and demand ( DL ). In light of 
economic theory, the loan supply depends on a required reserve ratio ( RR ), bank 
lending rate (RC) and inflation rate ( ), which affects the real rate of return on bank 
credits. Loan demand depends on the macroeconomic conditions, a proxy for 
economic activity (GDP), and the general price level (CPI) and the bank lending rate, 
which affects the bank credit profits. The data on bank loan aggregate from the PBC 
quarterly statistics were used as the data on bank loan demand and on bank loan 
supply simultaneously. This simple model allows the identification of the loan supply 
and demand thus avoiding the identification problem (see Section 2.3.4) that arises in 
the estimation of reduced-form credit supply equations. The model can be written as: 
 
0 1 2 3 2
DL GDP RC CPI                                (5.1) 
0 1 2 3 1
sL RR RC CPI                   (5.2) 
 
If the presence of two cointegration relationships cannot be rejected, the identification 
of the supply and demand functions depends on the estimated sign of the lending rate, 
which is negative in the demand and supply equations. This is inconsistent with 
classical economic theory. In the classical economic theory, the bank lending rate is 
regarded as the bank loan return rate and is positively correlated with loan supply. 
However, during 1994-2006, Ginger (2008) found that China‟s domestic credits 
increased with the declining official one-year lending interest rate. In addition, 
identification depends on testing for two exclusion restrictions: the required reserve 
ratio should not enter the demand function (while negatively correlated to loan supply) 
and GDP should not enter the loan supply function (while positively correlated to loan 
demand).  
 
The test for cointegrating relationships in a VAR system is sensitive to the lag length 
of the variables in the system. In choosing the lag length, one must weigh two 
opposing considerations: the curse of dimensionality and the correct specification of 
the model (Canova, 1995). The optimal lag length in this study is based on Schwarz 
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(SC) and Akaike (AIC) criteria, together with misspecification tests for the error 
terms. The results of the lag length criteria from Eviews 6 are reported in Table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.4 VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Lag Logl LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 44.959 NA 2.22e-07 -1.134 -0.323 -0.833 
1 314.2 428.42* 3.34e-12* -12.238* -10.414* -11.56* 
2 318.40 30.170 3.48e-12 -12.251 -9.998 -11.42 
3 346.12 34.81 3.49e-12 -12.377 -9.101 -11.16 
4 374.15 28.67 3.97e-12 -12.518 -8.218 -10.93 
5 416.56 33.53 2.92e-12 -13.328 -8.004 -11.36 
* indicates the identified lag number by different criteria  
 
Both the SC and AIC criteria suggest the inclusion of one lag. Applying the no-
residual-correlation criterion, we found that the VAR also supported the choice of one 
lag (LM-statistic = 19.48, and P-value = 0.77).  
 
Table 5.5 reports the results of the Johansen cointegration tests (with no trend 
included in the cointegration equation and VAR). The trace test suggests two 
cointegration relationships. In addition, all characteristic roots lie inside the unit circle 
and, as a result, the system is stable and converges to its long-run equilibrium.   
 
Table 5.5 Results of Johansen Cointegration Tests 
0H  Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 5% p value  
0r   0.666 94.553 69.818 0.002** 
1r   0.428 52.196 47.856 0.018** 
2r   0.344 26.466 29.797 0.115 
** indicates significant at 5% level.  Mackinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
The estimated unrestricted cointegrating vectors are reported in the top panel of Table 
5.6. Based on the signs of the relevant parameters, the vectors 1  and 2  could be 
interpreted as demand and supply relationships, respectively. The bottom panel of the 
Table 5.6 reports the hypothesis tests conditional on the selected rank. The long run 
exclusion tests suggested that none of the variables included in the VECM can be 
omitted from the long-run relationships at the 5% level of significance. The 
hypothesis of weak exogeneity cannot be rejected for the required reserve ratio.  
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Table 5.6 Unrestricted Cointegration Vectors and Restriction Tests 
 
 Loan  GDP RR RC CPI 
 Unrestricted Vector 
1  16.449 -17.636 -0.285 1.365 46.181 
2  -3.865 -8.154 -0.838 -0.374 106.97 
  Hypothesis Tests
(1) 
Long run exclusion 
17.702 
[0.000] 
17.928 
[0.000] 
4.481 
[0.006] 
10.115 
[0.006] 
8.950 
[0.011] 
Weak exogeneity 
5.937 
[0.051] 
5.890 
[0.052] 
0.743 
[0.689] 
8.304 
[0.015] 
5.627 
[0.059] 
(1). The test statistic are distributed as 2 with 2 degree of freedom ( valuep   are reported in brackets) 
 
 
To identify the supply and demand equations, the following joint exclusion and 
exogeneity restrictions are imposed on the cointegration parameters.  
 
02121  RRRRGDPRR   
 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the loan demand is unaffected by the required 
reserve ratios, the loan supply is unaffected by GDP and the required reserve ratios 
are weakly exogenous. The null hypothesis could not be rejected at the 5% level of 
significance based on the LR test (
2(2) 743  , -value=0.689p ). As a result, the 
parameters in the loan demand ( DL ) and supply ( SL ) equations normalized in bank 
loan (L) are given as follow (the absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses):  
 
0.811 0.085 0.359  
          (10.79)        (-7.08)       (-0.61)  
DL GDP RC CPI  
   (5.3) 
0.0471 0.098 7.059
          (-2.88)          (-3.629)        (9.617)
SL RR RC CPI   
                                (5.4) 
 
The estimated parameters show that GDP is a strong determinant of the demand for 
bank loans. However, the estimated value of the income elasticity of bank loan 
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demand for China is relatively low compared with other studies, such as Mello and 
Pisu (2009) for Brazil, Calza et al. (2006) for the Euro area and Kakes (2000) for the 
Netherlands. Moreover, the demand for loans appears to be negatively related to the 
lending rate and the coefficient is statistically significant.  
 
There are negative relations between bank loans and required reserve ratios as well as 
the bank lending rate in the loan supply in equation (5.4). The estimated RR and RC 
coefficients are statistically significant. This finding points to the existence of a bank 
lending channel in China, since monetary policy movement affects the supply of loans. 
In addition, the inflation rate is positively related to loan supply and statistically 
significant. The negative relationship between the loan supply and lending interest 
rate implies that China‟s economy is neither completely market-based nor entirely 
planned. A market-based indirect monetary policy approach (mainly through open-
market operations) has been adopted, together with quantity-based monetary measures, 
to achieve the monetary policy targets in China. Under such a situation, if the PBC 
increases interest rate to fight inflation and uses quantity-based instruments 
simultaneously to supply a given amount of money without considering prices, the 
higher interest rate on the given amount of funds would lead to overall higher interest 
rate. This leads to a negative relationship between the loan supply and lending interest 
rate (Ginger 2006). The positive inflation rate is similar to Mello and Pisu‟s (2009) 
findings.   
 
We tested the short-term dynamic adjustment process to confirm these relationships. 
The short term dynamic loan supply and demand can be assessed using the loading 
matrix (  ) in conjunction with the normalized restricted cointegrating vectors 
reported in equation (5.3) and (5.4). According to Juselius (2006), if ija  and ij  have 
the same signs, the  variable adjusts towards the equilibrium defined by the 
cointegrating relationship. If they have opposite signs, the i th variable does not 
converge to the equilibrium; in this case, convergence is achieved through the other 
variables included in the VECM (Mello and Pisu, 2009).  
 
Based on the loading matrix presented in Table 5.7, the demand in equation (5.1) is 
equilibrium-correcting with regard to the loan volume, but this is not true for the 
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supply equation ( 2l  is not statistically significant). As a result, all other things being 
equal, short-term disequilibria in the demand for loans are self-correcting. Although 
GDP and RC are statistically significant, the 1GDP and 1RC  signs are opposite to the 
1GDP and 1RC  signs in the long-run demand equation in (5.3), so convergence is not 
achieved through their movements. On the other hand, the short-run disequilibria in 
the long-run supply equation in (5.4) are corrected through changes only in the 
lending rate. The inflation rate ( 2 ) is statistically significant but has an opposite 
sign to the 2 . In summary, monetary policy plays an important role in restoring 
equilibrium in the credit market where excess supply of loans affect the commercial 
banks‟ lending rates regulated by China‟s central bank.  
 
Table 5.7 Loading Matrix 
 
 Demand 
1( )  
Supply 
2( )  
L  -0.129 
(2.186) 
0.053 
(1.403) 
GDP  -0.630 
(2.560) 
0.247 
(1.563) 
RR  0.000 
(-) 
0.000 
(-) 
RC  5.253 
(4.694) 
-2.807 
(3.909) 
  0.041 
(1.863) 
-0.061 
(4.357) 
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
5.4  Simulation Results and Historical Analysis of McCallum Rule   in China  
 
This section documents the results of counterfactual simulation using the McCallum 
Rule in an estimated simple macroeconomic model. Before conducting the simulation, 
we first estimate equations (4.27) and (4.29). The estimated result of equation (4.27) 
is:  
1 2 1 3ˆ0.0474 0.552 0.226 0.431t t t t tX X X B               (5.5) 
   valt   )506.2(    )234.4(        )717.1(        )186.1(  
     251.02 R   091.0

 )539.0,(737.0 test)Godfrey(BGBreusch valueP  
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where t3   is the residual, i.e. the estimated disturbance for period t. The simulated 
values for tB  and tX  were calculated for 60 periods using equations (2.1) and (5.5), 
with the initial conditions equal to the 1994:Q2 values and with t3  values fed in as 
the shock estimates for each period. Table 5.8 lists the results of this simulation 
exercise with different   values. The study used RMSE to choose the   value to 
verify if McCallum Rule can be a guideline for Chinese monetary policy.  
 
Table 5.8 Simulation Results (using Equation (5.5)) 
Policy )( * XXRMSE   
Actual Historical 0.1016 
Rule (1) 
0  
0.02102 
1.0  
0.02104 
2.0  
0.02114 
3.0  
0.0213 
5.0  
0.0219 
7.0  
0.0229 
1  
0.0256 
Rule (2)     0.02100  0.02107 0.0212  0.0217  0.0225 0.0242 
Rule (1) refers to the rule using the lag-one nominal GDP value in the final term. 
Rule (2) uses the average nominal GDP growth rate over the past four quarters.  
 
 
Since a smaller RMSE means a better performance, the RMSE values in Table 5.8 
suggest that adopting the McCallum Rule (1) or rule (2) would have dramatically 
improved the macroeconomic performance compared with the actual performance 
when not following a rule. Furthermore, using the nominal GDP growth rate of the 
most recent quarter in the rule‟s final term, )(
* XXRMSE   increases when   
increases. We obtained similar results when the average nominal GDP growth rate 
over the past four quarters is in place of that of the most recent quarter in the rule‟s 
final term. Rule (2) is slightly superior to Rule (1).  
 
Next, we checked the performance of the McCallum Rule under the macroeconomic 
condition specified in equation (5.6) - the regression result of equation (4.29), so that 
we can robustly identify which rule is better and what value to assign to . 
 
1 2 1 1 4
ˆ0.0470 0.5689 0.2635 0.4863 0.345t t t t t tX X X B S                (5.6) 
t -value (2.509） (-4.388)           (-1.987)           (1.302)          (0.701) 
               27.02 R         091.0

    )529.0,(401.0BG test valueP  
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The simulated values for tB  and tX  were calculated using equations (2.1) and (5.6) 
for 60 periods, with the actual 1994:Q2 values as the initial conditions and with the 
4t  values fed in as the shock estimates for each period.  Table 5.9 presents the 
simulation results.  
 
Table 5.9 Simulation Results (using Equation (5.6)) 
Policy )( * XXRMSE   
Actual Historical 0.1016 
Rule (1) 
0  
0.0225 
2.0  
0.0228 
5.0  
0.0240 
7.0  
0.0255 
1  
0.0301 
Rule (2)       0.0228    0.0238    0.0250   0.0272 
     Rule (1) refers to the rule using the lag-one nominal GDP value in the final term. 
     Rule (2) uses the average nominal GDP growth rate over the past four quarters.  
 
Comparing the )(
* XXRMSE  value in Table 5.9, we found that the 
macroeconomic performance improved greatly by adopting a policy rule. In addition, 
the value for )(
* XXRMSE   ascends when   increases, regardless of Rule (1) or 
Rule (2) being adopted; and Rule (2) is slightly superior to Rule (1) when   is bigger 
than 0.2. 
 
The simulated results in Table 5.8 and 5.9 clearly show that adopting the McCallum 
Rule could significantly improve Chinese monetary policy performance. To identify 
the stability property of the rule with different values for , we depicted the target 
GDP growth rate together with simulated GDP growth rates in Figures 5.3 to 5.6
9
.  
Explosive oscillation does not appear, but the band of oscillation gets wider with an 
increase in the value of   as shown in the four figures. The improved base rule is 
slightly better than the original base rule as a monetary policy guideline. Thus, for the 
stability of nominal economic growth, we selected Rule (2) as China‟s monetary 
policy guideline with   = 0.2, which is similar to McCallum results based on US data 
(1987, 1988, and 1993). When 2.0 , the original and improved rules produce equal 
)( * XXRMSE   under the macroeconomic condition specified by equation (5.5), 
                                                 
9  The GDP growth rate is expressed in term of percentage, the difference between the value of simulated GDP 
growth rate and target GDP growth rate are in percentage. The difference between the simulated values shows 
directly the merits of McCallum rule when different coefficient values are assigned to the McCallum rule. 
Therefore, we follow McCallum method to compare the simulated values with target GDP value, not their ratios.  
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and produce approximately equal )(
* XXRMSE   under the macroeconomic 
condition specified by equation (5.6).  
Figure 5.3 Simulation results with  set at alternative values in a model 
consisting of Rule (1) and equation (5.5) 
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Figure 5.4 Simulation results with  set at alternative values in a model 
consisting of Rule (2) and equation (5.5) 
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Figure 5.5 Simulation results with  set at alternative values in a model 
consisting of Rule (1) and equation (5.6) 
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Figure 5.6 Simulation results with  set at alternative values in a model 
consisting of Rule (1) and equation (5.6) 
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This study has demonstrated how the McCallum Rule could describe China‟s 
monetary policy using a counterfactual simulation method. Next, we followed Stuart 
(1996) and Taylor‟s (1999B) historical analysis method to further assess whether the 
McCallum Rule would have provided useful information about the policy stance in 
specific economic situations. We tested whether past policy errors can be identified 
by observing the divergence of actual policy from the paths implied by the rule based 
on historical data (rather than simulation). This method looks at the trend in actual 
policy rather than comparing point estimates. Figure 5.7 shows the path for actual 
historical monetary base quarterly growth rate and the path for the rule-specified 
(Rule (2) where 2.0 ) is the monetary base quarterly growth rate between 1994:Q2 
and 2009:Q1. 
 
Figure 5.7 McCallum Rule for Monetary Base 
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The actual monetary base growth rate showed an upward trend between 1995:Q1 and 
1996:Q4, but the rule-specified base growth rate displayed a downward trend (see 
Figure 5.7). During this period, China experienced high annual inflation rates, 16.9 
and 8.3% in 1995 and 1996, respectively. Between 1997:Q1 and 2001:Q4, the actual 
base growth rate in most cases is below the rule generated base growth rate and, on 
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many occasions, the actual momentary base growth rate is negative. During this 
period, China experienced deflation with annual inflation rates of -0.8, -1.4, 0.3, and 
0.5% in the four years. During 2003 to 2008, the actual base growth rate is above the 
rule-specified base growth rate in most cases. The inflation rate climbed to 5.9% in 
2008. The actual monetary base growth rate oscillated around the rule-specified 
growth rate during the study period. Using the McCallum Rule as a benchmark, when 
China‟s monetary policy is too restrictive, the Chinese economy experienced deflation; 
when the actual policy is too expansionary, the Chinese economy ran into an inflation 
cycle.  
 
The peaks and troughs of the actual monetary base growth rates shown in Figure 5.7 
result from the policy adjustment shocks. The Chinese government implemented a 
tight monetary policy to reduce high inflation from the second half of 1993. 
Following successful control of price levels and the local government investment 
impulse in the first half of 1996, a relatively expansionary policy was adopted by 
lowering the benchmark interest rate in May 1996. The first peak appeared in 
1996:Q3, which is regarded as the rebound of the money supply. The second peak in 
1998:Q1 is the result of a series of policy actions to stimulate the economy, such as 
removal of the imposition on credit rationing in state-owned commercial banks, and 
undertaking more open market operations to increase the money supply.   
 
The transitory effect followed by a trough in 1998:Q2 results from a dramatic 
decrease in China‟s export demand and therefore the aggregate demand. After four 
years of deflation, an increase in government investment in infrastructure and real 
estate as well as the increase in the official wages led to the third peak at the 
beginning of 2002. Another trough appears in 2002:Q2 because of the call-back 
adjustment and the rise in the interest rate on reserve requirement in June 2002. From 
then on, the Chinese economy recovered and started a gradual increase in price level.  
The big gap between the actual monetary base growth rate and the rule-generated 
monetary base growth rate during the 2006:Q2 – 2008:Q3 is the result of 
expansionary monetary policy (the negative real deposit interest rates) and the 
increasing funds outstanding for foreign exchange. Chinese foreign exchange reserves 
increased from US$ 9,411.15 billion to US$ 19,055.85 billion during the 2006:Q2 to 
2008:Q3.  
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5.5  Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, we reported the empirical results of the three research objectives. 
Section 5.2 documented the impacts of changes in short-term interest rates on general 
price level, real GDP, exchange rate and monetary aggregate. The impulse response 
functions and variance decompositions have shown us that shocks of short-term 
interest rates on general price level and real GDP were not consistent with what 
should happen when an effective interest rate channel plays a role in monetary policy 
transmission. Furthermore, shocks to the monetary aggregate growth rate significantly 
influenced the short-term interest rates change but not vice versa. This is evidence that 
it is the monetary aggregate not the short-term interest rates that is more appropriate 
to serve as the policy variable. Therefore, we conclude that an effective interest rate 
channel has not come into existence over the study period.  
 
In Section 5.3, the empirical test results assure us of the existence of a bank lending 
channel in China. By imposing joint exclusion and exogeneity restrictions on the 
cointegration parameters in a VECM model, we found negative relationships between 
bank loans and required reserve ratios as well as the bank lending rate in the loan 
supply in equation (5.4). RR and RC affect the loan supply significantly. Further, we 
tested the short-term dynamic adjustment process to confirm these relationships. 
Based on the loading matrix presented in Table 5.7, the short-run disequilibria in the 
long-run supply equation in (5.4) are corrected only through changes in the lending 
rate. This means monetary policy plays an important role in restoring equilibrium in 
the credit market by changing the commercial banks‟ lending rates.  
 
In Section 5.4, our counterfactual simulation results of nominal GDP growth path 
showed that the McCallum Rule could have been a policy guideline for the PBC 
during the evaluated period. In the economic circumstance provided by equations (5.5) 
or (5.6), simulated nominal GDP growth rate produces )(
* XXRMSE   much less 
than that produced by actual nominal GDP growth rate. Historical analysis confirms 
our results based on simulation. When actual values of the monetary base growth 
significantly deviate from the McCallum Rule specified values, the economy ran into 
problem of inflation or deflation.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents a summary of the study, including the empirical results and new 
study issues that emerged as a result of the research. Section 6.2 summarizes the main 
empirical findings of the research. Section 6.3 discusses the policy implications of the 
research findings. Section 6.4 points out the limitations of the study and provides 
suggestions for future research.  
 
6.2 Summary and Main Empirical Findings  
 
China has seen great progress in its monetary policy framework reform in the past 
three decades, especially after the mid 1990s. First, the PBC was established and it 
began functioning as a central bank in 1984. Ten years later, the law for the People‟s 
Bank of China was promulgated in 1995. Secondly, monetary policy instruments have 
switched from direct credit quota control to a combination of indirect methods: 
reserve requirements, open market operations, central bank discount, and central bank 
lending and deposit interest rates. The monetary policy goals in China have been set 
essentially to keep the currency value stable and maintain low inflation, together with 
promoting economic growth and employment (Zhou, 2008). Therefore, the monetary 
transmission mechanism in China has also changed accordingly.  
 
Since 1994, a monetary policy framework with monetary aggregate and monetary 
base as intermediate target and monetary policy instrument separately has been in 
operation. However, the current adopted monetary targeting regime has recently been 
under question because some researcher have concluded that there is lack of stable 
relationships between monetary base and monetary aggregate (M1 and M2), and 
between the monetary aggregates and general price and real output. Therefore, some 
studies have been conducted to search for the actually existing policy transmission 
mechanisms in China, mostly focusing on the possibility of short-term as policy 
operating objective. However, some ambiguities reviewed in Chapter 2 remain to be 
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solved. This research focused on three aspects of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in China.  
 
The first was to identify the possibility of using short-run interest rate as a policy 
operating target for China. To do so, we tested the impact of changes in short-term 
interest rates on real GDP, general price level and exchange rate based on a standard 
VAR framework covering the period 1996:Q1 to 2008:Q1. We then identified 
whether an effective interest rate channel exists in China. If an effective interest rate 
exists, then it is possible for the PBC to switch from the monetary base to the short-
term interest rate as its policy operating objective.  
 
We examined the integration properties of data using ADF and DFGLS tests. Both 
tests showed that the time series are not stationary but the Johansen cointegration tests 
showed that cointegration relationships do not exist among short-term interest rates, 
real GDP, CPI, monetary aggregate (M2) and nominal effective exchange rate. 
Therefore, we constructed a VAR using the first difference of the data. The results of 
the Granger causality test showed INTm and NEER significantly predicted the CPI at 
10% and 1% separately, but do not Granger-cause GDP.  Monetary aggregate Granger 
caused INTm at the 10% significance level, but not vice versa. The impulse response 
function showed that, following an exogenous, unexpected and temporary rise in 
money market short-term interest rates, output increased by about 0.4%, peaking in 
the second quarter and vanishing completely at the seventh quarter; CPI increased by 
about 0.2%, peaking in the second quarter and decreasing to below 0.1% by the fifth 
quarter. The response of the monetary aggregate to the interest rate shock appears to 
be insignificant. These results show that the response functions of GDP and CPI are 
inconsistent with what we expected for the effects of a contraction in monetary policy. 
Only the impulse response function of the nominal effective exchange rate appeared 
to be consistent with the theoretical prediction that an increase in the interest rate 
leads to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, but it is statistically 
insignificant. For example, following a one-unit shock of monetary aggregate, GDP 
declines by 1% immediately, reaching the trough at the second quarter and reverting 
to 0.5% at the peak of the third quarter; CPI and NEER show insignificant reaction. 
However, the impact on the short-term interest rate is significant at the 10% level 
after one quarter. Therefore, the impulse response functions showed that short-term 
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money market interest rates moved along with money aggregate, not the reverse (see 
Figure 5.1).  
 
These findings show that under the current monetary aggregate targeting regime in 
China, a movement in the short-term money market interest rate did not reflect the 
changes in macro-economy variables.  In other words, the response of the assumed 
central bank‟s benchmark interest rate to macro-economy fluctuations fails to transfer 
effectively to the money market.  The weak link between the short-term interest rate 
and the macro-economy variable implies that China cannot use the short-term money 
market interest rate as its operating target. An institutional reason for this failure is the 
existence of two cut-off separate interest rate systems: the central bank interest rate 
system and the commercial bank loan and deposit interest rates system.   
 
Secondly, the research focused on whether PBC could effectively fulfill its policy 
goal via the control of credit/bank loans. We utilized the VECM approach to identify 
the existence of bank lending channel in China under monetary targeting and window 
guidance system. The difficult problem in testing for the existence of a bank lending 
channel for monetary transmission is disentangling the loan supply and demand 
effects of monetary-policy movement. Different identification strategies have been 
proposed, including using aggregate data (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992), 
disaggregated data on non-financial firms (Gertler & Gilchrist, 1994; Onliner & 
Rudebusch, 1995), and disaggregated data on banks (Kashyap & Stein, 1995, 2000). 
Since the reduced-form VAR method cannot clearly distinguish the bank lending 
channel from the conventional money channel and the unavailability of bank level 
data, this study tested the exclusion/homogeneity restrictions on multiple 
cointegration vectors using aggregate data for the period 1997:Q1 to 2008:Q4.  
 
The estimation of a VECM using China‟s quarterly aggregate data yielded two 
cointegration vectors.  Based on the signs of the relevant parameters, the vectors 1  
and 2  are interpreted as demand and supply relationships, respectively. The long run 
exclusion tests suggested that none of the variables included in the VECM can be 
omitted from the long-run relationships at 5% level of significance. The hypothesis of 
weak exogeneity cannot be rejected for the required reserve ratio (see Table 5.6). To 
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identify the supply and demand equations, we imposed joint exclusion and exogeneity 
restrictions on the cointegration parameters: the loan demand is unaffected by the 
required reserve ratios, the loan supply is unaffected by GDP and the required reserve 
ratios are weakly exogenous. The LR test results showed that the hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at the 5% confidence level. There are negative relations between bank loans 
and required reserve ratios as well as the bank lending rate on the loan supply side in 
equation (5.4). The estimated RR and RC coefficients are statistically significant. This 
finding documented the existence of a bank lending channel in China, since the PBC 
could affect the supply of loans through its policy changes. In this way, we clearly 
disentangled the forces of bank loan demand and bank loan supply that drove the 
changes in bank loans. In addition, the results showed that the inflation rate is 
positively related to loan supply and statistically significant. The negative relationship 
between the loan supply and lending interest rate implies that China‟s economy is not 
yet a mature market economy. Market-based indirect monetary policy approach 
(mainly through open-market operations) has been adopted, together with quantity-
based monetary measures (credit quota) to achieve the monetary policy targets in 
China. This result further verified our first result that an efficient interest rate channel 
did not exist in China.  
 
To confirm these relationships, we checked the short-run dynamics adjustment 
process. According to the loading matrix (see Table 5.7), the short-run disequilibria in 
loan supply are corrected only through changes in bank lending rate. The inflation rate 
in the loading matrix is statistically significant but has an opposite sign to its 
counterpart in the long-run equation. The disequilibria in loan demand in the short-run 
are self-correcting. Although GDP and RC are statistically significant, the signs of the 
parameters are opposite to their counterparts in the long-run equation.  Based on these 
empirical results, we concluded that monetary policy plays an important role in 
restoring equilibrium in the credit market where excess supply of loans responded to 
the commercial banks‟ lending rates regulated by China‟s central bank.  
 
 Thirdly, this study identifies a suitable monetary policy guideline for the PBC. The 
monetary base is still the PBC‟s policy operating objective and general price level and 
real output are the PBC‟s policy goals, so we focused on the McCallum Rule. The 
empirical results of the effect of changes in short-term interest rates on macro-
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variables and the result of bank-lending channel fundamentally supported this choice. 
In addition, we documented that Taylor‟s and McCallum‟s research supported the fact 
that in developing countries with monetary base as its policy operating objective, it is 
preferable to choose a monetary base instrument policy rule.  
 
We employed the counterfactual simulation method to evaluate whether the 
McCallum Rule could be used as a monetary policy guideline for China based on the 
data covering 1994:Q1 through 2009:Q1. To confirm the robustness of our empirical 
results, we employed two simple macroeconomic models to specify the 
macroeconomic conditions for the rule to operate. The first model followed the 
framework used in McCallum‟s research that specified the relationship between the 
nominal GDP growth and monetary base growth. The other one is a revised model 
that includes the exchange rate variable to take into consideration the influence of a 
managed floating exchange rate regime on monetary policy in China. We assigned 
different values to the monetary policy response factor when conducting the 
simulation process to identify an appropriate value for the monetary policy response 
factor of the rule for the PBC, considering the value of the response factor in the 
original McCallum Rule was derived based on U.S. data.  
 
The study reports on the simulated monetary base growth and the nominal GDP 
growth paths. The root–mean–squared-error was used to measure the deviations of the 
simulated and actual values of the nominal GDP from the targets. Using the 
simulation results, we showed that the )( * XXRMSE  between the target nominal 
GDP growth rate and the simulated nominal GDP growth rate was much smaller than 
that between the target nominal GDP growth rate and actual historical nominal GDP 
growth rate. The McCallum Rule that uses the average nominal GDP growth over the 
past four quarters for the final term is referred to as the improved (McCallum) rule in 
this study. With similar values for the monetary policy response factor, the 
performance of the improved rule is slightly better. We found that a smaller value for 
the monetary response factor in the McCallum Rule was more appropriate for China. 
The simulated nominal GDP growth rate is much closer to the target nominal GDP 
growth rate with a smaller monetary response factor than with a bigger monetary 
response factor. A bigger monetary response factor resulted in wider economic 
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growth oscillations. In addition, this study followed the Stuart (1996) method to check 
the validity of the McCallum Rule as a monetary policy guideline in China. The result 
showed the rule-specified path of monetary base growth rate could be a monetary 
policy guideline for China.  
 
6.3 Policy Implications 
 
The results of this research offer a few significant policy implications. Understanding 
these implications is important for the monetary policy-makers and policy-followers 
in China.  
 
First, the switch of monetary policy operating target from monetary base to short-term 
interest rate has been widely accepted by central banks in all developed economies, 
most emerging countries and many developing economies. However, this does not 
mean that the PBC currently could use the short-term interest rate as its operating 
target. The results of this research showed that changes in representative short-term 
interest rates do not have a significant effect on the general price level and real output. 
This means that after about 30 years‟ reform and advances in the financial system, the 
relationship among central bank policy interest rates, financial market rates and 
deposit and lending rates of commercial banks has not been harmonized and therefore 
the role of interest rates as monetary policy instrument is still limited.  
 
The PBC has been facing some difficulty in controlling monetary aggregate due to the 
speedy increase of foreign exchange reserves after 2003, because it has adopted a 
contractionary monetary policy (i.e., increasing the issuance of central bank bills to 
reduce the money supply), it could not effectively influence the money market short-
run interest rate.  In this situation, the interest rate on the central bank bills rather than 
the money market interest rate, acts as the central bank target interest rate (Wu, 
2008A).  To switch to an official interest rate as a policy instrument and to adopt a 
short-term money market rate as an operating target, China needs gradually to 
establish an effective interest rate transmission channel through which financial 
institutions price their loans with reference to market rates where the market rates 
move in response to central bank benchmark rate adjustments. This will allow the 
PBC effectively to influence the short-term money market rate through OMOs.  To 
114 
 
complete this process, the precondition is to liberalize interest rates that are still under 
the PBC control, improve financial institutions‟ liquidity management capability and 
their sensitivity to macro management measures by the central bank.   
 
The development of Shibor is an encouraging sign for interest rate liberalization. 
Before it can be used as a recognized benchmark interest rate, like the Libor (London 
interbank offered rate) or Tibor (Toyko interbank offered rate), to replace the rates for 
loans and deposits set by the central bank, some progress should be made. First, in 
terms of global experience, Shibor should be taken as a benchmark for financial 
product innovation. However, Shibor still has some defects and many innovative 
financial products are utilizing non-Shibor benchmarks, for instance the 7-day repo. 
Further, Shibor is not the benchmark for many other financial products. At present, 
many financial products are linked with certain interest rates set by the PBC. This 
requires the PBC, when adjusting interest rates, to take into consideration many 
factors and the balance of interest relations. However, to balance interests among 
different interest groups, the situation is increasingly complicated. As a result, we 
need an objective benchmark acceptable to all interest groups. In this rspect, Shibor 
has not been functioning as a benchmark as it should have.  
 
Thirdly, Shibor has not played its due role in internal transfer pricing. The 
significance of Shibor also lies in its link with the market and internal transfer pricing 
in commercial banks. Many Chinese commercial banks are big banks across the 
nation, and there are many internal transfer prices in terms of region, products, 
deposits and loans, and assets and liabilities. Branches that have more deposits than 
loans bring pressure on their headquarters for higher deposit rates. Branches with 
more loans ask for the opposite. The only reasonable and convincing way to strike a 
balance is to introduce Shibor into internal transfer pricing. Shibor is a market-based 
interest rate indicator, linking the internal with the external. However, in current 
Chinese commercial banks‟ internal transfer pricing, Shibor has not been widely 
adopted. The fundamental reason why Shibor has not been functioning as Libor and 
Tibor in other countries is due to problems in the authenticity and quality of Shibor. 
Currently, the spread between quoted and concluded interest rates is narrow for 
Shibor below 3 months, and the trading is active. However, the gap for medium- and 
long-term Shibor above 3 months is still wide. This means the correlation is not high 
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between Shibor quotations and the concluded price of interbank lending above 3 
months. The gap between the quoted and concluded prices, particularly for Shibor 
above 3 months, is still the key factor that undermines the quality, credibility and 
authority of Shibor quotations (Yi, 2008).  
 
Secondly, China‟s central bank started adopting a monetary targeting policy in 1994 
and abandoned direct credit control in 1998. However, the PBC still closely monitors 
and  influences bank loans with window guidance (moral suasion) because of the 
unstable short-run relationship between monetary aggregate nominal GDP that is 
attributed to financial deregulation and innovation, monetization process (Yi, 1991; 
Zhou, 2006), and the pegged foreign exchange rate regime (Goldstein & Lardy, 2008; 
Zhou, 2008). With regard to the relationship between monetary base and monetary 
aggregate (M1, M2), we consider the base multiplier approach that emphasizes the 
availability of reserve as a constraint on bank lending. In testing the role of bank 
lending channel in monetary policy transmission mechanism, we consider the 
availability of reserves that constrain the ability of a commercial bank to lend to the 
non-bank public. Therefore, when the relationship between the monetary aggregate 
and policy goal is unstable in China, identifying the existence of bank lending channel 
will assist the PBC in improving its policy effectiveness  
 
According to some researchers, the unstable relationship between monetary aggregate 
and nominal GDP does not imply that monetary targeting regime is completely 
ineffective. Zhou (2006) stated that when we study the relationship between monetary 
supply and output and general price level, we should take into consideration the 
monetization process that occurred in China. Monetization has accompanied 
economic reform and transition. Monetization, a process in which the market-based 
allocation of sources such as housing that were distributed in a way adopted by 
government during planned economy era, may require the prices of these sources to 
rise in tandem with the worker‟s income. As a result, unlike the basic parallel growth 
of money supply and nominal GDP in mature market economies, money supply for 
many years has grown slightly faster than nominal GDP in China. Under this 
condition, if the PBC is able to control the bank loan volume and further to influence 
the money supply process, the credit indicator will be a supplement of monetary 
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aggregate indicator. When the credit indicator operates in tandem with monetary 
aggregate indicator, the monetary targeting regime is still operational.   
 
Our research result showed that the PBC is able to influence bank loans through its 
constraint on bank reserves. Policy-makers of the PBC (Hu 2007, Wu 2008B) 
addressed their viewpoints on more than one occasion that also argued for this result. 
According to Wu (2008B), the growing trade surplus, under the pegged exchange rate 
regime, resulted in increased foreign exchange reserves for China. However, during 
1997-2007, using an open-market operation and an increase in the required reserve 
ratio, the PBC has successfully carried out the sterilization policy to control the 
growth of base money as well as the liquidity of the bank sector.  
 
According to the flow of funds approach to money supply determination, flows of 
bank lending to non-bank public affect the stock of monetary aggregate (Bain and 
Howells, 2009, p.49). Considering the role of the government in economic growth in 
China, the PBC should keep an eye on bank loans. Following 30 years of economic 
reform, the Chinese economy is still characteristic of a transition economy. The 
government still plays a significant role in resource allocation. Local governments 
compete for economic growth. When domestic consumption cannot drive economic 
growth, exporting is out of local government control and the only way to promote 
local economic growth is to increase investment. Currently, local governments have 
less authority to issue local government bonds freely, so most of the investment funds 
rely on bank loans. Due to the local government investment impulse, the PBC should 
pay more attention to the credit policy when it tries to constrain overheating 
investment. At the other extreme, when the economy is in recession, loosening the 
credit policy will be part of the expansionary monetary policy.  
 
Finally, we discussed the policy implications of evaluating the possibility of taking 
McCallum Rule as an appropriate monetary policy guideline for China. If an effective 
interest rate transmission channel does not exist, the short-term interest rate cannot be 
used as an operating objective and the only appropriate choice of policy operating 
objective for the PBC is the monetary base. Meanwhile, a pre-specified price level 
and real GDP growth rate are the ultimate policy goals for China. In this situation, the 
McCallum Rule provides an appropriate framework for the PBC. The simulation 
117 
 
results in this research showed that the rule-specified path of monetary base growth 
rate could be a monetary policy guideline for China. If the PBC had taken this rule as 
its policy benchmark, nominal GDP fluctuations would have been reduced 
significantly in China.  For this reason, we recommend the PCB to use the McCallum 
Rule as an illustrative benchmark instead of strictly following the simple McCallum 
Rule. Adoption of this rule implies that the PBC will accept the three ideas proposed 
by Mishkin (2007B): 1) expectations are critical to monetary policy outcomes; 2) 
monetary policy is subject to the time-inconsistency problem; and 3) a strong nominal 
anchor is the key to producing good monetary policy outcomes.  
 
One implication of rational expectations in a world of flexible wages and prices is the 
policy ineffectiveness proposition, which indicates that if monetary policy were 
anticipated, it would have no real effect on output; only unanticipated monetary 
policy could have a significant impact. Although the evidence for the policy 
ineffectiveness proposition turns out to be weak, the point of the rational expectation 
revolution has become widely accepted that monetary policy impact on the economy 
is substantially influenced by whether it is anticipated (Mishkin 2007A). Most 
macroeconomic models attribute the short-run real effects of monetary disturbance to 
the presence of nominal wage and/or price rigidities. These rigidities mean that 
nominal wages and prices fail to adjust immediately and completely to changes in the 
nominal quantity of money (Fisher, 1977; Taylor, 1979B, 1980; Calvo, 1983).  
 
The expectations of market agents regarding the rate of inflation depend on their view 
of the likely behaviour of the authorities, specifically the expected conduct of 
monetary policy. Following a monetary rule, the monetary authorities could assist 
market agents in their formating of monetary policy expectations. After 30 years of 
economic reform, market agents‟ expectations have significantly influenced the 
PBC‟s policy effects in nominal prices and wages. If the PBC adopted the McCallum 
Rule, it would lead market agents to make good judgments regarding the credibility of 
the policy announcement of the authorities. This will be helpful for the PBC in 
fulfilling its policy goals.  
 
In addition, adopting the McCallum Rule will provide the PBC with a reference 
nominal anchor: nominal GDP. Many economists (see Hess, Small & Brayton, 1993; 
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Feldstein & Stock, 1994; Hall & Mankiw, 1994) have discussed and supported 
nominal GDP as a nominal anchor. Recently, Bernanke et al. (1999), Bernanke and 
Woodford (2005),  Mishkin (2000,) and Jonas & Mishkin (2003) support inflation 
targeting as a nominal anchor and inflation targeting has been adopted as a nominal 
anchor in some countries, such as New Zealand and Canada. From the viewpoint of 
Zhou (2006), the PBC currently does not support the inflation targeting because, in a 
transition economy, if currency (Yuan) instability occurs, it is more likely due to the 
special traits of the economy, rather than the quantity or price of money. In addition, 
for a low-income developing country and an emerging market economy, economic 
growth and employment are important objectives of the country.  Therefore, nominal 
income as a nominal anchor is more suitable for China.  A stable nominal income 
growth indicator implies a stable price level and stable real output growth.  
 
When adopting a rule, according to Taylor (2000B，2010) and McCallum (2002B), 
central banks should not follow a policy rule in a “mechanical-looking” algebraic 
form. Instead, policy makers should use the rule as a policy guideline or benchmark in 
making policies. It focuses on whether there is a deviation from a policy rule. Large 
persistent deviations serve as measures of accountability for monetary policy makers. 
The policy recommendation is that the rule should be used as an aid in making 
decisions in a more predictable, rule-like, manner. Central bank staff would use the 
information from the paths described by a policy rule in making the decision about 
whether to change the policy operating target.  
 
The rationale for using deviations from policy rules as measures of accountability is 
based on historical and international experience over the past decades (Taylor, 2010). 
The simulation results in this research showed that there are big deviations from the 
policy rule and, at times, that performance is less than satisfactory. A question is 
whether, in future, the policy rule will be used more often as a measure of 
accountability rather than as simply a guide or aid for policy decision. If rules become 
more commonly used for accountability, then policy makers will have to explain the 
reasons for the deviations from the rules and be held accountable (Taylor, 2010).  
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6.4  Contributions of the Study 
 
Much research on China‟s monetary policy has been conducted before this study (see 
Chapter 2). However, as an emerging economy still under transition, China‟s 
monetary policy transmission keeps changing from policy instruments to policy goals. 
A good understanding of current monetary policy transmission enables the PBC to 
choose an appropriate policy instrument to fulfil its policy goals.  The PBC has been 
studying the experience of central banks of developed economies in conducting 
monetary policy and has been trying to set up an effective monetary transmission 
mechanism, from direct transmission mechanism to indirect transmission mechanism. 
This study contributes to three aspects of China‟s monetary policy development.  
 
First, much previous research denied the existence of an effective interest rate channel 
in China‟s monetary policy transmission (Xie, 2004; Ginger, 2006, 2008; Wu, 2008A). 
However, recently, the PBC has been trying to foster an effective yield curve so that 
an effective interest rate channel could be developed. The reforms and developments 
of the financial system and financial market in China convince us that a new study 
was necessary to identify more clearly the role of interest rate in monetary policy 
transmission in China. In this study, we used the VAR method, based on appropriately 
selected variables and data, to test the shock of short-term interest rates on real 
variables: output and price level. The results of the impulse response function and 
variance decomposition revealed that changes in the short-term interest rate do not 
have a significant impact on output and price level. Therefore, an effective interest 
rate channel has not been developed. Before the PBC could take advantage of interest 
rate channel to carry out its policy, the interest rate regime and bond market still need 
further reforms and advances until an effective yield curve comes into existence.  
 
Secondly, because, since mid 1980s, interest rates have been under the control of the 
PBC and bank credit has long played an important role in monetary policy 
transmission in China, a little research regarding the role of bank credit in China‟s 
monetary policy transmission has been conducted. However, in our opinion, the 
variables selected and the research methods used in previous studies (Jiang, Liu & 
Zhao, 2005; Sheng & Wu, 2008) could not provide robust results. Therefore, we use 
advanced econometric methods to identify the long-run and short-run structure in a 
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cointegrated VAR model and to disentangle the bank loan supply and bank loan 
demand forces.  The results of this study show that the PBC could effectively use a 
required reserve ratio to control the bank loan supply, but bank lending rate is 
negatively related to bank loan supply. This finding proves that the PBC currently still 
relies heavily on quantity and not price instrument and that it needs time before the 
PBC could effectively use the interest rate as its main policy instrument to fulfil its 
policy goals.  
 
Thirdly, to provide the PBC with a policy benchmark so that it could improve its 
policy performance, we evaluated the McCallum Rule when considering money 
supply as the PBC main policy operating target. In this study, we used the 
counterfactual simulation method and the identified variables to avoid the 
shortcomings in previous research. The simulation results in this study showed that 
following the McCallum Rule could significantly reduce the RMSE. This implies that 
following the McCallum Rule could improve the PBC policy performance.  
 
In summary, this study identifies: 1) that an effective interest rate channel does not 
currently exist in China, 2) that the quantity instrument now is still the main policy 
instrument for the PBC, and 3) that the McCallum Rule could be used as a policy 
benchmark for the PBC to improve its policy performance. These results could be 
used as references for the PBC in making and conducting its policies.  
 
6.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Some limitations remain in this research. We now discuss these limitations and point 
out the direction for future research.  
 
First, in examining the effectiveness of the interest rate channel, we adopted the 
standard VAR method. Although this method has the desirable property that all 
variables are treated symmetrically so that the econometrician does not rely on any 
“incredible identification restrictions”, it has been criticized as being devoid of any 
economic content. In identifying the underlying structural model from the reduced-
form VAR model, the innovations in Choleski decomposition do not have a direct 
economic interpretation. Innovation accounting does require an ordering of the 
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variables in the Choleski decompostition, but the selection of the ordering is generally 
ad hoc. If the correlation coefficients among residuals are low, the ordering is not 
likely to be important. However, in a VAR with several variables, it is improbable 
that all correlations will be small. In some instances, innovation accounting derived 
based on the Choleski decomposition is not a reasonable interpretation of the related 
economics relationships (Enders, 2010).  
 
Sims (1986) and Bernanke (1986) proposed an alternative to the Choleski 
decomposition. In their identification scheme, a priori information is used to impose a 
contemporaneous restriction on the elements of coefficient matrices of the structural 
model innovation vector and reduced form VAR residual vector, different from the 
Choleski ordering. The basic idea is to estimate the relationships among the structural 
shocks using an economic model. Blanchard and Quah (1989) proposed another 
alternative to Choleski decomposition. Long-run behaviour of shocks often provides 
restrictions acceptable within a wide range of theoretical models. A typical restriction 
compatible with virtually all macroeconomic models is that the long-run demand 
shocks have zero impact on output. Blanchard and Quah showed how these 
restrictions can be used to identify VARs. In future, these methods could be used to 
identify related VAR by giving more attention to the underlying macroeconomic 
theory in examining the interest rate channel in China.  
 
Another limitation in identifying the interest rate channel is concerned with the 
variable chosen. We chose the 7-day interbank interest rate and 7-day interbank repo 
rate as the assumed policy interest rates. In January 2007, SHIBOR started operation. 
Three years later, it should have, to some extent, the characteristics of the short-term 
interest rate used as operating target, like Libor and Tibor. Due to the short duration 
and monthly data unavailability, we could not examine the effects of the SHIBOR on 
policy goals in China, future research could attempt to solve this problem and test the 
term structure of interest rates by taking the SHIBOR overnight rate as the operating 
target rate.  
 
Secondly, in testing the bank lending channel, we used aggregate credit data of 
financial institutions to identify the bank lending channel. In this instance, we could 
test the changes in availability of loanable funds for commercial banks because of the 
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PBC‟s policy changes at the aggregate level. However, we cannot identify the 
sensitivity of bank lending to the PBC policy changes for different type of banks 
(small banks and big banks) using such a method. Currently, commercial banks in 
China could be classified into state-owned commercial banks, regional banks and 
local banks in light of the region where their branches are located.  The three types of 
banks have different sensitivity to the PBC policy signal in their bank loan practices, 
because of the difference in the availability of source of loan funds. The four big 
state-owned commercial banks can obtain  loanable funds relatively more easily under 
a tightening policy due to their large volume collateral assets relative to regional and 
local commercial banks. Future research could be conducted based on bank level data 
so that the results of the research could reflect the role of different type of banks in the 
monetary policy transmission through bank lending channel.  
 
In addition, we used the required reserve ratio and the official one-year commercial 
bank lending interest rate as the PBC‟s policy instrument variables to identity the 
bank lending channel in our research. These two variables are the PBC quantity and 
price instruments. However, we left out another important policy indicator regarding 
bank credit, “window guidance”,10 due to lack of relevant information. This indicator 
could be taken into consideration in future studies, so that the results will be more 
robust.  “Window guidance”, to some extent, stands for the administrative measures 
of the PBC that reflect the complex of the monetary policy in an immature market 
economy.  
 
The dates when the “window guidance” occurs could be viewed as the time when the 
PBC attempts to make a decision with reference to bank credit policy in the following 
period: easing or tightening. In this aspect, Romer and Romer (1989) have done a 
pioneering work in testing the bank lending channel in the U.S. by identifying dates 
that signal contractionary shifts in monetary policy, 
 
Thirdly, we used a backward-looking single equation model to specify the 
macroeconomic condition in evaluating the feasibility of the McCallum Rule as a 
                                                 
10 A major point of the concept is the temptation to influence the market participants through words rather than 
strict rules. Despite the phrase guidance, which implies a voluntarily aspect in the system, the PBC has a major 
influence on the lending decisions especially of the Big Four state-owned commercial banks (Ginger, 2006).  
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monetary policy guideline for China. Linde (2002) documented that a backward-
looking model exhibits significant parameter instability that is economically 
important, but that a standard econometric tests for detecting this instability fails to do 
so accurately in small samples. The author‟s finding suggests that the relative merit of 
alternative policy rules should be checked based on well-motivated theoretical 
foundations.  
 
Currently, the widely used models are dynamic, stochastic, and empirically estimated. 
More importantly, these empirical models incorporate both rational expectations and 
sticky prices, and they are sophisticated enough to be used to examine how policy 
rules would work in practice (Taylor, 2010). In the early 1970, Robert E. Lucas and 
Thomas J. Sargent, and their coauthors stressed the role of expectations as a crucial 
element in many structural relationships of macroeconomic models. The recognition, 
that economic behaviour is forward-looking in character and thus the effects of 
government policy upon expectations are critical to its overall effects, is fundamental 
to current ways of thinking about monetary and fiscal policy. It is now widely 
accepted by central banks that the way in which the public perceives monetary policy 
should be a critical concern of central bankers (Woodford, 1999).  
 
Since the 1980s, it has been common to model nominal rigidities by imposing the 
assumption that prices (wages) are fixed for multi-periods so that the impact of 
monetary disturbances on real output was persistent (Taylor, 1979, 1980; Calvo, 
1983).  Examples of empirical models with rational expectations and sticky price 
include the simple three equation econometric model of Taylor (1979), the multi-
equation international models in the comparative studies by Bryant, Hooper & Mann 
(1993), and the econometric models in robustness analysis of Levin, Wieland, and 
Williams (1999). In the face of uncertainty about the true structure of the economy, a 
robust rule should work well across a wide range of structural models. The 
performance of a rule can be measured by the policy objective function that is to 
minimize the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of the inflation rate and the 
output gap. Today, the standard approach in monetary policy analysis is to incorporate 
nominal wage or price rigidity into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
framework that is based on optimizing behaviour by the agents in the model. 
124 
 
Therefore, future research on China‟s monetary policy rule can use a range of 
different structural models.   
 
Finally, this research focused on only three closely related aspects of China‟s 
monetary policy transmission mechanism in current monetary policy framework. The 
impacts of monetary policy changes on assets prices, such as stock market and 
housing prices, and further on general price level and real output are still debatable. 
 
In developed countries, the impact of asset price bubbles on monetary policy has 
drawn considerable attention and debate,  namely, the proper role of asset prices in the 
determination of monetary policy (Kohn, 2006, 2009; Mishkin, 2001, 2008; Trichet, 
2005). In line with conventional strategy, a central bank focuses exclusively on the 
stability of prices and economy activity over the next several years. Under this policy, 
a central bank responds to stock prices, home values, and other asset prices only 
insofar as they have implication for future output and inflation over the medium term.  
The influence of monetary policy on asset prices is at the heart of the transmission of 
the policy decision to real activity and inflation (Kohn, 2006).  
 
According to the extra action strategy (Trichet, 2005), the central bank would adopt a 
somewhat tighter policy stance in the face of an inflation asset market than it would 
otherwise allow if confronted with a similar macroeconomic outlook under more 
normal market  condition.  Since the initial operation of China‟s stock market, it has 
experienced several marked fluctuations. Therefore, the role of the stock price 
variable in China‟s monetary policy transmission deserves close attention. In addition, 
since the 2000 housing policy reform, housing prices have been increasing, especially 
after 2004. Currently, whether severe housing market bubbles exist and how the 
central bank should respond to the current situation is still debatable. Future research 
should give more attention to the role of asset price in monetary policy transmission 
in China.  
 
The impact of the current manageable floating exchange rate regime on monetary 
policy in China has also drawn considerable attention of researchers interested in 
China‟s monetary policy. Previous research provided two oppositing answers. In the 
light of the “impossible triangle” (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998), a government can 
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select only two out of the following three goals: an independent monetary policy, a 
fixed exchange rate, and capital mobility. Nevertheless, neither theory can explain any 
other combination except for the extreme cases of these three elements, which can be 
applied to the current situation in China (Yi and Tang 2001).  
 
Anderson (2004) argued that China can run an independent monetary policy under 
any exchange rate regime. The author believes China‟s capital controls are relatively 
effective and that sterilization has been successful and can be maintained indefinitely. 
Green (2007a, 2007b) held a similar view that the PBC has little difficulty in retaining 
control of the growth of the domestic money supply using the sterilization operation. 
Jin (2008) and Wei (2008) argued the virtue of a flexible exchange rate regime in 
enhancing the effectiveness of China‟s macroeconomic policy may be overrated, 
because the effectiveness of a monetary policy is constrained by factors beyond the 
currency regime.  
 
In contrast, Greenwood (2008) argued that the PBC is capable of using sterilization to 
control the monetary aggregate growth in short-term but is not able to control it long 
term. Meanwhile, sterilization creates significant distortions in the financial sector, 
namely distorting interest rates and the asset portfolio of Chinese commercial banks. 
Prasad (2008) also argued that a flexible exchange rate is required to deliver an 
effective monetary policy and further capital account liberalization and, without such 
a monetary policy and capital account regime, it is much harder to achieve stable 
macroeconomic policies and an efficient and well functioning financial market.  
 
Due to these conflicting results, further research regarding the impact of the current 
exchange rate regime on the effectiveness of China‟s monetary policy is necessary. A 
large economy like China cannot give up the independence of monetary policy. 
Therefore, accurate assessment of the impact of the ongoing exchange rate regime on 
macroeconomic policy is a precondition for PBC to choose and conduct proper 
monetary policy.  
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